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vThis book studies the new types of political organizations that emerged 
in (western) Europe and the United States during the nineteenth century, 
from popular meetings to single-issue organizations and political parties. 
The development of these types has often been used to demonstrate a 
development toward democratic representation or political institutional-
ization. This book challenges the idea that the development of “democ-
racy” is a story of rise and progress. It is rather a story of continuous but 
never completely satisfying attempts of interpreting the rule of the peo-
ple. Taking the perspective of nineteenth-century organizers as its point 
of departure, this study shows that contemporaries hardly distinguished 
between petitioning, meeting and association. The attraction of organiz-
ing was that it promised representation, accountability and popular par-
ticipation. Only in the twentieth century, parties became reliable partners 
for the state in averting revolution, managing the unpredictable effects 
of universal suffrage and reforming society. This book analyzes them in 
their earliest stage as just one of the several types of civil society organi-
zations that did not differ that much from each other. The promise of 
organization, and the experiments that resulted from it, deeply impacted 
modern politics.
Maartje Janse and Henk te Velde (eds)
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Perspectives on Political 
Organizing
Maartje Janse and Henk te Velde
In the long century between the Revolutionary Era of the late eighteenth 
century and the extension of the franchise in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, new types of political organization emerged, from 
nationwide pressure groups, to the revolutionary clubs of 1848, and to 
political parties. In hindsight, it is tempting to present these new orga-
nizations as part of a linear process of democratization and progress. In 
the twentieth century, the dominant understanding of democratization 
focused on the extension of suffrage rights and the emergence of the 
political party as indications of democracy. From this finalist perspective, 
a history of nineteenth-century political organizing would culminate in 
the ‘invention’ of the all-important political party. As one historian put it: 
‘The history of political associations belongs to the history of the emer-
gence of parties as political agents’.1
This book instead takes the perspective of nineteenth-century con-
temporaries as its point of departure and unearths a far messier his-
tory: political organizations were established as part of a decades-long 
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 process of trial and error with new models of political expression. These 
experiments did not have a preconceived goal—and only a very limited 
number of them were primarily aimed at the extension of the fran-
chise. Their purpose was broader: to develop new modes (or reinvent 
older modes) of popular participation and deliberation and of express-
ing popular opinion in the press, by petitioning, public meetings or 
organizations.
Some of the most influential nineteenth-century experiments were 
those that increased the scale and scope of previously known forms of 
organization. Changes in government and infrastructure, among other 
things, created both the need and possibility for national organization, 
in addition to often already existing local and regional organizations. 
This resulted in organizations with far greater membership than had 
been possible before. The supra-local mass organization first originated 
in the religious sphere but was applied to political issues from the 1820s 
onwards.
By political organizations we mean voluntary associations mak-
ing claims that imply changing government policy and legislation, be it 
directly, through influencing parliament by means of petitioning; or indi-
rectly, through trying to change public opinion, and attempting to influ-
ence voter’s behaviour. These organizations eventually had a deep impact 
on political life at large. They stimulated citizens to redefine their relation 
to the state, forge new political identities and negotiate the boundaries of 
what was considered politics.
Seen from this perspective the history of democracy is not so much 
a history of ‘phases’ of democracy that occur one after the other, but 
rather a history of practices that were often used simultaneously in order 
to organize democracy. To better understand the phenomenon of political 
organization as it developed in relation to (representative) democracy, this 
book focuses on the nineteenth century, when political parties had not yet 
become the dominant mode of political organization. As a consequence, 
the case studies presented here are from Western Europe, mainly Britain, 
Ireland, Belgium, France, the German Länder and from the United States. 
The purpose of this book is, however, not to study these cases as such but 
to investigate the emergence of several types of organizations at a time 
when the difference between (ad hoc) meetings and (more permanent) 
associations still had to be defined.
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Features oF NiNeteeNth-CeNtury PolitiCal 
orgaNiziNg
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the countries that appear in 
this book had at least developed a representative system of sorts, which 
allowed for participation of social elites within constitutional boundar-
ies. This also implied a limited influence of a public opinion that was 
often narrowly defined as rational deliberation by financially independent, 
upper- and middle-class men—approximately the same group of citizens 
that was allowed to vote. During the French Revolution, the ideal of gen-
eral suffrage had not been realized because even revolutionaries feared 
the direct influence of ordinary people on the political process.2 Still, the 
limited post-revolutionary public opinion could put ‘pressure from with-
out’ on the parliamentary system. The freedom of public opinion showed 
the (potential) gap between public opinion and parliament, and gave rise 
to fundamental questions such as: Do our representatives truly represent 
the people? How can we make heard the voices of those officially excluded 
from politics, as well as the voice of the people in between elections?3
Besides the press, public meetings and petitions, political organizing 
acquired increasing importance as a way to express opinions of the people 
in a broad array of issues. The attraction of organizing was that it could 
implement ideals of representation, accountability and popular participa-
tion already at the heart of popular protests but that had been very hard 
to realize. No matter their objectives, through their organizational prac-
tices  alone, political associations challenged people’s understanding of 
politics and expanded the political domain.4
Even though some histories of the pressure group go back as early as 1720, 
it is generally accepted that ‘[m]odern extraparliamentary political organiza-
tion is a product of the late eighteenth century’, as Eugene Black writes in the 
conclusion of his study of early British reform organizations.5 Henry Jephson 
was, at the end of the nineteenth century, the first historian of public assem-
blies, and a strikingly perceptive scholar whose work remains worth reading. 
He too devotes an important part of his study to the rise of ‘the Platform’ 
in the eighteenth century.6 Around 1780, he sees an important innovation 
in British political life: political associations were established to supplement 
and strengthen popular assemblies for the first time, and supra-local political 
organization was used ‘as an instrument for giving cohesion and strength’ to 
movements that had hitherto been ad hoc and local in character.7
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Even in Britain, the legitimacy of a ‘powerful Association to back up 
Platform agitation’ was still broadly contested until the 1820s at least. The 
Platform agitation of public meetings itself was associated ‘with the violent 
harangues of Athenian demagogues and Roman tribunes’. Similarly, the 
connected practice of petitioning was often regarded with suspicion and 
distaste, ‘as tending dangerously towards government by the populace’.8 
Interestingly, and characteristic of the early nineteenth century, the critics 
hardly distinguished between meetings, petitioning and political organiza-
tions. All these things stirred up unrest and misled the innocent common 
people. In general, critics were annoyed that ‘those who were excluded 
from the political nation could express their grievances to parliament’. 
According to most, they did not represent a real, legitimate ‘interest’ or 
point of view.9 The political association both formulated public opinion 
and expressed it—it was ‘both leader and follower of the people’—and as 
such the political association was seen as an illegitimate competitor to par-
liament. For the social elite, it was acceptable to voice demands only if they 
were presented in the form of polite requests to the respectable audience 
of the House of Commons or other political authorities.10
Some British radicals challenged the legitimacy of parliament by claim-
ing that their organizations more faithfully represented the wishes of the 
people than did parliament and that they, in fact, were the true parliaments 
of the people. In a less radical manner, the right to petition was often 
invoked to legitimize political associations, as for instance in 1780: ‘That 
association is a measure of unquestionable legality appears from the spirit 
of our laws, from the express right to present Petitions to Parliament, 
which involves the right to join in any peaceful mode for the more effec-
tual support of those Petitions.’11 It indicates that, at first, the organizers 
themselves also hardly distinguished between petitioning, meeting and 
association. Meetings were like short-term associations, and associations 
consisted of a series of meetings, while petitions could be the product of 
both. Only gradually did these forms become more clearly separated.
The eighteenth-century British campaign against the slave trade com-
bined public assemblies, petitions and political organization in an inno-
vative mode of agitation. Organized antislavery activity on a nationwide 
scale began in 1787 with the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 
led by what was known as the London Committee. By employing trav-
elling agents such as Thomas Clarkson, a ‘new form of extraparliamen-
tary action’ and a ‘novel type of reform movement’ were conceived and 
developed. The London Committee ‘set the movement on its “modern” 
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course, evolving a structure and organisation which made it possible to 
mobilize thousands of Britons across the length and breadth of the coun-
try’.12 The antislavery movement deeply influenced subsequent single- 
issue movements, most notably the Anti-Corn Law League.13
The campaign against slave trade of the late eighteenth century intro-
duced several remarkable innovations, but the numerous popular assem-
blies in the Anglo-American world and the new organizations connected to 
them usually had a markedly local or regional character. Religious, benev-
olent and moral reform organizations were crucial in the development of 
new organizing practices of the nineteenth century. The Missionary and 
Bible Societies, in fact, offered a blueprint of the modern mass organiza-
tion, including most forms and activities that would become standardized 
later, such as local auxiliaries to national organizations.14
The proliferation of religious organizations explains why British, and 
to a lesser extent American, political organizations developed earlier and 
their organizational culture at large differed from that on the continent. 
The oppressive politics of some continental regimes also did much to dis-
suade their citizens from organizing in public. Here political associations 
often took the shape of networks of small-scale secret societies or crypto- 
political associations, rather than national mass organizations, and they 
were more likely to engage in either small societies or violent action than 
in mass petitioning.15 And even when around mid-century there was a will-
ingness to experiment with British-style antislavery organizations in coun-
tries such as France and the Netherlands, public meetings and agitation 
did not always prove to be the most obvious route to success. Differences 
in political culture, specifically a strong fear of mass organizations in the 
light of revolutionary experiences, prevented a ready transfer of ‘foreign’ 
organizational practices. However, after some adaptation to better fit the 
‘national character’ and national political culture, some foreign organi-
zational forms were adopted, albeit often without noisy mass meetings. 
Political organizing offered political outsiders the opportunity to experi-
ment with, and test the limits of, popular participation in politics.16
Even in the United States, the country that called itself ‘democratic’ 
when that word was in other countries still a term of abuse, it turned out 
that democracy was easier said than done.17 Here, fear of organizing was 
not related to a fear of democracy, as was the case in Europe. Still, orga-
nizing was far more contested than Tocqueville’s famous account of the 
central role of voluntary associations in American democracy has made it 
seem. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, much as in Europe, 
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voluntary associations with a political aim were often considered as uncon-
stitutional and dangerous moral crusades that endangered and destabi-
lized the political system.18 Specifically the fact that women and members 
of the free black community used the tool of organization to speak out 
in political matters as controversial as slavery was regarded as a threat to 
the political system.19 Only white men were allowed to vote and seen as 
legitimate political actors.
There was another reason why American observers—and European 
ones for that matter—regarded political organizations as dangerous. As 
Johann Neem among others has shown, the early nineteenth-century sus-
picion of political organizations was rooted in the notion that national 
unity was created through the Revolutionary past; to ‘organize’ only a 
part of the whole equalled breaking up the nation.20 This was partly an 
inheritance of the idea that ‘parties’ were not legitimate, as had been the 
common understanding of the phenomenon during most of the ancien 
régime.21 On the other hand, the American attitude towards organizing 
reminds us of the French rejection of organization. There the story of the 
revolutionary origins of the nation created an even stronger discourse of 
national unity. Because of the importance the Jacobin tradition attached 
to the ‘one and indivisible nation’, full freedom of association was not 
granted until 1901. This was partly because citizens should relate to 
the government without interference of intermediate bodies that would 
‘usurp’ power from the legitimate government.22
The ‘communications revolution’ that could be witnessed in the United 
States and Europe in the second quarter of the nineteenth century—pro-
duced by railways, postal systems, cheaper printing techniques—made 
organizing on a supra-local level easier, more common, and, in time, more 
accepted.23 However, even then opinions differed on the best type of 
political organization. During the 1820s and 1830s, American Democrats 
had started to realize that single-issue organizations and their impres-
sive moral crusades constituted a form of grass-roots politics that was 
hard to control. The modern Democratic Party was developed in these 
same decades, in part as an answer to the threat critical citizens posed 
through their organizations and protest. Organizing citizens as loyal par-
tisans seemed a benign solution to the danger of instability that came 
with  citizen protests, and one that allowed political leaders to retain con-
trol and stability.24 Organization thus not only was a tool in the hands 
of political outsiders but could also be used by political elites to retain 
control over democracy. For Britain, it has even been argued that national 
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 democracy- cum- organizations partly replaced older, more powerful forms 
of direct political participation by the local population.25 Organization was 
not a democratic panacea.
In Britain, as early as 1818, the importance of party organization was 
similarly recognized by Whigs when they expressed the hope that ‘The 
formation of a regular and respectable party to maintain the cause of 
the people, instead of blowing up the flame, and causing an explosion, 
is rather likely to moderate its violence, and give it a safe vent.’26 It is, 
however, not easy to determine what they meant when they were talking 
about a ‘party’. It is obvious that it was more than only the parliamentary 
party, but until the end of the nineteenth century no real national party 
organization existed, let alone determined political decisions inside parlia-
ment by organizing the voters. A party consisted of a cloud of associations, 
clubs and informal contacts, loosely held together by a common current 
of thought. When the Birmingham ‘Caucus’ in the 1870s first voiced its 
ambition to organize a national party, this caused quite a stir. Both defend-
ers and critics of the Caucus agreed that it should not become a party 
‘machine’ that manipulated the voters in order to gain electoral victory. 
Rather, its proponents argued, it should be an open forum that encour-
aged popular participation in politics. It turns out that the Caucus was, 
in practice, a rather rambling organization, which did not have nearly the 
demonic disciplining power its detractors accused it of having.27 This form 
of organization was much closer to the earlier single-issue organizations 
than the older historiography, starting with the famous analysis by Mosei 
Ostrogorski, would have us believe.28 In the same vein, American political 
organization, which had so many faces, was now mainly used to demon-
strate the dangers of ‘machine’ politics.
In the meantime, liberal and Protestant continental political organi-
zations were (rhetorically or literally) using the famous example of the 
British Anti-Corn Law League (1838–1846) to experiment with some-
thing that came close to a modern political party, as is demonstrated in 
this book by Andreas Biefang.29 However, from our point of view, the 
question is not when exactly ‘modern’ political parties started. Instead we 
believe that these early parties belonged to the same category of associa-
tions as the ones that they took as examples for their organizational model. 
This is not to deny that something changed at the end of the nineteenth 
century, but this book will look at this history from a different angle. We 
are not interested in the history and prehistory of the modern political 
party as such but in the multifaceted forms of political organization and 
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mobilization during the nineteenth century. Political parties were not the 
necessary outcome of this process, but one of the subcategories of the 
larger species of political organization.
Even when full-blown mass parties emerged in Europe at the very end 
of the nineteenth century—the German socialist party of the 1890s being 
the first example—they still contained many features of earlier forms of 
organization. And in countries such as France, party organizations never 
succeeded in truly dominating national politics, not even during the twen-
tieth century, as is shown in this book by Nicolas Roussellier. Still, the 
dominance of political parties grew, and they became the political organi-
zations par excellence during the twentieth century. They have dominated 
the picture so completely that the resulting form of democracy has been 
characterized as ‘party democracy’.30 This was probably not because of 
their capacities for perfect representation and organization of the peo-
ple as such but rather because they seemed to be able to bridge the gap 
between the political system and the electorate—a new concern in light 
of the extension of the franchise. Perhaps an even more important fac-
tor was that they proved to be reliable, dependable partners for the state 
who needed social partners for its endeavours to reform society and, later 
on, also build a welfare state. But this is a twentieth-century story. In the 
nineteenth century, political parties could already mobilize voters, but for 
this book their role as political organizations in civil society takes centre 
stage, and seen from this perspective, they do not differ that much from 
other organizations.
It is obvious that there are great differences between the countries 
discussed in the case studies of this book in terms of government, suf-
frage rights, public sphere, political culture and the pace of develop-
ments. However, this volume does not concentrate on these differences 
but analyses various forms of political organizing that emerged in the 
Western world in the nineteenth century. This book is not an attempt at 
a comparative history of political organizing, in the sense of juxtaposing 
individual national cases. Rather, we analyse the phenomenon of political 
organizing in the long nineteenth century through a series of case studies 
which all add to our understanding of the phenomenon. That the national 
contexts differ helps us to demonstrate how the phenomenon of political 
 organizing worked in remarkably similar ways across the modern world. In 
that sense, this volume follows the footsteps of Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, 
who in his book Civil Society convincingly points out the remarkable simi-
larities in associational life from Boston to St Petersburg. In a sense, our 
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volume supplements his book because Hoffmann excluded political orga-
nizations from his study.31 While it is important to acknowledge differ-
ences, in this book we aim at a transnational study focusing on similarities 
between political organizations and in associational life at large. This will 
help us understand how and why political organizing was important to 
contemporary actors as well as to the development of political life, and 
why, on the other hand, so many commentators feared it so much.
Moreover, the occurrence of so many similarities despite all the national 
differences is no coincidence. Political behaviour is learned behaviour, and 
modes of organization are often the result of the transfer of foreign exam-
ples. Those seeking to mobilize others were always on the lookout for the 
optimal mode of organization and were eager to learn the best practices of 
other, including foreign, organizations. It depended on the circumstances 
whether they acknowledged their examples as prestigious models or rather 
ignored them because they wanted to show the purely ‘national’ character 
of their organization. Triggered by the successes of past- and present-day 
organizations, both at home and abroad, either with political, religious or 
social aims, they experimented further to build the ideal organizational 
forms to become successful in their own struggle. As Maartje Janse’s essay 
on the way contemporaries thought and spoke of a new type of mass orga-
nizations suggests, from around 1830 organizing became ‘modular’, as 
historical sociologists term the adoption of organizational forms in new 
contexts.32 Several of the chapters in this book focus on national organi-
zations, especially since these were relatively new in the early nineteenth 
century: Andreas Biefang and Anne Heyer, for instance, discuss national 
political organizations in Germany, even before the country was fully uni-
fied. However, local organizations remained important throughout the 
century, as the contributions by Geerten Waling about Paris and Berlin in 
1848 and Robert Allen about New York in the 1880s indicate.
orgaNiziNg DemoCraCy
On an analytical level, this book shows the ways political organizations 
facilitated, organized and conceptualized democracy. Much has been writ-
ten about the relationship between civic engagement and democracy, as 
the idea that a strongly developed civil society nurtures and sustains a sta-
ble democracy has become a dominant notion in political science since the 
Second World War.33 Most important for historians perhaps was Jürgen 
Habermas’ assertion about the eighteenth and early nineteenth  centuries 
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that a flourishing public sphere depends on practices of sociability, which 
also links non-political activities to the realm of politics.34 His work has 
stimulated research that underlines the merits of non-political—that is, not 
explicitly political—organizations in civil society for democracy. Meanwhile 
the relationship between political organizations and democracy seemed 
self-evident and unproblematic. Political historians and political scientists 
often assumed that political parties were the ideal bridge between parlia-
ment and the people.35 On the other hand, social historians and historical 
sociologists wrote about social movements that furthered democracy by 
emancipating oppressed social groups, and historians of culture, gender 
and religion wrote about reform organizations such as antislavery that had 
important political aspects and implications. These debates were for a long 
time rarely informed by each other.
This book is the product of recent changes in the way we view politics 
at large and the way we understand democracy. The cultural turn in his-
tory has produced a rich historiography of ‘political cultures’ that takes 
contemporaries’ perspectives as their point of departure and often tries 
to integrate what has been separated in our tradition of overspecialized 
history. In recent years, the interpretation of the development of democ-
racy has changed. A couple of decades ago, scholars were first and fore-
most interested in ‘democratization’, understood as the spread, growth 
and reform of democracy. They did, of course, realize that democracy is 
a complicated concept, but were not primarily concerned with question-
ing the nature of democracy. No serious scholar would present a simple 
forward march of democracy, but many were interested in the connections 
between democracy and modernization, as, for instance, in interpretations 
about different waves of democratization, or, in the particular role of the 
state, as for instance in extending step by step citizen rights.
More recently, another perspective has been added, which addresses 
more directly the ambiguities and tensions inherent in the concept of 
democracy. Is it at all possible to have a ‘real’ democracy? Is not what we 
call democracy, in fact, a kind of representative aristocracy?36 What did 
contemporaries mean when they used the term?37 This new approach does 
not only exclude a simple linear development but also challenges the idea 
that the development of ‘democracy’ is a story of rise and progress at all. 
It is rather a story of continuous but never completely satisfying attempts 
of interpreting the rule of the people.38 In this volume, we take this new 
interpretation as our point of departure, but we investigate democratic 
practices rather than democratic theory, even though we acknowledge 
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that conceptions of politics and political practices develop in dynamic rela-
tion to each other.
The contributors to this book are not interested in the ‘phases’ of 
democracy but instead investigate the various democratic organizational 
practices that were used and discussed during the nineteenth century. This 
could take the shape of the efficient and even bureaucratic form of a mod-
ern political party but also more floating forms, such as ad hoc mass meet-
ings. The aim of this volume is not so much to challenge evolution per se 
but rather to uncover the implications, attractions and difficulties of the 
different modes of organizing democracy that coexisted at the time.
Robert Michels analysed the main example of the modern political party, 
the (German) Social Democratic Party, in his well-known Political Parties. 
A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy 
(1911). He argued that even in socialist parties, democracy ran the risk 
of turning into an oligarchy, at the expense of real popular participation. 
He set this tendency, partly implicitly, against a competing version of ‘real’ 
democracy which involved the direct participation of the members of the 
party, as opposed to merely formal representation. He did, of course, not 
invent this form of participatory democracy, whose ambitions and desires 
were certainly older than the parties themselves. The important thing is 
rather that these desires and this form of democracy did not disappear 
when the parties arrived.
Often the emergence of political parties has been interpreted as an indi-
cation of the modernization of politics.39 In the same vein, Charles Tilly 
uses a dichotomy between pre-modern and modern repertoires of col-
lective action to voice discontent and social and political protest. He also 
presents the rise of the social movement in the early nineteenth century 
as the transition from early modern to modern practices, and even seems 
to define the modern social movement as something that seems to be 
very close to the organization of a political party.40 However, the history 
of political organization is much more than a history of political mod-
ernization, and concentrating on a pre-modern/modern dichotomy has 
led scholars to neglect the coexistence of the different democratic prac-
tices that, taken together, reveal the many faces of democracy, and perhaps 
also its inherent tensions. These tensions should be understood as the key 
characteristics of democratic practices, and, looking at democratic prac-
tices more closely, it appears that most forms of democracy also contain 
a combination of elements related to what we from a later perspective 
would define as either direct or representative democracy. The student 
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of the nineteenth century could therefore also be misled by a dichotomy 
between representative and direct democracy. At the time, many elements 
of democracy were merged. However, on the basis of this volume, three 
main democratic organizational practices or ways in which democracy was 
organized can be identified:
 (1) Popular meetings: ad hoc mobilization and organization of the 
people as a manifestation of participatory democracy. These meet-
ings both channelled and produced political ideas, energies and 
agitation, and gave people a sense of real participation in politics. 
Popular meetings were aimed at debating and voting on resolu-
tions. These meetings were not ‘direct democracy’ in the classic 
sense of the word, the sense of plebiscites and referenda. However, 
as a democratic practice they produced a strong sense of direct 
involvement in politics, through voting and debating about the 
procedure, agenda, chairman and the order of the speakers. This 
was democracy on the spot, but its reach was limited and its effects 
often short lived. The contribution by Reeve Houston shows the 
importance of this side of democratic organizing in the United 
States, and Geerten Waling demonstrates that in the revolutionary 
situation of 1848, meetings were crucial, but that the difference 
between meeting and association was not obvious at all, particu-
larly in revolutionary Paris. Gita Deneckere argues that public 
meetings, petitions, mass demonstrations and political associations 
in Belgium in the 1830s and 1840s were all closely related expres-
sions of popular dissent, making use of the window of opportunity 
offered by the progressive constitution of the new kingdom, but 
with the intention to remain within the limits set by this new con-
stitution. The story of political organizing in the nineteenth cen-
tury is unthinkable without popular meetings. In fact, the two were 
closely related in most cases, and most of the contributions to this 
book contain references to these meetings, even if they are not the 
prime subject of the chapter.
 (2) Single-issue organizations: semi-permanent mobilization, agita-
tion and organization of people by means of meetings, petitioning 
and campaigns to right a social, moral or political wrong. More 
often than not, this included a substantial association that was, 
however, meant to be temporary, only for the duration of the cam-
paign, and did not aim at permanent representation in (national) 
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politics. The single-issue organizations fostered a sense of connec-
tion and solidarity with like-minded people across the country. In 
doing so, they empowered in particular those who were formally 
excluded from politics to speak out in political matters. Maartje 
Janse shows that around 1830, the scale of national reform organi-
zations, and the systematic nature of their campaigns, changed 
contemporaries’ conceptions of the power of organization. Even 
though such associations were highly contested throughout the 
Anglo-American world, organizing had now clearly become a very 
powerful tool, or ‘machine’ as it was often referred to. The attrac-
tion of organizing grew in the early nineteenth century, and Kevin 
Butterfield’s contribution addresses the remarkable fact that in the 
United States, membership was increasingly defined as the legal 
right of an individual citizen to join associations in civil society. 
This right was considered so important that the court could even 
overrule the decision of an association to expel a member. Henry 
Miller, in his contribution, does not concentrate on political orga-
nizations, but on petitioning as a form of political action. In doing 
so, he is able to show that for a long time, little distinction was 
made between single-issue organizations, on the one hand, and 
meetings and ad hoc protest forms, on the other.
 (3) Political parties: permanent mobilization and organization of 
people who share political views. This normally included putting 
up candidates for (national) elections, a permanent board, national 
representation of local auxiliaries and some sort of bureaucracy, 
which, in the long run, ensured success in the game of established 
politics. The newly organized parties gave their members the sense 
they belonged to a powerful political and moral community that 
would eventually determine national politics. Andreas Biefang 
shows that the German Nationalverein of the 1860s already had 
the appearance of a modern party, but it was in practice a pressure 
group directed at influencing government policy rather than a 
social movement aiming at mobilizing the people for a just cause. 
Its organizational model was the by-that-time-iconic Anti-Corn 
Law League. Robert Allen makes visible a cloud of floating and 
flexible organizations based on personal engagement by concen-
trating on just a short time frame in political New  York in the 
1880s, instead of a teleological story of the development of  political 
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organizing. What mattered was not the organization as such but 
what one wanted to achieve by it. Therefore, according to Anne 
Heyer, the early political parties that were often accused of manip-
ulating the masses honestly attempted not only to organize the 
people but also to give them a voice. They had to do this, simply 
because it was their raison d’être, and also the only way to convince 
their potential followers to join up. Underlining organization as 
almost the only defining feature of the new parties is, at least partly, 
the result of hindsight, as Henk te Velde argues in his contribution. 
At the time, at the end of the nineteenth century, parties were part 
of a broad process of democratization that showed that participa-
tion was at least as important as organization. There were other 
ways to mobilize the people than through political parties. Even 
though in Western Europe political parties came to dominate poli-
tics in the twentieth century, Nicolas Roussellier uses the French 
case to stress that this result was less obvious than has often been 
thought. And where parties were dominant, as in Britain, even the 
Labour Party, modern party par excellence, could not simply rely 
on its organization but was to a certain extent dependent on older 
traditions of elite networking, as Hanneke Hoekstra argues.
The three forms of meetings, single-issue movement and parties could 
have been presented as a sequence of increasing sophistication in political 
organizing and a development towards a more democratic form of repre-
sentation or towards political institutionalization. In this vein, the political 
party would appear as the democratic ‘outcome’ of the nineteenth cen-
tury. We argue, however, that the three organizational forms are part of 
the same desire or need to organize democracy, and that they have always 
complemented each other. The three categories even partly overlap. Both 
single-issue organizations and political parties used popular meetings to 
express their aims and further their goals, and popular assemblies needed 
at least a rudimentary form of organization involving a chair, which some-
times evolved into a more permanent structure. Instead of necessarily 
identifying popular assemblies with direct participation and political par-
ties with representation, this book contends that all three organizational 
forms contained at least some elements of both types of democracy. Reeve 
Huston’s Chap. 4 in this volume shows that popular meetings have traits 
of representative democracy as well as direct democracy, and Henry Miller 
shows that this is also true for single-issue campaigns.
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In the middle, or at the end of the nineteenth century—the moment 
differed according to the country—political organizations lost their rev-
olutionary connotations and were increasingly understood as efficient 
means for putting pressure on the political system, disciplining the people 
or simply representing them. Politicians and reformers alike appreciated 
the possibility organization offered for streamlining the political process 
while still making the voice of the people heard. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, it was by no means clear what direct role, if any, ‘the 
people’ should play in politics. How to transform ideas about political 
participation into participatory practices? This was one of the key ques-
tions that dominated political life from the Revolutionary Era of the late 
eighteenth century onwards. Political organizations offered an answer 
that, eventually, appealed to both political outsiders and members of the 
political establishment. Though the latter group was often critical and 
fearful of the power of organizations, they realized that this was a prefer-
able alternative to revolution. The political organization became a staple 
of modern politics, not in the least because it was a vehicle that seemed, 
on the one hand, to be able to avert revolution and, on the other, to man-
age the unpredictable effects of universal suffrage. The previous period of 
experimenting with new ways of mobilizing the people had demonstrated 
the power of organizing to all parties involved.
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CHAPTER 2
‘Association Is a Mighty Engine’ Mass 
Organization and the Machine Metaphor, 
1825–1840
Maartje Janse
In Britain and the United States, the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century saw the rise of a new generation of single-issue organizations. 
Antislavery societies, temperance societies, the Irish Catholic Association, 
and the Anti-Corn Law League, to name a few prominent examples, 
impressed contemporaries with their efficient modes of organization. 
Mobilizing and disciplining a massive amount of people through numer-
ous local auxiliaries into a national organization, influencing public opinion 
through a deluge of tracts and periodicals, mass petitioning, fundraising, 
led contemporaries to believe this was a new phenomenon, a new power 
in politics, for better or worse. But was there really a new type of political 
organization emerging in the late 1820s?
The first problem we encounter in answering this question is that we 
need to define the phenomenon in order to be able to study its lineage. 
Are these political organizations? Extra-parliamentary political organiza-
tion in general is of course not an invention of the nineteenth century, 
rather a product of the late eighteenth century. Are these organizations 
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part of the genealogy of benevolence, or of religiously motivated moral 
reform? In that case, the same applies: not an invention of the early nine-
teenth century.1 Still, the sources for the late 1820s and 1830s indicate 
that contemporaries spoke of the organizations that attempted to sway 
public opinion (and often had clear political goals as well as moral aims) 
as a novel phenomenon. Building on the legacy of benevolent, religious, 
political, and moral reform organizations, these organizations had taken 
on new shapes and new meanings. They offered new promises and posed 
new threats. This chapter explores contemporary understanding of politi-
cal organization through a close reading of sources in which people reflect 
on this phenomenon.
The most striking feature of these reflections is that this phenomenon 
did not have a name yet. A century later it would be called a pressure group 
for the first time, and to this day, different historiographies refer to it in 
different ways—social movement organizations, reform societies, advo-
cacy groups, or single-issue organizations. This chapter does not attempt 
to narrowly define any phenomenon or plead for one specific expression, 
but instead focuses on one of the central characteristics of these organi-
zations: their scale. It deals with national organizations with a sizeable 
membership, aimed at changing public opinion, and often aimed at legis-
lative change as well, in the period between 1820 and 1840, ‘when reform 
enthusiasms were, by earlier standards, most diverse and widespread, by 
later standards most intense’.2 Around 1830 people described these orga-
nizations in various ways3; one metaphor, however, soon became domi-
nant: that of the political organization as a machine, more specifically a 
steam engine.
Historians can use metaphors to analyse ideas and assumptions preva-
lent in a culture.4 The widespread use of this metaphor is important for 
several reasons. Besides indicating that contemporaries sensed, in the sec-
ond half of the 1820s, that there was something new at play here, the met-
aphor facilitated reflections on the opportunities and liabilities of this new 
phenomenon. Speaking of organizations as if they were machines allowed 
for negotiating their possibilities and dangers when placed in a political 
context. Furthermore, language is not just a passive operator of mean-
ing but accomplishes something. Likewise, a metaphor does not simply 
reflect ideas already present, it moulds them too. Conceptual metaphors 
structure people’s thoughts and actions as well as their language. These 
representations of reality shape action and enclose the field of possibilities 
by referring to what is ‘thinkable’. Reconstructing the use of this meta-
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phor, therefore, is reconstructing the way in which actors understand their 
situation, and, in the Weberian sense, ‘rediscovering the affinities and the 
oppositions from which they plan their action, drawing the genealogies 
of possibilities and impossibilities that implicitly structure their horizon’.5
Understanding the phenomenon of mass organization through the 
concept of the steam engine had important implications for contempo-
raries’ perceptions of mass organization, and their subsequent behaviour 
based on this perception. A more in-depth analysis of this metaphor is 
therefore warranted to arrive at a proper understanding of how its pres-
ence in political discourse empowered political outsiders, while it intimi-
dated members of the establishment. The debate on mass organizations in 
society and politics can be read as a debate on mass society and democracy, 
and since people base their behaviour on their understanding of the world 
they live in, their understanding thereof matters.
One striking feature of the machine metaphor is that it was a transna-
tional phenomenon, surfacing during the same years in debates over Irish, 
British and American reform organizations (and perhaps elsewhere). This 
chapter aims to explore the use of the machine metaphor in a transnational 
context, and attempts to answer the questions why this metaphor gained 
popularity in the late 1820s and early 1830s, and what insights it offers 
to the changing nature of reform, society, and political life in these crucial 
decades. The political constellations of the countries under scrutiny dif-
fered greatly and developed in varying ways, and there are differences in 
the way this metaphor functioned. However, the scope of this chapter 
prohibits a thorough comparative study. Instead, making use of a wide 
array of primary and secondary sources, going back and forth between 
different national contexts while focusing mainly on the shared rhetoric of 
mass organizations as machines, it should be seen as a broad exploration of 
a topic that merits additional research. As we will see, the metaphor repre-
sents a specific historical moment in social and political history: that of the 
birth of what historical sociologists later described as the social movement 
organization. Studying this metaphor can help us connect the lived expe-
rience of contemporaries to the structural development of political life.6
The Machine MeTaphor in poliTics
The metaphor of machinery used to describe political structures dates 
back to at least the seventeenth century. Besides important organic met-
aphors such as the ‘body politic’, mechanical metaphors were regularly 
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used. For centuries, people have thought and spoken of states in terms 
of the machinery, mechanism, or the wheels of government. There is 
an extensive literature on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mecha-
nism. In the quest for political stability, philosophers discussed how states 
should integrate their different ‘parts’ into a well-working political ‘sys-
tem’. They spoke of a ‘European state system’ as a machine that, when it 
worked properly, would ensure a balance of power.7 The implications of 
this machine metaphor meant that the political process could be imagined 
as (ideally) reliable and transparent, functioning consistently and inde-
pendently from external influences. In the earliest decades of the nine-
teenth century, ‘political machine’ usually referred to the government 
or the political decision-making process at large as, for instance, when 
the German historian Heeren criticized the modernization of Western 
European state administration of the eighteenth century as the ‘principle 
of rendering as far as possible, the administration of the state, a mechani-
cal operation; for thus, it was thought, could it be organized most cheaply 
and commodiously’.8
The machine referred to here was still the classic machine of the autom-
aton or the clockwork. The rapid developments in steam technology, how-
ever, as they occurred around 1800, infused the machine metaphor with a 
new element: that of power. Steam engines create movement by building 
up steam pressure and channelling that pressure in the desired direction. 
The politicization of the language of pressure dates from the 1820s and 
1830s, decades that saw progress in mechanization and subsequent social 
and economic transformation at a much faster pace than any previous 
change.9 This language is visible, for instance, in the debates on political 
reform in Britain. The Reform Act of 1832 was the product of novel con-
ceptions about the place of public opinion in politics.
After the peace of 1815, it had become clear that a fundamental and 
permanent change had taken place. As Peter Fraser put it: ‘An entirely 
new kind of public had come into being, which appeared to be stronger 
than the government’.10 On 23 March 1820, a young Robert Peel, at 
that time member of parliament (MP) for Oxford University, wrote a 
letter to his friend and confidant John Wilson Croker on the crisis that 
had followed upon the death of King George III: ‘It seems to me a curi-
ous crisis—when public opinion never had such influence on public mea-
sures, and yet never was so dissatisfied with the share which it possessed. 
It is growing too large for the channels that it has been accustomed to 
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run through. … [T]he engineers that made them never dreamt of vari-
ous streams that are now struggling for a vent’.11 The French Revolution 
had made politicians and the public alike aware that ignoring public 
opinion was no longer an option. If the steam of public opinion were to 
build up to produce too much internal pressure, the whole system could 
explode.
This language of political pressure referred specifically to public opin-
ion. Talking about slavery, an observer compared the British Parliament 
to ‘the steam engine which required only the steam of public opinion, 
strongly expressed, to enable it to annihilate Colonial Slavery at one 
majestic stroke’.12 Most accounts of the political changes around this time 
argue that the 1832 Reform Act was the answer to this building pressure: 
the political engineers in Parliament designed a new system with broader 
channels for public opinion to run through, to stay with Peel’s metaphor. 
By extending the franchise from 500,000 to 813,000 adult males, allow-
ing a total of one out of six adult males to vote, the reformed parliament 
was considered to be doing enough justice to public opinion. Or, as radi-
cals had argued in 1831, better representation would act as ‘a safety valve 
by which the opinions of an immense part of the population would reach 
the House in a constitutional way’.13
Around 1830, however, reformers and their adversaries in Ireland, 
Britain, and the United States increasingly understood pressure groups 
as political machines in their own right. Reform organizations were 
thought to be expanding the political system by building channels and 
machines for change that they successfully welded onto the existing sys-
tem. They generated and channelled pressure to change public opinion 
and thus ultimately bear upon government machinery. In the words of 
a radical Irish abolitionist: ‘the rules and constitution of our Society 
[offer] the application of two or three plain … principles to this question, 
which are capable of being combined, so as to form the unlimited levers 
of a new machine of immense power, that has never yet been brought 
to bear fully or, indeed, at all, on the West Indian proprietory in these 
Kingdoms’.14 It is important to note that these ‘engines for reform’, 
often built and operated by  political outsiders, suggested not only that 
outsiders too should have a voice in debates over legislation but also that 
the political system could and should be expanded to include large num-
bers of disenfranchised citizens as they were represented in organized 
pressure groups.
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religious Machines
Modern mass politics were fundamentally shaped by religious practices 
and techniques. Elsewhere I have explored more extensively the different 
ways in which religious ideas and practices and forms informed a new per-
spective on the possibilities of mass organization in reform.15 The religious 
associations of the early nineteenth century had created a large group of 
experienced organizers, new networks and new imagined communities, 
based on a shared religious identity. Many political mass organizations, 
both in Europe and the United States, took their organizational and dis-
ciplining techniques from churches, evangelical revivals, and religious 
organizations.16 In particular, the innovations made in the latter, most 
importantly the auxiliary system and new fundraising methods, revolu-
tionized the impact of political organizations from the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century. Just as national churches were locally organized, 
religious and later political organizations too started to organize in a way 
that balanced the role of the central organizing committee with its often 
cautious long-term strategy and the role of the local auxiliaries, which 
were the life and soul of the organization in terms of fundraising, mobiliz-
ing new members, and disseminating print work.
The Irish Catholic Association, founded in 1823, is a remarkable 
example of an early political mass movement that was shaped by religious 
forms. Its aim was political equality for Roman Catholics. British politics, 
of course, was closely intertwined with the Anglican Church, and nei-
ther Protestant dissenters nor Catholics could hold office or be elected to 
Parliament. The revolutionary decision of the organization’s leader, law-
yer Daniel O’Connell, in 1824 to open membership to anyone who was 
prepared to pay a penny—called the Catholic Rent—swiftly transformed 
the movement: in 1828, it had 10,000 full members and over three mil-
lion associate members (close to half the total population of roughly seven 
million people), and a weekly income of over £2000. That same year, 
Conservative Prime Minister Peel and the very reluctant King George IV 
realized that to prevent a bloody revolt in Ireland they must give in to the 
demands of the Catholic Association. In 1829, the Catholic Relief Act was 
passed, opening the doors of Parliament to O’Connell.17
Reflecting on the Catholic Association, people often chose the machine 
metaphor to make sense of what had happened. In explaining the success 
of the Catholic protests, some pointed to the strongly shared sense of 
wrongdoing in Catholic Ireland. But, as organizer and historian of the 
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Catholic Association Thomas Wyse pointed out in 1829, just after the 
demise of the organization:
To say that Ireland feels as one man, is merely saying there is a common suf-
fering, common pursuit, and common sympathy; but floating loosely over 
society, without order or combination, this feeling is not yet of sufficient 
practical avail. Like similar powers in the physical world, unless pressed, by 
skill and management, into proper directions, and combinations, for any 
really useful result, they might as well not exist.18
These powers needed to be coordinated by the ‘mighty engine’ of the 
Catholic Association to effectively shake the Protestant supremacy.19
Not only the Catholic Rent, but also the ‘Simultaneous Meetings’ 
offered an impressive display of organizational power. Both were based 
on an innovative suggestion: Why not utilize the structure and mobiliz-
ing capacities of the Catholic Church, invite priests to act as agents, and 
organize simultaneous meetings directly after Sunday Mass? The Catholic 
Association coordinated this initiative. On 13 January 1828, meetings 
were held in more than 1600 Catholic churches, and O’Connell claimed 
that over 100,000 people met in Dublin, and almost five million gathered 
in the countryside. The purpose of these meetings was to petition parlia-
ment, but the symbolic effect was considered equally if not more impor-
tant: the coordinated mass meetings represented the threat of a general 
armed insurgency.
To quote Wyse once more:
The people met without arms, and for the peaceable purpose of petitioning: 
but they met at once, —they met on the same day,—above all, they met by 
the order of the Association. What if the Association at some later-period 
had ordered them to meet with arms, for the purpose, not of petitioning 
against, but resisting tithes, &c. &c.; —would they have disobeyed? The ful-
crum and the power were found—the lever could be applied to any thing.20
This last sentence touches upon the essence of the mechanical metaphor 
of mass organizations: once the structure has been built, it can start pro-
ducing change—and with some adjustments, it can be applied to purposes 
other than those it was originally intended for. The difference between 
a mass petition and a mass organization is of course the latter’s semi- 
permanent character: all the effort put into mobilizing a group of people 
to further a cause was preserved in their membership. Once the engine 
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was built and had come to steam, it could change its course without losing 
too much power or momentum.
The Catholic Association was impressive, both for its supporters and for 
its enemies, ‘who saw and feared the mighty engine which had been raised 
to shake their supremacy’.21 Wyse described in 1828 his visions of ‘good 
organization’: ‘uniform, universal, permanent, system of enlightened and 
energetic co-operation’. For good organization, he argued, order and com-
bination were crucial. His criticisms of the leaders of local and provincial 
societies that were part of the Catholic Association reveal how political asso-
ciation on this new massive scale was understood in terms of engineering:
[Their leaders] went wrongly about it. They continued pouring in, day after 
day, new streams of electricity—charging with the animating fluid number-
less portions of the political machine—generating steam as occasion sug-
gested; but a great deal of this was done at random, and no provision was 
made or attempted, when such powers were fully produced, for their tem-
perate and judicious application. Besides the danger which they exposed us 
to in this wandering and uncontrolled shape, they did not allow us to bring 
one-half of our energies, and that half but feebly, into play.22
Just as in the case of real steam engines, the mechanics who knew how to 
work them and make fine adjustments to them were crucial to their suc-
cess and could make the difference between a well-oiled machine, gaining 
momentum and efficiently mounting pressure on government, or one that 
never came up to speed. Or—worse still—one that built up too much 
pressure without providing a vent, leading it to explode.
‘The greaT arT of adapTing Means To ends’
Where reformers were excited about the possibilities national mass orga-
nizations offered, some contemporaries were critical of this development 
and lamented it as evidence of the mechanization of society at large. In 
his famous essay ‘Signs of the Times’, published in the Edinburgh Review 
in 1829, British historian Thomas Carlyle bemoans the mechanization of 
society, culture, and spirit. This is visible, he argues, in many of the new 
mass organizations:
Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the 
internal and spiritual also. Here too nothing follows its spontaneous course, 
nothing is left to be accomplished by old natural methods. Everything has 
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its cunningly devised implements, its preestablished apparatus; it is not done 
by hand, but by machinery. … [W]e have Religious machines, of all imagin-
able varieties; the Bible-Society [is] a machine for converting the Heathen. 
It is the same in all other departments. Has any man, or any society of men, 
a truth to speak, a piece of spiritual work to do; they can nowise proceed 
at once and with the mere natural organs, but must first call a public meet-
ing, appoint committees, issue prospectuses, eat a public dinner; in a word, 
construct or borrow machinery, wherewith to speak it and do it. Without 
machinery, they were hopeless, helpless; a colony of Hindoo weavers squat-
ting in the heart of Lancashire.23
The importance of the technological metaphor in understanding the 
transformation of reform becomes clear in Carlyle’s phrasing that soci-
eties ‘construct or borrow machinery’ to further their goals. Historical 
sociologist Sidney Tarrow introduced the phrase ‘modularity’ to indicate 
a unique characteristic of the protest repertoire of modern politics. From 
the late eighteenth century on, the repertoire of contentious action was 
no longer tied to specific circumstances, but could be employed in a vari-
ety of settings by a variety of social actors against a variety of opponents. 
The boycott, petition drive, and mass demonstration, for instance, were 
easily transferred across places, regimes, issues, and actors, as a number 
of historical sociologists, most prominently Tarrow himself and Charles 
Tilly have demonstrated.24 Unfortunately, most scholars of social move-
ments and protest repertoire pay little attention to the role of religious, 
benevolent and moral reform organizations in the development of the 
social movement. They present national ‘social movement organizations’ 
as self-evident efforts to coordinate ‘campaigns of collective action’.25 
However, from the perspective of the history of religious and benevolent 
reform, it was rather the Bible Society, for instance, which offered a blue-
print of the modern mass organization with all the forms and activities 
that would become standardized later. What frightened contemporaries 
was the fact that this powerful tool of mass organization as pioneered 
in religious field could be applied to political issues and was easily trans-
ferred across issues or borders. An American observer warned that the 
Anti-Slavery Society was ‘an immense and powerful combination, that has 
suddenly leaped from the sphere of the religious world, brought with it 
a machinery which was manufactured in that sphere, … and neither the 
public, nor the Government, seem yet to know which end, or how, head 
or tail, to take hold of the monster’.26 In 1824, a British critic of the 
recently established Anti-Slavery Society worried that this was a dangerous 
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precedent: ‘if unchecked, and that the [anti-slavery] machinery is found to 
work well, according to the views of the institutions, why not have an anti- 
tythe society; [and] an anti-persecution society, for supporting religious 
freedom?’ Or, adding what he considered an even more absurd question, 
‘Why not have an anti-restriction society, for the purpose of obtaining 
universal suffrage?’27
In the years between 1825 and 1840, the first generation of pressure 
groups experimented with fine-tuning their machines and improving the 
blueprint of the engines of reform. The wide availability of this new tech-
nology of organization can be understood as a crucial step in the process of 
democratization: ordinary men and women could make themselves heard 
and participate in public debates. For contemporary critics like Carlyle, 
however, the mechanization of society rather impeded human freedom 
by threatening man’s ability to think and act creatively. The modularity of 
associating and protesting was typical of the ‘Age of Machinery’: ‘the age 
which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches and practices the 
great art of adapting means to ends’.28
Some rejected this goal-oriented approach of ‘adapting means to 
ends’ and the calculated nature of these enterprises as reform devoid of 
life. Others welcomed the systematic approach to change as it empow-
ered them to battle problems that had seemed impossible to tackle. The 
machine metaphor refers to a new conception of individual, society, and 
reform that gained popularity in the decades around 1800: that society 
can be changed by design, that reform is possible, and what is more, that 
if change for the better is possible, it is imperative that people do what 
they can to effect this change. Scientific improvement, good government, 
moral behaviour, and religious conversion were no longer seen as inci-
dents, effected by the grace of God or even simple coincidence. They 
were now understood to be governed by universal laws and principles, 
and applying those principles in a systematic manner would guarantee the 
desired outcome.29
To give some limited examples from the United States: the systematic 
approach to achieving better results in agriculture, for instance, brought 
forth dozens of Agricultural Societies in the United States in the 1810s 
and 1820s, that spread new scientific insights on more productive farm-
ing. The farmer who laboured more steadily and systematically was 
rewarded by ‘more return for the cultivation of his labor’. The tangible 
results offered people a new understanding of success and progress. Once 
the right approach was established, diligent application and perseverance 
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could result in spectacular outcomes.30 This was proven once more by the 
success of the Evangelical Revivals. Charles Grandison Finney, the most 
prominent revivalist, declared that a good evangelist should be as self- 
conscious about his methods as a good farmer about scientific agriculture. 
‘A revival of religion is not a miracle’, Finney taught, but a ‘result of the 
right use of the constituted means’. In this sense, these evangelists were 
early psychologists of the techniques of persuasion.31
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the notions that a 
system was needed in everything and that success was in the hands of the 
individuals started to spread among middle-class men and women, and 
among considerable parts of the working classes as well. This was the era 
of self-help literature and of the self-made man. Through exercising moral 
restraint, he had better chances in the new market economy.32 While this 
was by no means an exclusively American phenomenon, in the United States 
with its ample opportunities for social mobility and relatively weak political 
institutions, it seems to have been stronger, as reform was often aimed at 
improving individual behaviour. Inspired by both the changing economic 
situation and evangelical revivals, the modern man swore off drinking and 
gambling, worked hard and attempted to live a pious life. Moral reform 
organizations such as the American Temperance Society, founded in 1826, 
bridged the gap between individual aspirations and the concerted effort to 
change American society. The systematic approach to individual and social 
reform was carried out on a grand scale by this and other religious benevo-
lent organizations that were national in scale and had a more permanent 
basis than the revivals. Their conviction that the forces of evil waged war 
on the world made them conceive of a  counter- offensive that could match 
the magnitude of the attacks of the Lord of Darkness. ‘There is power 
enough to reform almost any giant evil, if it is only directed against the 
evil by combined effort’, concluded an American attending a meeting 
of the British and Foreign Temperance Society.33 Similar organizations 
combined individual moral reform with political action, for instance, the 
General Union for Promoting the Observance of the Christian Sabbath, 
the Anti-Masonic Party (both founded in 1828), or the American Anti-
Slavery Society (1833).34
These reformers embraced the machine metaphor because it specifically 
referenced the systematic approach to large-scale change. While theirs 
may seem a very utilitarian approach, the popularity of systematic reform 
through mass organizations comprised more than just a rational approach 
to change, as the fascination with mass organizations held a more emo-
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tional or irrational connotation as well. True, the steam engine repre-
sented man’s control over the natural powers of boiling water and steam 
pressure, but the effect the machine had on its audience was comparable 
to that of natural phenomena such as volcanoes. Cultural historians have 
pointed out that the nineteenth century saw the advent of the ‘technologi-
cal sublime’, in which the man-made steam engine offered a spectacle that 
inspired awe in all who witnessed it.
The Technological subliMe
The ‘age of inventions and discoveries’ sparked a profound fascination 
with technology on both sides of the Atlantic. The latest innovations 
were popularized through exhibits and periodical press. Workingmen’s 
associations and self-help literature regarded knowledge as a prerequisite 
for individual and national prosperity.35 In the second half of the 1820s 
and 1830s, newspapers and magazines were filled with stories of steam 
engines, as these were the years steam locomotives became available for 
public use on railroads. In 1825, British engineer George Stephenson 
built The Locomotion for the Stockton and Darlington Railway, the first 
public steam railway in the world. In 1829, he built The Rocket, which 
was entered in, and won, the Rainhill Trials. This news was followed 
closely around the world, as Britain was the source of innovation for a 
long time. Only in the early 1830s did American engineers and mechan-
ics start competing with their own engines.36 The pioneers of steam 
locomotives were always attempting to find the right balance between 
speed and safety. News of innovations that made these engines faster and 
safer vied with reports of numerous incidents, such as explosions and 
derailments.
Eyewitness accounts of people riding a train, of those watching a train 
speed by as well as of those who survived railway accidents indicate a 
great enthusiasm for technology. The fascination for technology has been 
described as being at its core an experience of the sublime: an intense 
experience of being overcome by both admiration and fear at the same 
time. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the sublime experi-
ence was typically associated with natural phenomena, such as the erup-
tion of a volcano, a thunderstorm, or glancing into the abyss. Romantic 
poets, writers, and painters had popularized this notion, and the birth of 
modern tourism was intimately connected to the modern desire to sub-
ject oneself to the destructive forces of nature—though preferably from a 
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safe distance. Climbing Etna and glancing down into its crater or visiting 
Niagara Falls was among the thrill-seeking activities of the well-to-do.37
As it turned out, there were varieties of sublime experience. In the 
nineteenth century, people responded similarly to the sublime spectacle 
that technology provided. Those who were ignorant of the progress of 
technology interpreted a train that passed by at 25 miles an hour—a speed 
considered to be ‘annihilating space and time’—, in supernatural terms, 
as monstrous. However, those who knew about technology—a word 
first  formulated in 1828—could add admiration to fear, and experience 
the sublimity of a powerful machine under human control. The response 
to technology provides a valuable context to better understand the obser-
vations made about the promise and perils of the new mass organizations. 
Similar observations are made of the scale, vastness, power, destructive 
potential, and of the big question: Who is in control of this inanimate 
object that seems to have come to life? Can we trust that person? Is he 
really in control?38
Could it be that the responses to mass organizations are another variety 
of the sublime experience? Can we speak of the sublime spectacle of mass 
organization? At first sight, it seems that there is an important difference 
between a steam engine on display and a mass organization—the latter is 
less visible, less tangible. For a large part, mass organizations are rhetorical 
constructions; symbolic claims for inclusion and attempts to redefine the 
boundaries of the official public (political) sphere.39 National mass orga-
nizations could become true mass organizations only because they were 
larger than any real functioning mass meeting could ever be. While mass 
meetings and the display of mass petitions are capable of representing 
the mass organization, and are known to have made a great impression 
on onlookers, the modern mass organizations were considered powerful 
exactly because they were even larger and could never be seen in their 
entire manifestation. Instead they were represented in numbers: in quan-
tifications of membership, auxiliaries, and income.40
It is exactly its abstract nature and the fact that one had to try and imag-
ine the size and power of the mass organization that fascinated observers. 
The metaphor of the steam engine not only refers to the fact that com-
bined efforts can lead to great changes; the steam engine also functioned 
as a representation of the invisible, intangible masses, like pressure build-
ing up—invisible until it causes motion or explosion. As long as the masses 
seemed far away or powerless, they were harmless. The sublime experience 
occurs when contemporaries catch a glimpse of the masses and realize that 
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the masses are real, are here, are unspeakably vast, and capable of effecting 
real change, for better or worse. The machine not only literally empow-
ered people but also rendered large groups of anonymous individuals vis-
ible and challenged older, idealized, abstract notions of ‘the people’.41
National mass organizations offered reformers a structure to conduct 
a long-term reform campaign. The sustained pressure made it possible to 
strategize and attempt to change public opinion over a number of years, 
but rendered them also more visible to critics, who started pondering 
the implications of semi-permanent campaigning for social and politi-
cal life. Inspired by his visit with British abolitionists right around the 
time Parliament abolished slavery, American abolitionist William Lloyd 
Garrison professed in 1833: ‘One important measure remains to be 
effected—a national organization of our strength’. He believed that for ‘a 
hundred thousand dollars … there may be moral machinery put into oper-
ation of sufficient power to emancipate every slave in the United States 
within seven years’.42 He was too optimistic—slavery would be abolished 
only in 1865—but six years later, even a staunch critic of the American 
Anti-Slavery Society like Calvin Colton, listing its auxiliaries (1350), trav-
elling agents (38), money raised ($40,000) and publications issued (total 
646,502), had to admit that Garrison’s organization was ‘grand’ and ‘a 
stupendous machinery’.43
In the face of this stupendous machine, individuals seemed not to 
count anymore. Contemporaries lamented the increase in scale in modern 
society, for instance, in this chapter in an Evangelical journal:
This is the age of combinations. Mankind move only in masses. Individuals 
seem to be merely fractions—the societies of which they are members are the 
only units. Every thing seems governed by a kind of living steam engines—
a cluster of wheels, pistons and levers—the chief moving power of which 
is some General Agents, or Executive Board—and the connecting chains, 
the force of numbers. … [T]o attempt checking [the masses] by individual 
influence, is like to stopping a patent threshing machine by putting single 
straws into it.44
No one would be able to stop the ‘mighty engine’ once it gained momen-
tum, and it would destroy whatever obstacles were in its path, much like 
a steam-roller: ‘If individuals are in the way [of reform], they must be 
removed or broken down’.45 ‘Association is a mighty engine, and must 
act, either for good or evil, to an extent which no man can foresee or com-
prehend’, warned William Ellery Channing in 1829 in his essay Remarks 
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on the disposition which now prevails to form associations and to accomplish 
all objects by organized masses. ‘They are perilous instruments. They ought 
to be suspected. … They are a kind of irregular government created within 
our Constitutional government. Let them be watched closely [for] a dan-
gerous engine is at work among us’.46 A decade later, Colton echoed his 
concerns, arguing that the American Anti-Slavery Society was dangerous, 
exactly because it was ‘a grand and permanent political organization’. 
‘This Society, on account of its systematic and efficient organization is 
untiring, assiduous, is every where, lives forever, and is forever augment-
ing its forces’.47
This fear of the disruption of the social and political order by mass 
organizations that functioned as a ‘state within a state’ can be found in 
Europe as well. The Catholic Association in Ireland was described as ‘the 
spectacle of an imperium in imperio of the most perfect kind’,48 while 
British critics denounced the ‘angry passions’ and enthusiasm aroused by 
‘that self-constituted body, the Anti-Slavery Society’, as signs of increased 
polarization and opposition on both sides, and claimed that ‘all societies 
so organized … are dangerous to the state—no part of which can be vio-
lently disorganized without hazard to the whole’.49
The mass organizations were often democratic in the sense that they 
were ruled by their own constitutions and that the delegates represent-
ing the local auxiliaries had the final vote. While charismatic leadership 
certainly helped to mobilize people, the great advantage of this semi- 
permanent structure was that once it was in place, it could function almost 
independently, and it would not be disrupted too much by a change in 
leadership. Critics, on the other hand, feared that once a machine had 
gained momentum, it could easily be ‘turned to sinister ends’. Exactly 
because it was so powerful, the question of who controlled and operated 
the machine and what course they adopted was of paramount concern. In 
the words of Parsons Cooke, a Calvinist minister, a ‘director has only to 
put his finger on this and that spring, to turn his whole enginery against 
the christian ministry’.50
The tweaking of the machine, reformers admitted, could lead to dan-
gerous situations. Abolitionist William Scales thought it necessary to issue 
a manual-like warning: careful handling was advised. ‘A moral engine has 
been invented, and set in motion. True, it accords with the first principles 
of the mechanics, that it should be allowed to acquire a sufficient momen-
tum; but it also accords with these principles, that having acquired this 
momentum, it must be properly fed, or its velocity will be so increased 
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as to shatter its members, or its bands be so relaxed as to destroy its effi-
ciency—in either case, ruining its proprietor.’51 And of course the machine 
should appear dangerous for it to be effective. While many reformers still 
believed they would be able to convert everyone to their point of view, 
many started to consider the option of operating in a more combative 
style, antagonizing their opponents, stressing their power in numbers and 
hinting, however vaguely, at the possibility that they would not always 
be able to keep the lid on the pressure. Mass organizations like the Irish 
Catholic Association offered the prospect of a ‘peaceful revolution’ of 
public opinion, but often hinted at violence as a means to a peaceful end.
concluding reMarks
In Britain, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, pressure groups 
were thought to be ‘illegitimate, as they disturbed the deliberative role of 
parliament, and unnecessary as they spoke for no recognizable corporate 
or community interest’, as Patricia Hollis explains in her introduction to 
an edited volume on ‘Pressure from without’, one of the few historical 
studies of this new type of organization. They were seen as ‘the intimi-
dating activity of a mob’. However, around 1867, pressure from with-
out ‘was seen as the healthy participation of an active citizenry’, and any 
MP planning on submitting a bill could do so only if he had sufficient 
support from organizations who could put pressure from without on the 
legislative process. In only 30 years, pressure groups had gone from being 
 illegitimate threats to the political process to being a legitimizing force for 
legislative change.52
After the 1832 Reform Act, Westminster seems to have closed itself 
off somewhat  to the voices that clamoured outside its doors. In 1831, 
Parliament decided no discussion should accompany the presentation of 
petitions. The Speaker of the House, Tory Charles Manners-Sutton, told 
another young Tory, William Ewart Gladstone, that this was not simply a 
matter of saving precious time: ‘His maxim was to shut out as far as might 
be all extrinsic pressure, and then to do what was right within doors’.53 
In 1867, the year of the Second Reform Act, the same Gladstone referred 
to pressure groups as ‘agencies out of doors’, which formed and matured 
public opinion, and were therefore ‘the legitimate expressions of the peo-
ple, by which bad legislation was to be corrected’.54
It is always difficult to precisely assess the importance and impact of 
language and metaphors, but Gladstone’s reference to ‘agencies out of 
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doors’ that are ‘legitimate expressions of the people’ demonstrates a rec-
ognition of pressure groups as large and autonomous players in the politi-
cal field. It reflects a changed attitude to mass organizations in politics. 
However, Hollis adds, ‘After 1867, such groups were increasingly redun-
dant, displaced by national party political machines which were providing 
both ideology and organization for the parliamentary parties’.55 Already 
in 1818, the importance of party organization was recognized by Whigs, 
who hoped that a ‘respectable party’ would give ‘a safe vent’ to disruptive 
tendencies among the masses.56 Early attempts by British party politicians 
to have their party perform this function were only partly successful, and 
it seems that pressure groups functioned in a similar matter for several 
decades.
Right around this time, on the other side of the Atlantic, ‘political 
machine’ started to refer to organizations dedicated to mobilizing votes. 
It denoted a system of local politics in which loyal voters are rewarded with 
practical benefits, known as the spoils system. The Tammany Hall Machine 
is one of the better-known examples of the ward-based, patronage- driven 
form of local government as it developed mainly in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This was the system that gave ‘political machines’ a 
negative connotation.57 And even though more research would be needed 
to bridge the gap between the historiographies of early party forma-
tion and grassroots organization,58 the foundations laid for the modern 
Democratic Party in the 1820s and 1830s seem to stem from the same 
broadly shared sense that applying mass organization in politics was new 
and promising. Martin Van Buren, its main architect, had a ‘passion for 
organization … a passion that would have seemed strange, even sinister to 
[his] predecessors’. Van Buren wanted to centralize and systematize elec-
tion campaigns, and hoped for the election of a president ‘as the result of 
a combined and concerted effort of a political party’. On the other hand, 
he thought of the extra-parliamentary pressure groups discussed above 
as unconstitutional for bringing non-political crusades into the political 
arena. The Democratic Party was in part an answer to the threat criti-
cal citizens posed through their organizations and protest. Organizing 
citizens into loyal partisans seemed a benign solution to the danger of 
instability that came with citizen protests, and one that allowed political 
leaders to retain control and stability.59
In the United States, mass organizations for reform triggered a back-
lash in the 1840s when they were accused of sowing discord and setting 
members of local communities against one another. Radicalized temper-
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ance and antislavery societies had indeed played an important part in dis-
mantling the rhetoric of the common good that had been dominant since 
Revolutionary times. Their combative spirit and the hostile responses they 
provoked, but above all their staying power, made people conceive of civil 
society in a different light. National reform organizations contributed 
to the development of a national identity, but in the end also promoted 
political pluralism.60
It is not difficult to see why reformers themselves enthusiastically 
applied the language of technology to their organizations. The meta-
phor of engines suggests that the end result will be reform—the ques-
tion really is: At what pace? In 1853, Archibald Prentice, historian of the 
Anti- Corn Law League, put it this way: critics ‘will not be in force to 
stop the wheels of improvement; but, like the governor of a steam-engine, 
they may prevent a dangerous rapidity of motion’.61 Through associating 
their organizations with the steam locomotives and other engines reform-
ers appropriated the image of modernity and progress that excited and 
sometimes scared contemporaries. The versatility of this metaphor meant 
that critics of mass organizations used the same metaphor, warning of 
derailments, train wrecks, and explosions similar to those they read about 
in the press on a regular basis. By doing so, they confirmed and spread 
the notion that pressure groups were a powerful instrument. When in 
1829, Channing gloomily remarked that association was a ‘mighty engine, 
and must act, either for good or for evil, to an extent which no man can 
 foresee or comprehend’, he reinstated the idea that the future belonged 
to machines.62
The use of the machine metaphor also indicates the tendency to system-
atize reform and protest. It refers to the phenomenon that social scientists 
later identified as ‘modularity’: the machine metaphor both reflected and 
reinforced the notion that the mass organization was a phenomenon in its 
own right, less tied to specific locations, people, and issues. Replicating this 
newly developed machine in other causes and countries became expected 
rather than an exception. Historians have long  treated organizations as 
mere institutional reflections of social and political structures. Studying 
contemporaries’ perspectives once more stresses that organizations are 
instead agents of change, creative forces for reimagining society and poli-
tics.63 Having these machines at their disposal empowered large groups of 
people and encouraged them to engage in new struggles or organize to 
fight long-suffered wrongs. The revolutions in transportation, mail, and 
printing are important and oft-cited explanations for the changing nature 
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of reform organizations around this time, and indeed they facilitated the 
operation of reform organizations on an unprecedented scale. Still, such 
developments do not in themselves explain why people started to orga-
nize to reform their society and influence politics. We cannot explain the 
surge in popular participation in politics that lies at the heart of modern 
politics  without taking into account the  machine metaphor, which not 
only reflected but also reinforced awareness of the power of organization.
noTes
 1. Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes (eds), Rethinking the Age of 
Reform: Britain 1780–1850 (Cambridge 2003); H. Cunningham 
and J.  Innes (eds), Charity, Philanthropy and Reform from the 
1690s to the 1850s (Basingstoke 1998); Eugene Charlton Black, 
The Association: British Extraparliamentary Political Organization, 
1769–1793 (Cambridge, MA 1963); Albrecht Koschnik, ‘Let a 
Common Interest Bind Us Together’: Associations, Partisanship, and 
Culture in Philadelphia, 1775–1840 (Charlottesville 2007); Johann 
N.  Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners: Democracy and Civil 
Society in Early National Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA 2008).
 2. Innes and Burns, ‘Introduction’, in: Idem (eds), Rethinking the 
Age of Reform, 1–70, 57.
 3. For an overview of terms used see Graham Wootton, Pressure 
Groups in Britain 1720–1970: An Essay in Interpretation with 
Original Documents (London 1975) 1–12.
 4. Murray Knowles and Rosamund Moon, Introducing Metaphor 
(London, New York 2004) 12.
 5. Ibid., 30–32; Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Towards a Philosophical History 
of the Political’, in: Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher- Monk 
(eds), The History of Political Thought in National Context 
(Cambridge 2001) 189–203, esp. 194 (cit.), 200; also see John 
Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford 1962).
 6. Rosanvallon, ‘Towards a Philosophical History of the Political’, 
192–93.
 7. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Der Staat als Maschine: Zur politischen 
Metaphorik des absoluten Fürstenstaats (Berlin 1986); Harald 
Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power: A History of International 
Relations Theories (London 2000) 112–46 (cit. 121–22); Gerhard 
Dorn- Van Rossum and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Organ, 
‘ASSOCIATION IS A MIGHTY ENGINE’ MASS ORGANIZATION... 
Organismus, Organisation, politischer Körper’, Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, Bd. IV (1978) 519–622; and Note, ‘Organic and 
Mechanical Metaphors in Late Eighteenth-Century American 
Political Thought’ Harvard Law Review, vol. 110, nr. 8 (1997) 
1832–49 offer a useful introduction to mechanicism in (interna-
tional) politics.
 8. Dorn-Van Rossum and Böckenförde, ‘Organ, Organismus’, 558; 
Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, History of the Political System of 
Europe, and Its Colonies, from the Discovery of America to the 
Independence of the American Continent, vol. 2, [1809] Transl. 
George Bancroft (1829) 66.
 9. Wootton, Pressure Groups, 5–6; Maxine Berg, The Machinery 
Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815–1848 
(Cambridge etc. 1980) 21.
 10. Peter Fraser, ‘Public petitioning and Parliament before 1832’, The 
Historical Association (1961) 195.
 11. Peel to Croker, 23 March 1820, cit. in Louis J. Jennings (ed.), The 
Croker Papers, 3 vols (1884), vol. 1, 155–56.
 12. Anti-Slavery Monthly Reporter, May 1830; cit. in James Walvin, 
‘The rise of British Popular Sentiment for Abolition, 1787–1832’, 
in: Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher (eds) Anti-Slavery, 
 Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey (Folkestone, 
Hamden 1980) 149–62, 158.
 13. Cited in Patricia Hollis, ‘Pressure from Without: An Introduction’, 
in Idem (ed.), Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England 
(London 1974) 5.
 14. C.E.H. Orpen, The Principles, Plans and Objects of the Hibernian 
Negro’s Friend Society, contrasted with those of the previously existing 
Anti-Slavery Societies (s.l. 1831) 12.
 15. Maartje Janse, ‘A Dangerous Type of Politics? Politics and Religion 
in Early Mass Organizations: The Anglo-American world, c. 1830’, 
in: J. Augusteijn, P. Dassen en M. Janse (eds), Political Religion 
beyond Totalitarianism: The Sacralization of Politics in the Age of 
Democracy (Basingstoke, 2013) 55–76.
 16. Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners; Peter Stamatov, ‘The Religious 
Field and the Path-Dependent Transformation of Popular Politics 
in the Anglo-American World, 1770–1840’, Theory and Society 40 
(2011) 437–73; for one of the first analyses of the religious roots 
 M. JANSE
of mass politics see Henry Jephson, The Platform, its Rise and 
Progress, Vol. 1 (New York, London 1892).
 17. Fergus O’Ferrall, Catholic Emancipation: Daniel O’Connell and 
the Birth of Irish Democracy, 1820–30 (Dublin 1985).
 18. Thomas Wyse, Historical Sketch of the Late Catholic Association of 
Ireland, 2 vols. (London 1829) vol. 2, cxlvi.
 19. Ireland and O’Connell: A historical sketch of the condition of the 
Irish people, before the commencement of Mr. O’Connell’s public 
career; a history of the Catholic Association; and Memoirs of Mr. 
O’Connell (Tait [2nd ed.] 1835) 31.
 20. Wyse, Historical Sketch, vol. 1, 298–303, cit. 300, 303.
 21. Ireland and O’Connell, 31.
 22. Wyse, Historical Sketch, vol. 2, cl-cli.
 23. Thomas Carlyle, ‘Signs of the Times’, Edinburgh Review xcviii 
(1829) 439–59, 442–43.
 24. This literature is immense; useful introductions include C. McPhail, 
‘Modular Protest Forms’, The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Social and Political Movements (2013); Charles Tilly, The 
Contentious French (Cambridge, MA 1986); Idem, Popular 
Contention in Great Britain 1758—1834 (Cambridge, MA 1995); 
Sidney  Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and 
Contentious Politics (Cambridge, UK 1998); Idem, ‘Modular 
Collective Action and the Rise of the Social Movement: Why the 
French Revolution Was Not Enough’, Politics & Society, vol. 21 
no.1 (March 1993) 69–90.
 25. Tarrow, ‘Modular Collective Action’, 82; for criticism see Stamatov, 
‘The Religious Field’ and Craig Calhoun, ‘“New Social 
Movements” of the Early Nineteenth Century’, Social Science 
History, vol. 17 no. 3 (Fall 1993) 385–427. An important excep-
tion is Michael Young, Bearing Witness Against Sin: The Evangelical 
Birth of the American Social Movement (Chicago 2006).
 26. [Calvin Colton,] Abolition a Sedition, by a Northern Man 
(Philadelphia 1839) 29; for more on this see Janse, ‘Dangerous 
Type of Politics?’.
 27. J.R. Grosett, Remarks on West India Affairs (London 1824), 108–09.
 28. Carlyle, ‘Signs of the Times’, 442; Andrzej Diniejko, ‘Thomas 
Carlyle and the Origin of the “Condition of England Question”’, 
‘ASSOCIATION IS A MIGHTY ENGINE’ MASS ORGANIZATION... 
Victorian Web, http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/
diniejko1.html, 12-1-2015.
 29. A useful introduction to the notion of reform is Joanna Innes, 
‘“Reform” in English Public Life: The Fortunes of a Word’, in: 
Burns and Innes (eds), Rethinking the Age of Reform, 71–97.
 30. Richard Briggs Stott, Jolly Fellows: Male Milieus in Nineteenth- 
Century America (Baltimore 2009) 71; Mary Babson Fuhrer, A 
Crisis of Community: The Trials and Transformation of a New 
England town, 1815–1848 (2014), chapter 3.
 31. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation 
of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford 2007) 171–72.
 32. Stott, Jolly Fellows, 71, 91; for the cult of the self-made man see 
also Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation 
of Americans (Cambridge, London, 2000) 138–44; Scott 
A.  Sandage, Born Losers: A History of Failure in America 
(Cambridge, London, 2005) 22–43; Michael Kimmel, Manhood 
in America: A Cultural History (New York, etc. 1996) 22–29.
 33. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis, MD) 16 May 1833.
 34. Useful introductions into the vast literature on American reform 
include Ronald Walters, American Reformers, 1815–1860 (rev. ed. 
1997); Robert Abzug, Cosmos crumbling: American reform and 
the religious imagination (Oxford 1994); Young, Bearing Witness; 
Ronald P. Formisano, For the People: American Populist movements 
from the Revolution to the 1850s (Chapel Hill, 2008); Richard John, 
‘Taking Sabbatarianism Seriously: The Postal System, the Sabbath, 
and the Transformation of American Political Culture’, Journal of 
the Early Republic 10 (Winter 1990), 517–67; Ian Tyrell, Sobering 
Up: From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum America, 
1800–1860 (Westport, 1979); Richard S.  Newman, The 
Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the 
Early Republic (Chapel Hill, 2002).
 35. See for instance Bernard Lightman, Victorian Science in Context 
(Chicago 2008); G. N Cantor, Science in the Nineteenth-Century 
Periodical: Reading the Magazine of Nature (Cambridge, New York 
2004); Roger Luckhurst and Josephine McDonagh, Transactions 
and Encounters: Science and Culture in the Nineteenth Century 
(Manchester etc., 2002).
 36. Carroll W. Pursell, The Machine in America: A Social History of 
Technology (Baltimore 2007), esp. chapters 2 and 3.
 M. JANSE
 37. Joachim von der Thüsen, Het verlangen naar huivering: Over het 
sublieme, het wrede en het unheimliche (Amsterdam 1997) esp. 
11–29, 50–77; Philip Shaw, The Sublime (London, New  York 
2006); David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, 
MA, London 1994) 1–43; Paul Johnson, Sam Patch: The Famous 
Jumper (New York 2003) 79–125.
 38. Nye, American Technological Sublime, xi–xx, 45–76, 120–23, cit. 
53; John F.  Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and 
Republican Values in America 1776–1900, 139–80; the seminal 
study is Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford 1965).
 39. For ‘organisation as symbol’ see James Vernon, Politics and the 
People: A Study in English Political Culture c. 1815–1867 
(Cambridge, UK 1993) 183–206.
 40. Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners, 86–89.
 41. For the problem of representation see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le peu-
ple introuvable: Histoire de la Représentation Démocratique en 
France (Paris 1998) 27–41.
 42. The Liberator 12 October 1833; William Lloyd Garrison to Elliot 
Cresson, 16 November 1833, in William Lloyd Garrison, Walter 
M.  Merrill (ed.), The letters of William Lloyd Garrison vol. 1, 
1822–1835 (Cambridge MA, London 1971) 269.
 43. [Colton,] Abolition a Sedition, 15.
 44. ‘Society Combinations’, Evangelical Magazine and Gospel 
Advocate, vol. vi, no. 10, 7 March 1835, 78.
 45. Dura D. Pratt, Voluntary Associations: A Discourse delivered October 
10, 1841 (Nashua 1841) 39.
 46. William Ellery Channing, ‘Remarks on the disposition which now 
prevails to form associations and to accomplish all objects by orga-
nized masses’ [1829], The works of William E. Channing (6 vols., 
Boston 1841) vol. 1, 281–332, 307.
 47. [Colton,] Abolition a sedition, 184, 186. See for more on this 
notion of ‘imperium in imperio’ Janse, ‘A Dangerous Type of 
Politics?’.
 48. The Manchester Guardian and British Volunteer, 26 January 1828.
 49. The Manchester Guardian, 25 September 1830; Grossett, Remarks 
on West-India Affairs, 109.
 50. Parsons Cooke, Moral Machinery Simplified: A Discourse (Andover 
1839) 7, 15.
‘ASSOCIATION IS A MIGHTY ENGINE’ MASS ORGANIZATION... 
 51. The Liberator [Boston, MA], 11 April 1835.
 52. Hollis, ‘Preface’, vii; Idem, ‘Introduction’, 20, 25–26.
 53. Cited in Fraser, ‘Public petitioning’, 210.
 54. Hansard 17 May 1867, cited in Hollis, ‘Introduction’, 5.
 55. Hollis, ‘Preface’, in: Idem (ed.), Pressure from Without, vii–ix, vii–
viii; Idem, ‘Introduction’, 20.
 56. ‘The State of the Parties’, Edinburgh Review (June 1818), 
181–206, 197.
 57. See Henk te Velde’s (Chap. 13) contribution in this volume.
 58. Daniel Peart and Adam I.P.  Smith (eds), Practicing Democracy: 
Popular Politics in the United States from the Constitution to the 
Civil War (Charlottesville 2015).
 59. Jennifer R.  Mercieca, Founding Fictions (Tuscaloosa 2010) 
147–201, cit. 173; Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the 
Making of the Democratic Party (New York 1959) 133; Robert 
O. Rupp, ‘Parties and the Public Good: Political Antimasonry in 
New York Reconsidered’, Journal of the Early Republic vol. 8, no. 
3 (Autumn, 1988) 253–79, also see Henk te Velde’s (Chap. 13) 
contribution to this volume.
 60. Maartje Janse ‘“Anti societies are now all the rage”: Jokes, Criticism 
and Violence in Response to the Transformation of American 
Reform, 1825–1835’, Journal of the Early Republic 36 (Summer 
2016) 247–82; Kyle Volk, Moral Minorities and the Making of 
American Democracy (Oxford 2014); Mary Babson Fuhrer, A 
Crisis of Community: The Trials and Transformation of a New 
England Town, 1815–1848 (Chapel Hill 2014); John Brooke, 
‘Cultures of Nationalism, Movements of Reform, and the 
Composite-Federal Polity’, Journal of the Early Republic 29 (Spring 
2009) 1–33.
 61. Archibald Prentice, History of the Anti-corn-law League (1853) 30.
 62. Channing, Remarks, 4.
 63. Vernon, Politics and the People, 205.
 M. JANSE
© The Author(s) 2017
H. te Velde, M. Janse (eds.), Organizing Democracy, 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-50020-1_3
CHAPTER 3
‘Petition! Petition!! Petition!!!: Petitioning 
and Political Organization in Britain,  
c. 1800–1850’
Henry Miller
The significance and strength of petitioning as a form of political organiza-
tion lay in the fact that it was used by single-issue organizations to disci-
pline and organize campaigns and also to encourage popular participation 
and engagement. Petitioning can be seen as an alternative form of repre-
sentation at a time when the right to vote was limited, with petitioners’ 
wishes represented through issue-based demands, which were mediated, 
organized and mobilized through pressure groups and social movement 
organizations. At the same time, petitioning was inherently participatory, 
with petitions frequently the result of meetings or other forms of public 
engagement. Petitioning could therefore transcend some of the tensions 
between representation and direct action or popular assemblies and formal 
political organization explored elsewhere in this book. A study of peti-
tioning as a form of political organization is valuable in other respects. 
While petitioning was ubiquitous in nineteenth-century Britain and cen-
tral to popular political activity, it has been understudied as a general 
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 phenomenon although accounts exist of specific campaigns.1 Petitioning is 
best understood as a flexible tool or instrument that different groups used 
to serve different ends. Petitioning could be used to encourage popular 
participation while also forming a key part of the strategy of well-orga-
nized campaigns that sought to exert pressure on Parliament.
In his work on petitioning, Peter Jupp made an important distinction 
between ‘institutional’ and ‘constitutional’ petitioning. In his studies of 
the political system of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Jupp 
argued that elite politicians, especially those unsympathetic to popular 
causes, distrusted ‘institutional’ petitions produced by permanently cam-
paigning organizations, such as anti-slavery groups or Daniel O’Connell’s 
Repeal Association, which campaigned for the abolition of civil restric-
tions on Catholics that prevented them from sitting in Parliament or hold-
ing other public offices. Members of Parliament (MPs) considered such 
petitions to be the product of skilful activists and issued by central orga-
nizations rather than genuine reflections of public opinion. For example, 
in the 1840s, protectionist MPs and peers argued that free trade peti-
tions were stirred up by agents employed by the Anti-Corn Law League, 
the pressure group that campaigned for the abolition of tariffs on foreign 
grain to protect domestic farmers.2 Parliamentarians looked more favour-
ably on ‘constitutional’ petitions. These were petitions that were a sponta-
neous response to an issue, such as economic distress, which represented 
a broad cross-section of local opinion.3 For example, the many county 
meetings called in 1829–1830, which produced petitions for agricultural 
relief from economic distress, were hard to dismiss as the work of radicals, 
as they comprised landed gentlemen, tenant farmers and local notables 
and took place under the leadership of local social elites.
There was a third mode of petitioning, used mainly by popular radi-
cals, that was more participative. Popular radicals who believed in popular 
sovereignty and popular participation had much in common with radical 
democrats in the United States and revolutionaries in Europe. Radicals 
preferred to use petitioning in close association with the technique of 
the ‘mass platform’ (or huge public meetings). This mode of petition-
ing was less formally organized than ‘institutional’ petitioning and less 
hierarchical than ‘constitutional’ petitioning. It was also more confron-
tational, assertive and forceful. Radicals were dismissive of the language 
of ‘decorous servility’ traditionally used by petitioners and required by 
Parliament, arguing that the people had a right to demand redress from 
those in power. According to this view, the language of petitions should 
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be in terms of ‘resolute firmness and of determined authority’ and not be 
afraid of upsetting the sensibilities of elite politicians.4 While these differ-
ent forms of petitioning are worth distinguishing in theory, it would be 
unwise to draw too sharp a distinction in practice. Even in well-drilled and 
organized campaigns such as that of the Anti-Corn Law League, there 
were still opportunities for popular participation.
This chapter is split into three sections. Firstly, there is a brief overview 
of the enormous expansion of petitioning from the late eighteenth century 
to the mid-nineteenth century. This section outlines the huge increase in 
the volume of petitions and signatures as well as the shift to petitioning on 
public policy and national issues, and briefly examines some of the general 
methods of organization developed by the anti-slavery movement, which 
pioneered the use of petitioning in many respects. Secondly, the chapter 
considers the advantages of petitioning as a form of political participation 
and organization in this period, particularly in light of the different models 
of political organization discussed above. Thirdly and finally, the chapter 
reflects on petitioning and changes in this period, using the Anti-Corn Law 
League as a case study to highlight the shift away from the more spontane-
ous forms to the co-ordinated, orchestrated use of organized petitioning 
drives. Even so, there remained space for popular participation.
The GrowTh of PoPular PeTiTioninG
There was a phenomenal increase in the volume of public petitions to 
the House of Commons between the 1780s and the 1830s, as Table 3.1 
shows. The 1832 select committee appointed to investigate potential solu-
tions to the problems caused by this surge in popular petitioning noted 
with dry understatement that there had been ‘a progressive and very con-
siderable increase’ in public petitions.5 The number of petitions increased 
exponentially as did the number of signatures, although these were sys-
tematically recorded only after 1833. By the 1840s, tens of thousands of 
petitions were presented to the House of Commons each session, contain-
ing millions of signatures.
To give just a few examples, the first Chartist petition for male suffrage 
and other democratic reforms, presented in the House of Commons in 
1839, contained over 1.2 million signatures.6 While historians have long 
focused on the bogus signatures to the 1848 Chartist petition, even the 
most conservative estimate put the number of signatures at over 2 mil-
lion.7 The free trade campaigns led by the Anti-Corn Law League gained 
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1.25, 1.59 and 1.11  million signatures for the years 1841, 1842 and 
1843, respectively.8 The campaign of Protestant Dissenters against the 
1843 Factory Bill, whose educational clauses appeared to privilege the 
Established Church of England, generated over 10,000 petitions contain-
ing around 2  million signatures.9 The 1845 Ultra-Protestant agitation 
against the government scheme to permanently endow the Catholic semi-
nary at Maynooth in Ireland produced 1.2 million signatures.10
Outside of these well-known campaigns, there were plenty of other issues 
that generated large numbers of petitions and signatures. For instance, 
in 1840, there were 972 petitions, containing 268,259 signatures, from 
Evangelicals praying for an alteration in the system of lay patronage in the 
Church of Scotland.11 In 1842, 138 petitions, containing over 220,000 
signatures, called for the repeal of the legislative union between Britain 
and Ireland.12 The 1848 bill to allow Jews to sit in Parliament was backed 
by 849 petitions and almost 300,000 signatures.13
Enough figures have been provided to show the huge scale of petition-
ing as it developed from the late eighteenth century. This growth in the 
quantity of petitions was one key change in the culture of petitioning 
from the 1780s onwards. A second key change was that the overwhelming 
majority of petitions were increasingly on public policy and national issues 
rather than local or individual complaints. This development was part of 
what Charles Tilly has described as the ‘parliamentarization’ of British 
popular politics. Instead of directing claims at local patrons or agents of 
the state, increasingly people directed their demands and grievances at 
the centre of the British polity: Parliament.14 Petitioning for or against 
Table 3.1 Number of 
public petitions to House 
of Commons, 1785–1847
Years Number of public petitions
1785–1789 880
1801–1815 1026
1811–1815 4498
1827–1831 24,492
1837–1841 70,369
1843–1847 81,985
Source: Parliamentary Papers 1831–32 (639), Report from the 
Select Committee on Public Petitions, V, 335; PP 1847–48 (236), 
Return of the Number of Public Petitions Presented and Printed, 
1833–47, LI, 33; PP 1852–53 (166), Return of the Number of 
Petitions Presented Each of the Five Years Ending 1788–9, 1804–5, 
1814–15, 1832, 1837, 1842, 1847, and 1852, LXXXIII, 105
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proposed legislation, government policy or demands made by extra- 
parliamentary agitations became a standard part of political debate and 
culture. Long-running petitioning campaigns followed the rhythms of 
parliamentary life, with the process of organizing petitions starting before 
the new session. As the Anti-Corn Law League advised its supporters after 
Parliament had prorogued in autumn 1841, ‘These [next] five months are 
given us, the out of doors agitators against the bread tax, to work in … 
Not one of the engines already set in motion must be lazily worked, and 
more must be added’.15
While the huge expansion and change in the nature of petitioning are 
obvious to see, the reasons for this growth in popular petitioning remain 
unclear. The work of historians of anti-slavery activism has highlighted 
the importance of the abolitionist campaigns of 1787–1788, 1792 and 
1814 for pioneering new techniques of petitioning. For example, in 
1787–1788, Manchester abolitionists advertised their petition in news-
papers across the country, quickly publicizing and encouraging petitions 
from other areas.16 The anti-slavery movement also made use of the tactic 
of calling a public meeting to pass resolutions subsequently embodied in a 
petition, which was then followed up by personal canvassing to garner sig-
natures from the wider community.17 Abolitionists relied on the formation 
of local committees, firstly on an ad hoc and then on a more permanent 
basis, to manage petitioning, with strategy and timing directed by a cen-
tral body.18 While establishing new forms of organization, the anti-slavery 
movement drew heavily on religious networks, by appealing to religious 
opinion and engaging the energies of Dissent, Anglican Evangelicals and 
Scottish Presbyterians in their campaigns.19
While the innovations in petitioning by anti-slavery activists have been 
well-documented, we still know little about other factors contributing to 
the growth of petitioning from the late eighteenth century. For example, 
the precise correlation between the growth of petitioning and the expan-
sion of public meetings in this period remains to be examined.20 In terms 
of periodization, Jupp has noted the increase in popular petitioning came 
in two waves: after 1815 and then with another surge after 1832.21 There 
were differences between these two waves. Between 1815 and 1832, the 
presentation of petitions allowed MPs to speak and initiate debate, dis-
rupting and interrupting parliamentary business. After 1832, the right to 
speak on petitions was restricted by procedural changes, but petitions and 
the number of signatures were systematically recorded for the first time 
by a permanent Select Committee on Public Petitions. This development 
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encouraged pressure groups and campaigns to maximize the number of 
signatures, as well as petitions, to impress parliamentarians, the press and 
opponents. This led to ever-increasing numbers of petitions and signa-
tures in the 1840s, but the organizational techniques used led to com-
plaints that they were effectively manufactured by well-organized political 
machines.
Finally, the abolition of the slave trade (1807), the repeal of the Test 
and Corporation Acts (1828), Catholic emancipation (1829), the Reform 
Act (1832) and the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies (1833) 
all vindicated and validated the use of petitioning by political associations, 
pressure groups and radical movements. While Innes has rightly noted the 
failure rate of many campaigns, the examples above seemed to suggest that 
sheer weight of numbers would force Parliament to give way and engen-
dered an optimism about the power of petitioning that was common to 
many campaigns in this period.22 In 1830, an abolitionist urged petitions 
for the abolition of slavery as ‘these are not times in which a Ministry, a body 
of Representatives or a House of Peers would withstand such an appeal as 
this!!’.23 Just over a decade later, a free trader expressed similar sentiments:
[I]t is by petitioning that the views of the people can best be shown; and 
consequently, let petitions be sent, not only from large towns and cities, but 
from villages and hamlets; not alone from thousands and tens of thousands 
of people, but from hundreds, and twenties and tens. Let this be done, and 
the death blow will be given to the bread tax monopoly.24
The advanTaGes of PeTiTioninG as a MeThod 
of PoliTical orGanizaTion
Petitioning possessed several attractions to campaigners as a mode of polit-
ical organization and activity. Firstly, its ancient constitutional pedigree 
meant that it legitimized other forms of political activity and allowed cam-
paigners to push the boundaries of parliamentary conventions. Secondly, 
petitioning uniquely provided direct access to Parliament and indeed the 
debating chamber of the House of Commons. Thirdly, petitioning was a 
key form of political organization, giving coherence and order to national 
campaigns that remained, in many respects, heavily localized. Fourthly, 
petitioning was closely associated with the idea of public opinion that 
became increasingly pervasive from the late eighteenth century.
 H. MILLER
However, it is important to remember that petitioning was widely 
adopted partly because of the lack of alternatives. The right to vote in par-
liamentary elections remained heavily restricted throughout this period. 
The estimated UK electorate was around 500,000, or 16% of the adult 
male population, in 1801. Due to the vagaries of the unreformed electoral 
system and the franchise, some constituencies had relatively large, socially 
inclusive electorates, while others had few electors or were firmly under 
the control of local patrons. While the 1832 Reform Act had a significant 
impact in terms of reinvigorating parliamentary government and mak-
ing Parliament more responsive to public opinion, the electorate rose to 
only just over 800,000 or 18% of the adult male population.25 Petitioning 
was a means of mass popular political participation and mobilization in a 
political system that was by modern conventional measures remarkably 
undemocratic.
The widespread use of petitioning is easy to understand given the 
restricted franchise, but it also benefitted from some of the issues involved 
with other forms of political activity. Historians of the eighteenth century, 
influenced by Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, have high-
lighted in rich detail the expansion of urban associational life, free from 
aristocratic patronage and control, as evidenced by the proliferation of 
newspapers, voluntary associations and public culture involving the ‘mid-
dling sort’.26 However, the public sphere was effectively closed down in 
the 1790s with the raft of legislative restrictions placed on freedom of 
assembly, freedom of speech and liberty of the press by Tory governments, 
designed to clamp down on radicalism.27 For example, print was priced 
out of the reach of many by a series of duties on paper, advertisements and 
newspapers that were collectively dubbed the ‘taxes on knowledge’. The 
use of the mass platform by post-war radicals was eventually curtailed by 
legislation passed in 1819.28
Other forms of political organization and activity after the 1820s were 
also not without their problems. For example, ‘electoral pressure’, regis-
tering supporters as electors to establish an electoral bloc in a constituency 
that could be used to oust or pressure MPs into changing their opinions, 
became feasible after the 1832 Reform Act. However, it was an expensive 
strategy that only the most deep-pocketed pressure groups could afford to 
indulge in.29 For movements such as Chartism, which was largely made up 
of ordinary working people, the cheapness and accessibility of petitioning 
were key parts of its appeal.30
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A crucial advantage of petitioning was that it was an ancient right and 
undoubtedly constitutional. In the 1790s, loyalist, conservative, Tory 
and government opponents of political change frequently contrasted the 
British constitution with revolutionary France. Through a ‘balanced’ con-
stitution consisting of King, Lords and Commons, with each branch acting 
as a check on the other, Britain secured the benefits of monarchy, aristoc-
racy and democracy without the disadvantages. The gradual accretion of 
constitutional precedents secured the practical freedoms, such as property 
rights, enjoyed by freeborn Englishmen. The British system, its defend-
ers claimed, combined order with liberty, freedom with authority, unlike 
revolutionary France, which in sweeping away traditional customs had 
created anarchy, disorder and bloodshed.31 In the rhetorical war between 
loyalists and conservatives, on the one hand, and radicals and reformers, 
on the other, it was easy for the former to claim that corresponding soci-
eties were akin to Jacobin clubs, that radical publications were seditious 
and that public meetings or dinners were necessarily threatening and con-
spiratorial. Such arguments were used to justify and defend government 
measures to curb freedom of speech and assembly in the 1790s. However, 
it was harder to mobilize such arguments against petitioning given its 
impeccable constitutional credentials, as even William Pitt, prime minister 
1784–1801 and 1804–1806, was forced to admit.32 This left petitioning 
as one of the few forms of political participation and mobilization not 
subjected to checks in the late eighteenth and early  nineteenth centuries, 
and ‘the right to petition provided an entering wedge even when the state 
had filled other gaps in the polity’s wall’.33 While the constitution was 
not democratic, the Anti-Corn Law League argued that through petition-
ing, it ‘does afford means, which, if perseveringly worked, will enable us 
to attain our end, and it is our duty to work them until we get a better 
constitution’.34
The constitutionalism of petitioning legitimized political activity that 
was ostensibly for the purpose of petitioning Parliament, most obviously 
public meetings. Furthermore, as James Epstein has noted, while they 
were often on the defensive in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, radicals were able to make use of constitutional practices, his-
torical precedents and common law to defend popular liberties.35 It was 
no coincidence, then, that popular radicals such as William Cobbett pre-
sented the right to petition as one of the cherished birthrights of the 
freeborn Englishman.36 As noted above, popular radicals used petition-
ing to address Parliament in confrontational language that questioned the 
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legitimacy of the legislature and demanded redress. Even agitations often 
portrayed as essentially middle class, such as the Anti-Corn Law League, 
used language that carried an implicit threat should Parliament ignore the 
petitions. As the League’s newspaper thundered in 1841: ‘Let there be at 
least two millions [of signatures] this session, and it will be a fool-hardy 
legislature indeed which dares to resist the prayer’.37
Petitioning was also used to push the boundaries of what was accept-
able according to parliamentary conventions. This leads to a second key 
advantage of petitioning as a mode of political organization and mobiliza-
tion: it provided direct access to Parliament and could bring issues right to 
the heart of the legislature, something no other form of political activity 
could provide. For all the vitality and vibrancy of election meetings, which 
historians such as Jon Lawrence have rightly emphasized, the fact is that 
under the terms of the Septennial Act, general or parliamentary elections 
could be up to seven years apart.38 Petitioning enabled a constant stream 
of pressure to be exerted on Parliament and kept issues on the political 
agenda in the long gaps between parliamentary elections. Nothing would 
compel Parliament to act except ‘constant, urgent pressure’ in the view of 
the League.39 Petitioning allowed public grievances and popular politics to 
be directly introduced to the heart of the political system.
As many pressure groups recognized, petitioning provided access to 
what remained throughout the nineteenth century an exclusive space that 
was largely the preserve of a male, hereditary, landed class. For example, 
the Chartists combined signatures into one huge petition, demonstrating 
the weight of numbers behind their cause. The 1842 petition, which was 
six miles long, was paraded around London through a procession before 
its presentation in Parliament. The petition legitimized and provided an 
excuse to have a Chartist demonstration in the heart of the capital. The 
petition was so bulky that it got stuck in the doorway to the Commons 
chamber.40 The Chartist case is a good example of the theatricality of 
presenting petitions and the ways in which those campaigners outside 
Parliament sought to impress, even intimidate, legislators and gain public-
ity for their cause. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, both the Chartists 
and the Anti-Corn Law League campaigned for the right for petitioners 
to be heard at the bar of the Commons, a demand that was rejected. This 
was another way in which agitations attempted to use petitions as a means 
to bring their issues right into the Commons chamber.41
The way that petitioning evolved between the 1780s and 1820s pro-
vided further opportunities for agitations to use petitions as a means for 
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initiating debates and disrupting parliamentary business. Peter Fraser has 
written that the huge increase in the volume of petitions meant that by 
the late 1820s, the House of Commons spent almost all its time debat-
ing petitions. This was due to the procedure for introducing petitions 
and tabling motions. According to parliamentary conventions, substantive 
issues or motions, such as the abolition of slavery, could be debated only 
once a session. However, presenting petitions allowed debates on such 
issues to be initiated and kept on the parliamentary agenda throughout 
the session.42 This was because before the procedural reforms of 1833, 
parliamentary conventions allowed the presentation of a petition to be 
used to put up to four questions to the House, to be voted on. Combined 
with the sheer volume of petitions, this enabled parliamentary spokesmen 
for extra- parliamentary agitations to disrupt and hold up parliamentary 
business.
A third advantage of petitioning was that it provided a focal point for 
agitations and national movements that were heavily localized. Petitioning 
struck a balance between local initiative and central co-ordination, between 
participation and organization. National political movements often frag-
mented along regional lines, or, tellingly, when successful or coherent, 
often drew their strength from a particular region, such as the Anti-Corn 
Law League and the Lancashire cotton district, for instance.43 Petitioning 
campaigns, just like lecture tours or the use of official newspapers, were a 
way of providing national coherence and a collective identity to political 
movements that were largely carried on at a local level.44
Last but certainly not least, petitioning was increasingly valued as a 
means of political mobilization as it seemed to represent and reflect public 
opinion, a notion that gained credence from the later eighteenth century. 
The value of petitions (and increasingly signatures) for pressure groups 
and other political organizations was that it enabled them to claim the 
support of public opinion. This was important in two respects. Firstly, 
even parliamentarians who were opposed to political reform were forced 
to acknowledge the power of public opinion, if only rhetorically. By the 
1820s, public opinion, usually associated with respectable, or middle-class, 
opinion, was generally accepted as a legitimate part of the political process 
by many MPs. Despite some criticism and complaints about the means 
by which agitations got up petitions, many MPs accepted them as rough 
indicators of public opinion.45 Secondly, where political campaigns faced 
rival or counter-petitioning campaigns, it became essential to get more 
petitions and signatures to claim that they better reflected public opin-
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ion. For example, in 1792, anti-slavery campaigners quickly responded 
to a pro-slavery petition from Manchester signed by 400 people with one 
opposing slavery signed by over 2000.46 In the 1840s, the Anti-Corn Law 
League urged its supporters not only of the necessity of improving on 
the previous year’s totals for the number of petitions and signatures but 
also of comprehensively outperforming the petitioning campaigns of the 
agricultural protectionists. The League’s opponents, who had previously 
emphasized the quality of their petitions (i.e. representing the respectable 
or notable portion of local communities), were forced to adopt strategies 
to maximize the quantity of petitions and signatures.47
orGanizaTion and ParTiciPaTion: The case 
of The anTi-corn law leaGue
In many respects, the League perfected the organization of petitioning, 
building on past innovations by the anti-slavery movement and adding 
new tactics, which combined to provide a model for later agitations. To 
use Tilly’s idea of repertoires of contention, the League made full use of 
existing repertoires available to them and expanded them. The example of 
the League highlights how by the 1840s petitioning drives had become 
professionally organized and co-ordinated by permanent associations and 
less spontaneous than they had been earlier. Organization was essential to 
co-ordinate extra-parliamentary activity so that petitions were timed to 
arrive in Parliament with maximum impact. In 1839, J.B. Smith, one of 
the leaders of the League, wanted a stream of petitions to be presented 
every day in the House of Commons.48 Activity was timed to peak before 
Charles Villiers’s annual anti-corn law motion in the House of Commons 
and directed through the medium of the League’s official newspaper and 
circulars and correspondence between the League’s leaders and local activ-
ists and free traders. Model pro-forma texts were published in the League’s 
newspaper and circulated by itinerant lecturers, and petitioning forms for 
signatures were also available from the League’s printer.49
Considerable emphasis was put on maximizing the number of petitions 
and signatures. The systematic recording of petitions and signatures after 
1833 stimulated campaigns to engage in a numbers game and undoubt-
edly encouraged methods designed to artfully inflate signatures and peti-
tions. To maximize the number of signatures, the League suggested that 
petitions from public meetings signed only by the chairman should always 
be paired with separate petitions signed by the inhabitants.50 Many of the 
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inhabitants’ petitions from large towns contained huge numbers of sig-
natures, in the tens of thousands. To maximize the number of petitions, 
free traders adopted the tactics of anti-slavery and protectionist campaign-
ers and called for many petitions to be sent from separate places even if 
signed by only a handful of people. Richard Cobden, the League’s driving 
force, advised one free trader to ‘send up as many petitions from as many 
places as possible. Even if it be a hamlet of three houses only it will do for 
a pet[itio]n’.51 Others applied this formula of many petitions with a small 
number of signatures on a grand scale. As one London organizer wrote:
We have men employed for the purpose of getting petitions signed and in a 
very short time the number so signed will be large indeed. There is a double 
advantage in this plan of separate petitions. If we send a parish petition to a 
particular workshop a few only of the people employed will sign it but if you 
make it their own petition nearly all will sign. This plan of separate petition 
not only gives numerous petitions – a great advantage – but also affords 
more signatures.52
As this quote suggests, League organizers in London made use of paid 
agents or canvassers to work street by street. In 1840, Sidney Smith, chief 
organizer for the Metropolitan Anti-Corn Law Association, claimed that 
he could secure ‘all the petitions you choose to fund’ and 250,000 sig-
natures in the capital through this plan if money was forwarded from his 
Manchester overlords.53
In smaller places, local Anti-Corn Law Associations took the responsi-
bility of dividing the town into districts with each one canvassed by mem-
bers.54 Activists also used towns as a base to tour and secure petitions 
from the surrounding area.55 In the southern agricultural districts that 
were often protectionist strongholds, anti-corn law petitions were orches-
trated by the League’s itinerant lecturers during their speaking tours. For 
example, in 1841, the League lecturer James Acland reported that he was 
on track to send over 200 petitions from Buckinghamshire.56 The League 
also encouraged petitions from religious congregations and workplaces, 
particularly factories.57 Workplace petitions accounted for a high propor-
tion of petitions from the industrial northwest, over 900 out of almost 
1300 petitions in 1841.58
As with anti-slavery activism, the free trade campaign drew on the ener-
gies of female activists to canvass for petitions, while exploiting female petitions 
to emphasize the morality of the anti-corn laws cause. As  is becoming 
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increasingly apparent, petitioning was a key form of political participa-
tion for women in an era when they were denied political and property 
rights (which frequently went hand in hand) and in which the rhetoric 
of gendered separate spheres limited the space for public political activity 
in theory if not always in practice.59 In late 1841, the League embarked 
on a new strategy designed to complement its petitioning drive: sending 
a memorial to Queen Victoria from the women of the United Kingdom, 
appealing to the monarch as a woman to use the royal prerogative in favour 
of repeal of the corn laws.60 Speaking in Bolton, the celebrated anti-slavery 
lecturer George Thompson reminded his female audience of the influence 
they had exercised on the question of slavery and declared his belief that 
it required ‘but the women of Britain to give the casting vote in favour of 
the repeal of the bread tax’.61 The Bolton memorial ended up being signed 
by 16,000 women and being 50 yards long.62
The League’s petitioning campaign was remarkably successful in mobi-
lizing numbers behind the anti-corn law agitation. Between 1839 and 
1843, when the League abandoned petitioning to switch to a strategy 
of electoral pressure, over 17,000 anti-corn law petitions were sent to 
Parliament containing over 5.8 million signatures.63 Indeed the League 
was almost too successful in its organization of petitioning. With some 
justice, opponents alleged that petitions were stirred up by paid agitators 
using unconstitutional methods. In 1843, a parliamentary investigation 
found that one free-trade organizer had forged 201 out of 214 signa-
tures on one petition from south Yorkshire.64 Three years later, another 
select committee ruefully observed that some of the methods used by the 
League were bringing the ancient tradition of petitioning into disrepute.65
Contemporary accusations by Chartist and protectionist opponents 
that the League’s petitioning drives were inflated by misrepresentation, 
inauthentic signatures and the undue influence of employers over their 
workforce are one reason why the campaign was not taken seriously until 
recently. The League’s abandonment of petitioning in 1843 due to its 
apparent ineffectiveness in favour of an electoral strategy is another reason 
why historians long neglected the League’s use of petitioning. Yet while a 
degree of fraud was probably inevitable in large petitioning campaigns, it 
would be wrong to dismiss anti-corn law petitions as merely the product 
of a ruthless, professional organization. The petitioning campaign offered 
an opportunity for people to participate and make their voices heard. In 
this respect, petitioning allowed for a popular mobilization on behalf of 
free trade that was open to everyone. The switch to election campaigning 
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and fundraising reduced the opportunity for ordinary people who lacked 
the franchise or deep pockets to participate.66
Furthermore, petitioning drives used ‘open’ forms of signature collec-
tion that relied on genuine popular political participation as well as orga-
nized methods. These open methods, such as leaving petitions to lie in 
public places, gave people the freedom to sign or not and can be seen as a 
positive engagement with the petitioning process, beyond the solicitation 
by activists.67 The adoption of petitions at public meetings was another key 
way in which petitions fostered popular participation. A Bristol organizer 
wrote in 1840 that ‘the petition prepared by your Association was exposed 
in the streets & public meet[ing]s & signed by 6 or 7000’.68 The huge suc-
cess of the League’s campaign relied upon local activity, albeit encouraged 
from the centre. Petitions were products of local popular mobilization and 
often sources of local pride. For example, in Bilston in the Black Country, 
a correspondent boasted that their petition was 63 feet long and contained 
over 4000 signatures. Furthermore, ‘These names were not obtained after 
the bread-taxers’ fashion, by subtlety or force, but were all voluntarily 
attached at the leading shops in the town’.69 The impressive organization 
of the League’s petitioning campaign should not be forgotten, but neither 
should it overshadow the fact that huge numbers of people chose to sign 
these petitions, displaying their own agency, and were not simply cajoled, 
intimidated or duped into it by skilful agitators.
conclusion and reflecTions
The scale and nature of petitioning changed hugely in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The popularity of petitioning can be partly explained 
by the lack of other avenues for popular political participation at this time 
but also the unique advantages that petitioning offered as a means of polit-
ical organization. The constitutional pedigree of petitioning allowed it to 
escape curbs on other forms of political activity, and it provided a way to 
bring popular politics to the very heart of an undemocratic representative 
system. Petitioning struck a balance between local activity and central co- 
ordination and enabled movements to claim the support of public opin-
ion, an increasingly important commodity in the eyes of legislators. Due 
to the innovations of successive agitations, petitioning by the 1840s was 
largely organized by permanent campaigning bodies and less spontaneous. 
Yet we should be careful of assuming that there was some ‘golden age’ 
when petitioning reflected the unmediated voice of the public. Even the 
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campaigns of the League, arguably the most efficiently organized petition-
ing drives of the period under discussion, offered considerable space for 
genuine popular participation from people who lacked the means or rights 
(such as the franchise) to contribute through the other, limited meth-
ods available at this time. Petitioning, then, combined organization with 
popular participation, avoiding some of the tensions between these two 
models analysed elsewhere in this book. It must always be remembered 
that petitioning remained the most open, accessible and cheapest form of 
political participation for ordinary people, and this fact goes a long way 
towards explaining its extraordinary popularity and why it was used by so 
many different campaigns across the political spectrum.
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CHAPTER 4
Can ‘The People’ Speak? Popular Meetings 
and the Ambiguities of Popular Sovereignty 
in the United States, 1816–1828
Reeve Huston
Twenty-five years ago, the historian Edmund Morgan argued that from the 
seventeenth century forward, a fiction lay at the core of Anglo-American 
politics: that government rested on the consent of ‘the people’. That this 
was a fiction is not hard to demonstrate. Popular sovereignty posited a 
unitary people with a single will, something that has never existed. Even 
the most democratic polity cannot translate the multiple, changing, con-
flicting wills of the citizenry into a coherent policy regime; no governing 
structure, even in revolutionary governments, has put every social and 
political relationship up for debate and transformation. Policy coherence 
and the maintenance of power equally demanded that some policies, 
 institutions, and relationships—usually most of them—be removed from 
the influence of ordinary people.1
The fictitious character of popular sovereignty did not, however, 
stop people from trying to achieve it. The belief that the people should 
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rule  provided justification and ideological grounding for virtually every 
instance in which ordinary US citizens entered the public arena during 
the early nineteenth century. Ronald Formisano has argued that the cen-
tral feature of what he calls ‘populist’ movements during this period was 
an effort to close the gap between the ideal and the practice of popular 
sovereignty.2 I think that he is right about this and wish to build on his 
insight to ask a different question: How did always-unattainable quality of 
popular sovereignty affect Americans’ thinking about it?
This chapter seeks to answer this question for the United States in a 
particular period: the interregnum between the first and second ‘party 
systems’ (1815–1824, often misleadingly referred to as the ‘Era of Good 
Feelings’), when the United States was a one-party state and politics 
briefly turned on axes other than partisanship. Like Americans at every 
moment between the Revolution and the turn of the twentieth century, 
all white Americans during this period (and many others as well) embraced 
the idea that ‘the people’ should rule. As partisan conflict abated, they 
sought to put this ideal into practice in a wide variety of ways. In doing so, 
they unleashed extraordinary democratic energy, shaping political thought 
and practice for years to come. At the same time, they exposed the con-
tradictions and ambiguities embedded in the doctrine of popular sover-
eignty. Conservatives and radicals, political operatives, elites, and ordinary 
citizens all affirmed that ‘the people’ spoke in a single voice. But they 
invoked ‘the people’ to demand multiple, often conflicting policies and 
notions of governance. Politically active Americans in the early nineteenth 
century repeatedly wrestled with a knot of questions: How was one to 
know when ‘the people’ had spoken? How was the power of the citizenry 
to be exercised? What limits, if any, should be placed on ‘the people’s’ 
will? What function should representatives play in eliciting, interpreting, 
enacting, mediating, and/or blunting the expressed will of their constitu-
ents? Americans during the inaccurately named ‘Era of Good Feelings’ 
fought repeatedly over these questions. In doing so, they helped reshape 
American political practice and thought.
Nowhere were the contradictions and ambiguities embedded in popu-
lar sovereignty and the conflicts over how to resolve them more revealingly 
exposed than in public assemblies. Popular meetings were widespread in 
the so-called Era of Good Feelings. As partisanship waned after 1815, 
political elites abandoned their former practices of popular mobilization 
and government became less responsive. Ordinary people and outsider 
political activists began experimenting with inherited forms of popular 
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political mobilization and expression—especially through assemblies. A 
wide variety of activists called public meetings for numerous purposes: to 
benefit their faction at election time, repeal laws, oppose or promote the 
western spread of slavery, reform morals, and promote a plethora of eco-
nomic reforms. Although these meetings used the same forms and proce-
dures, the implicit political theory that informed them varied enormously. 
Organizers envisioned widely varying roles for ‘the people’ in public life. 
Meetings, in short, were the most prominent manifestation of a core 
political development of the Era of Good Feelings. They embodied an 
outpouring of democratic activity and sparked endless debate over what, 
exactly, ‘democracy’ was.
Public assemblies were part of a political inheritance reaching back to 
the colonial era. By the early eighteenth century, gatherings of subjects 
were taken to embody the will of local communities, and the aggrieved 
made use of those gatherings to present their grievances as those of the 
community as a whole. New Englanders viewed the town meeting as the 
voice of a homogeneous, united community. Throughout the English 
colonies, most people saw riots and ‘regulations’ (armed rural uprisings) 
as nothing more than local communities defending themselves. The mobi-
lization of ordinary citizens during the Imperial Crisis and the Revolution 
transformed these traditions. Middling and poorer Americans learned to 
intervene purposefully in affairs of state and came to believe that they as 
well as gentlemen were capable of and entitled to doing so. The local, 
defensive orientation of crowd actions often (but not always) gave way 
to a focus on national aspirations and a capacity to act proactively. As a 
frightened Gouverneur Morris declared, ‘the mob begin to think and to 
reason’. Between the outbreak of war and the ratification of the federal 
constitution, crowds came to act as a part of government, enforcing the 
decisions of revolutionary committees. The number of popular meetings 
proliferated, and middling and poorer people learned the basic rules and 
procedures of deliberative assemblies. Many argued that ‘the people out of 
doors’ should remain a part of government, claiming the right to instruct 
their representatives and to formally approve or veto legislation.3
The suppression of Shay’s Rebellion and the political ascendancy of the 
Federalists silenced the more radical claims for ‘the people out of doors’. 
But despite strenuous efforts, the Federalists failed to suppress or discredit 
public meetings that criticized governmental measures. Indeed, by the late 
1790s they came to encourage public engagement in politics, including in 
deliberative assemblies, as a way of combatting their political rivals, the 
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Republicans. Between 1800 and 1815, the frequency of public assem-
blies multiplied as both parties organized their constituents into meetings, 
nominating conventions, and electoral committees. But the variety and 
purposes of those meetings narrowed dramatically, as the number of inde-
pendent popular movements dropped dramatically at the very moment 
that partisan mobilization flourished.4
Partisan mobilization came to an abrupt halt in most of the United 
States after 1815. The Federalist Party collapsed under the weight of its 
reputation as a cabal of Anglophile traitors, and Republicans in most states, 
facing no significant opposition, abandoned popular political mobiliza-
tion. Increasingly, politicians practiced an insider game. Political alliances 
came to rest on what politicians called ‘friendship’: a patron-client rela-
tionship that centered on an exchange of favors. Elections, in the words 
of Donald Ratcliffe, became ‘one-sided personality contests’. Candidates’ 
friends promoted them on the basis of their character, talents, and devo-
tion to principle (without specifying which principles they were devoted 
to), while circulating unflattering rumors about their rivals. At the core of 
these changes lay a radical individualization of politics. Political choices 
ceased to be a collective matter and became the province of individual 
conscience and judgment. More than during the first decade of the cen-
tury, legislators came to treasure their ‘independence’—their freedom 
from any influence, including party or constituent pressure. Even voting 
came to be viewed as the aggregation of individual choices rather than a 
collective expression of a united citizenry. Increasingly, newspapers and 
political operatives came to label electioneering in any form—including 
calling party nominations and electoral meetings—as unwarranted ‘inter-
ference’ in the autonomous decision-making of voters.5
Public meetings were expected to follow the same procedure as they 
had before 1815. Each should be announced publicly (usually in the news-
papers) well in advance in order to ensure wide attendance. Upon assem-
bling, participants elected a chair and secretary pro  tempore. Typically, 
after hearing speeches, a committee (usually appointed by the chair, some-
times elected by the meeting as a whole) retired to compose resolutions 
expressing the sentiments of the meeting. Sometimes, the committee also 
wrote an address to the public. Ideally, these documents should be read 
aloud and approved or altered by the meeting. The secretary then pub-
lished them, along with the proceedings of the meeting, in the relevant 
newspapers. In theory, the chair’s job was to ensure that each speaker had 
equal opportunity to be heard and that participants were given a chance 
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to ask questions and raise objections—in short, that collective decisions 
were transparent and uncoerced. The purpose of these procedures was to 
ensure that meetings arrived at the unmediated, informed sentiments of 
the people attending and conveyed them to a broader public.6
Transparent, uncoerced deliberation, full discussion with freedom of 
speech on all sides—these were widely held expectations of meetings, which 
each meeting sought diligently to appear to uphold. Whether the meet-
ing’s organizers intended to uphold those expectations in substance was 
another question. In New York and Pennsylvania, where partisan mobi-
lization continued unabated after the War of 1812, electoral meetings 
remained a staple of political campaigns, and activists in other states occa-
sionally called such meetings as well. Wherever they were held, election- 
time assemblies were run by the ‘friends’ of the candidate—political clients 
who were tied to a great man by personal loyalty and an exchange of 
favors. Typically, candidates’ friends called a meeting and induced their 
clients to attend and to pressure their own dependents to attend. In 1816, 
when the friends of John Pope convinced two militia companies to call a 
convention to nominate someone to run against Henry Clay, Clay wrote 
to Willis Field, asking him to get other militia companies to pass resolu-
tions opposing the convention
I think … it would have an excellent effect if some company in Woodford 
county would meet and express in resolves [a refusal to concur in the nomi-
nation].… Can you not with some of my other friends get such resolutions 
adopted by some company? 7
Election-time meetings, in other words, were a show of strength by a 
candidate’s ‘interest’—a chain of clientage held together by personal loy-
alty and favors. Still, these meetings presented themselves as assemblies 
of ‘the people’ or of ‘the republican citizens’ of a town or county. Such 
claims were frequently ridiculed by the meeting’s opponents. According 
to a Pittsburgh newspaper editor, the process of holding a public meeting 
began when the local committee of vigilance advertised it in an obscure 
newspaper or through handbills handed out to a small circle of friends
The people know little or nothing of all this—two or three of our cronies 
in different townships, hold these elections and return if possible one of 
themselves as a delegate. Our delegates meet—we make a great noise about 
republicanism—protest against caucusing—talk much about democracy and 
the rights of the people—and then pompously announce to the public that 
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the delegates chosen by the democratic republicans of the different townships 
have formed a ticket to be run at the election—and woe to the man who 
dares to question our authority.… By this happy management we save the 
people an immensity of trouble.8
As partisan meetings became rarer and more tightly managed, the number 
of extra-partisan meetings exploded. The Era of Good Feelings witnessed 
the sudden intrusion of formerly minor issues—the expansion of slavery; 
banking, credit, and monetary policy; the responsiveness of elected officials 
to constituent demands—into public life. Initially, none of these issues was 
raised or debated along partisan lines. In the absence of an elite committed 
to popular mobilization, these issues gave rise to political experimentation, 
much of which aimed at developing (or recovering) effective forms of self- 
mobilization on the part of the citizenry. For reasons of space, this chapter 
will discuss only two examples: the public mobilization against a congres-
sional pay raise in 1816 and the wave of popular organizing that occurred 
in response to the Panic of 1819.
The first major effort at non-partisan popular mobilization arose in 
response to the Compensation Act. In 1816, Congress raised its pay from 
six dollars per day to 1500 dollars a year, retroactive to the beginning of 
the current Congress. Scores of meetings and hundreds of letters to the 
editor excoriated the law. Grand juries denounced it, and in one case a 
crowd burned its congressman in effigy.9 These assemblies seem to have 
been dominated by political neophytes. In Saratoga County, New York, 
only 4 of the 53 men who served as delegates or officers in protest meet-
ings (7.5 percent) had participated in a Federalist meeting in the previ-
ous five years (there was no Republican newspaper in Saratoga County). 
Another 7.5 percent had participated in quasi-Federalist meetings, like the 
Fourth of July celebration or the Saratoga Bible Society. As a congressman 
observed, the Compensation Act ‘aroused into active opposition … many 
who had seldom if ever been seen before on the political theatre’.10
Public meetings attacked the compensation law on a number of grounds. 
It expanded Congress’s powers beyond constitutional limits and sacrificed 
the public interest to the private advantage of congressmen. The new salaries 
greatly exceeded what critics saw as the actual value of representatives’ labor. 
As such, it robbed ‘the people’ of the fruits of their labor and turned the 
people’s representatives into ‘a privileged order’, separate from and above the 
people. This sort of ‘usurpation, encroachment, and corruption’ constituted 
‘the greatest danger which now threatens [sic] our rights … as citizens’.
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Most opponents of the law viewed their public meetings in a way that 
had been standard since the early 1790s: as a portion of ‘the people’ exer-
cising their ‘right … to … take into consideration the acts of its govern-
ment, … and freely discuss them and express their opinion of the same’. 
Protest meetings claimed to represent only those attending. But they 
did expect their actions to produce consequences in public life. Popular 
assemblies served to organize the citizens of a given locality for political 
action. Meetings throughout the US expressed their determination, as the 
citizens of Milton, New York, declared, ‘to withhold our votes from every 
candidate for any elective office … who shall have given his vote, encour-
agement, countenance or influence for the increase’ of congressional sala-
ries. Several followed the example of a Nashville meeting, which requested 
that those who voted for the Compensation Act ‘VACATE their seats, that 
the people may have an opportunity of choosing others who would not 
misrepresent them’.11
Assemblies also served to communicate public sentiment to represen-
tatives. Countless meetings drafted petitions and remonstrances to their 
congressmen and senators. Although they claimed to represent only the 
people attending, they clearly viewed themselves as a part of ‘the people’, 
and they believed that meetings, letters to newspapers, grand jury resolu-
tions, and votes at militia musters, all expressing the same sentiments in 
sufficient number, constituted an expression of the will of a unitary people. 
The citizens of Stillwater, New York, declared that when public servants, 
once remonstrated for their conduct by their constituents, continued to 
‘act incorrigibly, and endeavor to outrage the opinions of their employers, 
then it becomes the duty of the citizens to hurl them from their seats, and 
commit the care of their civil rights, to more worthy servants’. The rem-
edy they proposed was an uncontroversial one—even Federalists had rec-
ognized the rights of the people to vote unfaithful representatives out of 
office. Nonetheless, their measure of a representatives’ faithfulness was a 
radical one, not voiced widely since the 1780s: obedience to the expressed 
will of constituents. A Fourth of July toast in Washington, Pennsylvania, 
summarized this position even more pungently: ‘Representation. What 
matters it whether a government be called a monarchy, or a republic, if the 
representative can with impunity disregard the wishes of his constituents? 
The will of the people is LAW, to the faithful lawmaker’.12
Here was a doctrine that promised to transform constituents’ relation-
ship to their representatives. Since the revolutionary era, ‘the people out 
of doors’ had not presumed to dictate how their representatives should 
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vote. Petitions were uniformly deferential, ‘praying’ for specific relief or 
simply expressing the opinion of the signers. The widespread demand 
that representatives repeal the Compensation Act directly challenged the 
independence that officials treasured. More broadly, anti-compensation 
activists openly violated their representatives’ expectation of deference. 
Protesters vilified, even harassed, the supporters of the bill. The names of 
Maryland’s congressmen who had voted for the bill were posted ‘at all the 
taverns, stores, blacksmith’s shops and cross roads’ in Frederick County. 
The citizens of Putnam County, Georgia, burned the bill’s supporters in 
effigy. Many representatives shared the sentiments of Thomas Clayton of 
Delaware, who professed to feel ‘deeply injured’ by the ‘public degrada-
tion’ he faced.13
Anti-compensation activists also transformed the nature of politi-
cal campaigning, if only for one election. Normally, politicians avoided 
discussing policies in their campaigns. They expected to be judged on 
their character, their talents, and their record of service. Opponents of the 
salary law throughout the country demanded that incumbents and chal-
lengers alike state their position on the Act. They vowed to vote against 
anyone who voted for it, who would not promise to repeal it, even, in 
some places, who accepted the new salary. In many areas, protesters made 
the act a litmus test in races for the state legislature, for it was legislators 
who would select senators.14
In short, constituents were injecting issues into politics, holding their 
representatives accountable for their policy choices, and insisting that 
those representatives obey their instructions. Even more surprising, many 
congressmen went along. Some conservatives, like Timothy Pickering, 
resigned rather than knuckle under. But many more promised to reverse 
themselves and vote for repeal. When ‘A Fayetteville Voter’ called on 
J.  Carrel Breckenridge to state his position on the Compensation Act, 
Breckenridge wrote that ‘The right of the people to make such a call, is 
not questioned’. He declared his opposition to the bill and promised to 
work for repeal. Scores of congressmen did the same.15
The fall elections proved devastating to supporters of the Compensation 
Act. Nearly 70 percent of House members were not returned to office—
considerably more than the usual turnover of 50 percent. Only 19 percent 
of the men who voted for the law were reelected.16 When the outgoing 
Congress returned for its lame-duck session (i.e., its final session before 
being replaced), repentant members acknowledged their obligation to 
obey their constituents. ‘The people’, one congressman observed, were 
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the ‘owners and sovereigns’ of the country. Representatives were merely 
‘their stewards’ or ‘agents’. Another condemned ‘that high-toned prin-
ciple, which caused a man … to set up his opinion in opposition to the 
opinions of thirty-five thousand of his constituents.… He ceased to be 
a Representative of the people when he did so, and represented himself 
alone’.17
Conservatives ridiculed their colleagues’ posture of obedience. In the 
first place, they argued, those colleagues were genuflecting to a chimera. 
‘The voice of the people has not been heard’, declaimed John Hurlburt 
of Massachusetts. ‘It was the clamor of newspapers, it was the voice of 
party spirit, of faction, and misrepresentation’. John C.  Calhoun chal-
lenged advocates of binding instruction to ‘produce their instructions, 
properly authenticated. Let them name the time and place at which the 
people assembled, and deliberated on this question’. Thomas Grosvenor 
of New York went further, questioning whether ‘the people’ were capable 
of voicing a stable will. If a champion of constituent instruction were to 
obey the people’s will, he thundered,
Surely he would demand … that the voice he was about to worship should 
be that of a clear majority.… How can he ascertain that majority? Is there 
any method prescribed in the Constitution or the law? No; he must watch, 
and listen, and catch the voice of his district, as it floats on the breeze; or he 
must read it, if he can, in the popular shouts which issue from partial meet-
ings and conventions of the people.18
Even if ‘the people’ could be heard, conservatives argued, legislators were 
duty-bound to obey their own judgment and conscience—judgment 
that they believed to be superior to that of their constituents. With the 
‘doctrine of obligatory instruction’, Grosvenor argued, ‘the … legislator 
becomes an automaton, to be danced on this floor by wires to be held by 
… active and turbulent demagogues’.19 Make legislators the mere agents 
of the popular will and government bodies would replicate the tumult of 
popular assemblies: ‘What a babel of legislation would this House present! 
Local prejudice, narrow feelings, headlong violence must enter this Hall; 
and here, uninformed by discussion, unmitigated by sober reflection … 
would be seen in disgraceful and endless collision’.20
After a long debate, Congress repealed the Compensation Act. Speaking 
for a sovereign people in a single voice and mobilizing citizens in sufficient 
numbers to make their claims plausible, opponents of the act compelled 
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‘the people’s’ representatives to cede a portion of their authority to popu-
lar assemblies. Although their opposition to the congressional pay raise 
met with unqualified victory, their wider hope for an expanded popular 
sovereignty made no headway. The reason was simple: their movement 
was focused on a single issue and created no lasting organization. With 
the repeal of the Compensation Act, the meetings, remonstrances, and 
newspaper debates ceased, and politicians went back to business as usual.
Public, non-partisan meetings again became a major feature of pub-
lic life during the financial panic of 1819 and the ensuing depression. 
Scores of public meetings, as well as less formal debates at crossroads, 
street corners, taverns, and coffee houses, testified to the vibrancy of pub-
lic debate during the crisis.21 These mobilizations, however, lacked the 
anti-compensation movement’s unanimity. As a result, their impact was 
more fragmentary and more heavily mediated by officeholders and their 
political ‘friends’. On the other hand, these meetings, along with a grow-
ing number of voluntary associations, envisioned a new set of methods 
through which ordinary citizens could shape their economy, society, and 
culture. Most of these meetings displayed little interest in shaping gov-
ernment policy; instead, they sought change by mobilizing the public to 
enact change directly, without the mediation of the state.
We don’t know a lot about who attended the public meetings. A public 
assembly held in Frankfort, Kentucky, meeting was led by two former US 
senators and a retired congressman, at least one of whom was an officer 
of the Bank of Kentucky. Several meetings were held in response to a call 
by the New York Chamber of Commerce; the Boston meeting drafted a 
petition to be signed by the ‘merchants and traders of the whole common-
wealth’. More typical, however, was the assembly of ‘Merchant’s Farmer’s 
Miller’s &c.’ who gathered in Green County, Kentucky, to discuss the 
Frankfort meeting’s resolutions.22
More than any other meetings of the era, these gatherings gave rise to 
open and freewheeling debate. Unlike partisan meetings and those held 
in opposition to the Compensation Act, most of which heard only one 
side of debate, most meetings made room for speeches from the advocates 
of competing approaches to the crisis. An assembly in Lincoln County, 
Kentucky, read the Frankfort resolves three times and discussed each one 
at length before it ‘negatived’ all but one. The Harrison County meeting 
adopted its resolutions only ‘after strenuous opposition’.23
The Panic of 1819, in short, gave rise to a genuine civic debate over 
economic policy. The seriousness of the debate grew out of an assumption 
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shared by almost all the participants: that the solution to the crisis would 
come from the citizenry. Theirs was a bottom-up vision of economic 
recovery, in which the sovereign ‘people’ took on a direct policy-making 
role. The announcement of meeting to be held at Nashville in July 1819 
articulated this assumption well. The meeting was called ‘for the purpose 
of taking into consideration the situation of our country … of adopting 
means of relief against our present calamities; and of providing against 
future embarrassments’. The meeting was to adopt the ‘means of relief’ 
itself, not to recommend them to the legislature.24
Most of the remedies proposed by public gatherings depended on the 
collective efforts of ordinary citizens rather than government action. An 
assembly in Cincinnati called on all citizens to refuse payment in the ‘depre-
ciated paper currency’ issued by their city’s banks. Other meetings proposed 
the same action, while the Green County, Kentucky, meeting requested 
that inhabitants ‘suspend payment of their debts for the present’ in order to 
‘prevent this section of the country from being drained of precious metals’.25
Still, many meetings asked the government to intervene. The manner 
in which they addressed the government varied enormously, for there 
was little consensus in how a mobilized citizenry thought about its rela-
tionship to the government. Some meetings spoke in deferential terms, 
‘respectfully request[ing]’ or ‘humbly hop[ing]’ and ‘pray[ing]’ for par-
ticular laws. More frequently, constituents expressed neither deference 
nor commands. Many believed that in acting autonomously, they were 
cooperating with the authorities by ascertaining the public will and help-
ing the legislature craft remedies. The citizens of St. Louis declared that 
meetings like theirs allowed citizens and their representatives to ‘mutually 
understand each other, and cooperate for the general weal’. The Franklin, 
Kentucky meeting called on citizens throughout the state to gather and 
pass resolutions of their own, to be considered ‘among other measures’ 
by ‘the people and the legislature’. It charged its committee of correspon-
dence with collating the findings and laying them before the governor.26
Still, a large minority of mobilized citizens made clear that they 
expected their legislators to obey them. Many meetings gave instructions 
that they considered to be binding. In both Pennsylvania and Kentucky, 
constituents demanded that candidates for the legislature pledge to revoke 
the charters of state banks that failed to redeem their notes, or to tax the 
branches of the Bank of the United States, or both. In both places, candi-
dates went along—in Pennsylvania in 1818, a majority of the men elected 
to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives had done so.27
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The problem with the expectation that representatives obey ‘the peo-
ple’ was that the people did not speak with one voice. The years following 
the War of 1812 witnessed dramatic economic and social change, includ-
ing the beginnings of rapid industrialization in New England and the 
mid-Atlantic, growing class stratification in settled farming communities, 
rapid migration to the frontier, endemic conflicts over access to land, the 
economic and political marginalization of the gentry, the emergence of 
a highly speculative and controversial finance sector, and an increasingly 
fierce scramble among entrepreneurs for markets, credit, and legislative 
favors. All of these economic developments brought new class, sectoral, 
and sectional conflicts in their wake. Nor did it help that few understood 
the new economic order.28
At the very moment when ‘the people’ mobilized to find solutions to 
economic crisis, they were more divided by economic interest and ide-
als than ever before. Rather than speaking in one voice, they produced 
the ‘babel’ of proposals that congressional conservatives had predicted in 
1816. Different assemblies called for—and opposed—the chartering of 
new banks, the revocation of the charters of existing banks, the suspen-
sion of legal proceedings for the recovery of debts, a protective tariff, 
cuts in government spending, and complete government inaction. Several 
meetings were closely divided, and rival newspapers sometimes disputed 
whether a given proposal had been endorsed or defeated.29 This chaotic 
assemblage of demands posed fundamental problems for the expansive 
vision of popular sovereignty that had re-emerged in the opposition to 
the Compensation Act. That idea assumed that ‘the people’ were unified 
in their will and that their wishes always pointed to a unitary public good. 
During the debate over the Compensation Act, these assumptions were 
rendered plausible by the unanimity in public debate. In the debates over 
the economy, that unity no longer existed. How could such a divided 
people shape law and policy? What was a representative to do when ‘the 
people’ spoke in a thousand conflicting voices?
An emerging group of political activists believed they had an answer to 
that question. Where the non-partisan public meetings of the Era of Good 
Feelings all envisioned ‘the people’ as an autonomous body with a clear 
and independently determined will, these activists saw public opinion as 
something to be actively mobilized, shaped, and managed. Between 1815 
and 1828, a second and third generation of middling-born, upwardly 
mobile politicians gained unprecedented political power. During the early 
party battles between Federalists and Republicans (1795–1815), such 
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activists had taken the lead in mobilizing ordinary citizens into their par-
ties. While gentlemen dominated national and state politics during the 
early period, such men came to dominate the Republican Party in at least 
three states (New York, Kentucky, and New Hampshire) after 1819. They 
became a part of the leading clique in several others.30
These men inherited from their partisan forebears an unashamed 
embrace of partisanship and a welter of methods—newspapers, broad-
sides, printed tickets, partisan songs and symbols, parades, barbecues, 
public meetings, large election committees, door-to-door canvassing—by 
which to instruct constituents in partisan thinking and mobilize them on 
behalf of the party at election time. They also insisted that politics was 
a career like the law. Far more than their predecessors, they sought to 
build efficient and powerful political organizations and to vest control 
over them to political specialists like themselves.
The most innovative group of middle-class politicos was the Bucktail 
faction in New York state, led by future President Martin Van Buren. ‘The 
people’ rarely entered into the private correspondence or autobiographies 
of the Bucktails. Instead, their main constituency was other partisan activ-
ists. Van Buren’s memoir of the years before 1828 is crowded with people, 
all but one of whom is a political operative or an elected official. When 
Bucktail activists did mention ordinary voters in their letters and reminis-
cences, they alternately depicted them as an audience to be won over or a 
restraining force in politics, one that set limits on but did not determine 
what political leaders could do.31
The Bucktails were experts at popular mobilization, and after their 
break from their Clintonian rivals in 1819, they quickly revived the sys-
tem of electoral mobilization that had prevailed before 1815. Candidates 
below the state level were nominated by a pyramid of local, county, leg-
islative district conventions. Local electoral committees oversaw election 
activities. The faction’s newspapers exhorted the rank and file to turn out 
and to organize their neighbors. But this was a different sort of popular 
mobilization than that practiced by opponents of the Compensation Act 
or advocates of economic reform. Bucktail meetings were tightly con-
trolled and fully integrated into an electoral strategy overseen by an inner 
cadre of state leaders. Unanimity prevailed in Bucktail meetings; debate 
occurred in correspondence and over dinner tables among faction leaders, 
not in public assemblies. Nominations for state offices were made by the 
legislative caucus; popular meetings merely ‘concur[red]’ with those nom-
inations. The Bucktails’ most famous contribution to American political 
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practice was ‘party regularity’—the insistence on strict adherence to the 
collective decisions of the parties—and their resulting ability to enforce 
unanimous support for those decisions.32
Another important group of rising middle-class politicians was the 
Republican faction around the editor Amos Kendall in Kentucky. Like 
the Bucktails, this group was shut out of the genteel patronage net-
works that had traditionally regulated access to political power, and they 
sought an alternate means to political power. They succeeded primar-
ily by adopting the radical language of popular sovereignty pioneered 
by the anti- compensation movement. After being trounced in the 1816 
elections by the opponents of the Compensation Act, Kendall and his 
middle-class allies learned to adopt the ideas and self-presentation of 
their erstwhile opponents. In the wake of the Panic of 1819, they sought 
to capture the enthusiasm behind Kentucky’s public assemblies. As they 
did so, they narrowed a wide variety of ideas for economic relief voiced 
at those meetings to a single reform: debt relief. Rebranding themselves 
as the ‘Reform party’, Kendall and his allies maintained a top-down 
party structure. The state organization was run out of Kendall’s printing 
office in Frankfort. Through the pages of the Argus of Western America, 
Kendall and his assistant, Francis Blair, determined the party’s message. 
Nominations were made by informal caucusing among party leaders, not 
by convention. Party activists organized parades and dinners for the cause 
and sought the support of militia companies, but organizing remained 
in the hands of a few operatives rather than being delegated to electoral 
committees. On the other hand, their commitment to the idea of popular 
rule was uncompromising. Reform party spokesmen insisted that ‘the will 
of the majority makes law.… A different position would end in tyranny 
and despotism’. When the state supreme court invalidated Kentucky’s 
main debt relief law, party legislators abolished that court and replaced it 
with a new one, which they stacked with supporters of debt relief. Party 
leaders justified the policy by appealing to the same sort of radical popu-
lar sovereignty that had fueled the opposition to the Compensation Act. 
Courts, they insisted, had no right to declare a law unconstitutional; that 
power ‘can only be exercised by the people themselves’. The notion that 
judges should be the sole defenders of the constitution was nothing but 
‘the old story which has been preached to the people from the begin-
ning of the world, that they are incapable of government themselves, and 
ought, therefore, to surrender the government into the hands of the wise and 
enlightened few’.
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To validate their claim to speak for ‘the people’, Reform Party activ-
ists organized numerous public assemblies. In the year after their reor-
ganization of the supreme court, public assemblies, grand jury meetings, 
and militia musters throughout the state became constitutional courts, as 
assembled citizens listened to opposing speakers discuss the Act and took 
votes on its constitutionality. In most meetings, a majority was required to 
approve actions in order to pass constitutional muster. Here was another 
way of managing and channeling popular sentiment: by responding to 
widespread economic distress, expressing party initiatives in the language 
of radical popular sovereignty, and mobilizing the party rank and file in 
support of those initiatives.33
Middle-class political operatives like Kendall and Van Buren certainly 
championed a populist politics, but they combined it with a high degree 
of centralized control, vested in men like themselves. Both movements 
were very effective at mobilizing people, largely through public meetings. 
But they shifted the initiative in defining issues, making nominations, and 
determining strategy from local groups of assembled citizens to the politi-
cal specialists in charge of state political factions. Public meetings served 
not to develop, clarify, and publicize the policy preferences and political 
ideas of ordinary citizens, but to muster the support of those citizens for 
policies and nominees chosen by cadre. There was nothing illegitimate or 
undemocratic in the Bucktails’ or the Reform Party’s methods. To stake 
out a position and attempt to win support for it was a kind of democ-
racy—one that was more effective and institutionally lasting than the more 
spontaneous public mobilizations of 1816 and 1819–1820. But it was a 
very different kind of democracy than that pioneered by the opponents of 
the Compensation Act and those seeking remedies for economic depres-
sion. In the latter movements, ordinary citizens sought to act on their 
own behalf, without the mediation of representation. The Bucktails and 
Reform Party advocates re-introduced greater mediation into the expres-
sion of ‘the people’s will’, and in the case of the Bucktails, adopted orga-
nizational innovations that greatly enhanced the power of the mediators. 
This was the vision of ‘democracy’ that would become dominant during 
the presidential campaigns and presidency of Andrew Jackson.
Public meetings during the Era of Good Feelings had a firm founda-
tion in the doctrine of popular sovereignty. But in putting that doctrine 
into practice, they exposed the unresolved ambiguities and contradictions 
in that doctrine. Freed temporarily from the discipline of party organiza-
tion, public meetings became an arena for experiments in popular self- 
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organization and for rethinking the meaning of popular sovereignty. At 
times, these meetings proved enormously empowering, demonstrating 
that ordinary people and political outsiders could have a profound effect 
upon politics and policy. At all times, however, these meetings exposed 
the ambiguities of popular sovereignty without resolving them. In most 
cases, they also demonstrated the limits of spontaneous, localized popu-
lar organization: impermanence and policy fragmentation. The return of 
partisan politics, now newly dominated by a cadre of self-made political 
specialists, overcame those limits, but did so at the cost of the autonomy 
and self-direction of popular assemblies. Political action through orga-
nized factions and parties would henceforth be institutionally stable and 
ideologically coherent, but their demands and ideas would be largely 
determined by a class of political specialists whose interests were distinct 
from those of the rank and file. This tension—between organization and 
autonomy, freedom, and efficacy—would remain a central problem for 
popular politics throughout the nineteenth century and, indeed, into our 
own time.
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CHAPTER 5
Law and Voluntary Association in the Early 
United States
Kevin Butterfield
In 1835, New York Supreme Court justice Samuel Nelson drafted an opin-
ion in a case that addressed the power of the Allegany County Medical 
Society to expel one of its own members. Henry Fawcett, it seemed, had 
joined the society under false pretences, probably lacking the qualifica-
tions to practice medicine or to join his county’s medical society, which 
held a charter of incorporation from the state of New York. Fawcett found 
himself expelled from the medical society, with announcements to that 
effect circulated in the local papers. He sued for libel, claiming that the 
association had not followed the proper procedures in expelling him, and 
thus it had announced an expulsion that never happened. Announcing 
such a thing to the world, he declared, was a libellous assault on his repu-
tation. And the highest court in New York would agree.1
The details of the particular conflict between Fawcett and the society 
are not important because they were simply one set of variations on a 
remarkably frequent occurrence in the early American republic. As volun-
tarily joined organizations became more common in American cities and 
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towns, conflicts from within their ranks were inevitable. Joining together 
created new opportunities to exclude, expel, and break asunder. By the 
end of the first two decades of the nineteenth century, though, Americans 
had grown accustomed to the idea that law would provide the context 
and would define the contours of their growing civil society, in two ways. 
Within their own clubs and associations, there was a general tendency 
among American joiners and organizers to embrace a ‘law-minded’ way 
of thinking about affiliation and membership in private groups. Second, 
and equally important, those habits and practices helped to nourish the 
belief among the joiners and organizers of a wide array of associations 
that members had a right to expect legal protections when things went 
wrong. And throughout the post-Revolutionary period, American courts 
were willing and even eager to do what they could to resolve the tensions 
that arose between the desire for collective action and for the preservation 
of personal rights.2
Indeed, Justice Nelson took a moment to underscore the significance 
of that judicial superintendence when he declared that Fawcett’s expul-
sion, wrongful as it was, should not raise any concerns about the potential 
of rampant abuse of power. Nelson was pleased to note that the power 
of a private society to expel its members is one ‘deemed essential to the 
fulfillment of the object of the institution, and the orderly and faithful 
administration of its affairs’. But that same power of expulsion ‘cannot 
be considered very dangerous to the rights of the corporators, when so 
cautiously guarded, and subject also to review by the writ of certiorari 
or mandamus’. Here, speaking of an incorporated institution, he applied 
common law principles governing corporate law to his understanding of 
the associational life of the new American republic. Nelson appeared con-
fident that something he treasured, the ‘individual rights’ of each member 
or a corporator, was not in any real danger. The superintending power of 
the law, he and many others had come to believe, was the best guarantor 
of the rights and freedoms of those Americans who chose to join ranks 
with one another.3
In an age when the survival of even the new republic appeared to be 
tenuous, the associational impulse presents us with thousands of sepa-
rate efforts to muster effective cooperation from previously unaffiliated 
 individuals. Recent trends in two separate fields of early American histori-
cal research—legal history and the history of American civil society—help 
us to understand how and why the first generations of American citizens 
chose the solutions that they did. In terms of legal history, scholars such as 
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Christopher Tomlins have helped historians of the early United States to 
become extraordinarily attentive to the ways that law, not merely or even 
primarily as institutionally embodied, but rather as a way of thinking about 
all kinds of interpersonal relationships, became ‘the paradigmatic discourse 
explaining life in America’. In the early republic, law gave shape to col-
lective life, on the small and the large scale. What is more, recent studies 
in the history of early American civil society have alerted scholars to the 
various problems and challenges posed by the explosive growth of civic 
associational life in post-Revolutionary America, not least the concern that 
the organization of diverse interests was a bane, not a blessing, to an ide-
ally unified commonwealth. Bringing those two fields of historical inquiry 
together, however, points the way to a fuller understanding of what hap-
pened in the early United States and why so many Americans came to 
believe that law-minded and law-bound ways of acting collectively were 
the single-best way to resolve the tensions inherent between individual 
autonomy and collective action in a post-Revolutionary republic.4
In the end, Americans embraced a pluralistic world of competing 
advocacy and social-reform organizations only when that world was fully 
encompassed by the legal regimes of the American states. There was an 
emphasis unique to the post-Revolutionary United States—a new republic 
in which people frequently called upon older principles of corporate and 
individual rights derived from the English common law—on the idea that 
all groups, from the nation-state to the private association, comprised the 
same fundamental unit: the rights-bearing individual. Together, the every-
day practices of association and the judicial protections of the personal 
rights of members reveal a belief that effective collaboration and collective 
strength came from law-minded and law-bound ways of joining together.
Law-Mindedness and everyday ConstitutionaLisM 
in aMeriCan CiviL soCiety
A young Alexis de Tocqueville in his American travels in 1831 was among 
the first observers to draw attention to Americans’ propensity to form 
voluntary associations and to join them with a fervour and a  frequency 
unmatched anywhere in the world. Since that time, the idea that 
Americans of the early nineteenth century were, in Tocqueville’s words, 
‘forever forming associations’ has become something more than a com-
monplace. It has become a subfield of American historical studies, one 
that has grown immensely in the past two decades as people attempt to 
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explain what works about American ‘civil society’ or the American ‘public 
sphere’—and why it is so important. Although some kinds of voluntary 
associations, such as fraternal clubs and charitable societies, had existed 
in colonial British America, their membership was not extensive and was 
limited to a handful of urban centres. After the Revolution, something 
new appeared: men and women at nearly all levels of social standing, white 
and black, and in communities large and small, embraced voluntarism and 
self-created, relatively formal organizations as the very best of means to 
improve society and their own lives.5
There was a remarkable breadth and diversity to this burgeoning asso-
ciational civil life of post-Revolutionary America. As more and more orga-
nizations were formed that were intended to work and advocate, not for 
the good of the public at large, but for the good of a particular interest in 
society—profit-seeking companies, political clubs, moral-reform societies, 
and the like—there were of course powerful post-Revolutionary anxieties 
about the fragmentation of the ideally unified commonwealth that these 
rising numbers of private organizations represented.6
Beyond that question, however, it is also incredibly revealing to exam-
ine how exactly these joiners and organizers chose to join together—that is, 
the methods they used, the priorities they set out for themselves, and the 
pitfalls they discovered and hoped subsequently to avoid. Where colonial 
societies organized voluntarily according to ideas of sensibility and socia-
bility, the early decades of the new United States witnessed the forma-
tion of countless associations that were based upon models of concerted 
action that emphasized consent, procedural fairness, and constitutional 
and legal limits on what even a democratically organized association (that 
is to say, one formally organized and majority-ruled) could and could not 
legitimately do in regard to their own members. Even leaving aside for the 
moment the judicial protections of the rights of members, it was clear that 
when men and women joined voluntary societies in the early American 
republic they made certain that they were entering a world of rules, con-
stitutions, democratic decision-making, and procedural regularity.
The factors at play in this tendency towards increasingly rule-bound 
and procedurally structured ways of organizing were diverse. Duplication 
of existing, often British, models was an especially important one. For 
instance, Benjamin Lundy in his Genius of Universal Emancipation repro-
duced the writing of British Quaker activist Elizabeth Heyrick and even 
reprinted a British sample constitution for the formation of female anti- 
slavery societies. This mock-up, which was drawn from ‘the Proceedings 
 K. BUTTERFIELD
at the organization of Ladies’ Anti-Slavery Societies in England’ and 
which the paper called a ‘formula’, included such details as how to form 
committees, hold meetings, and even fill-in-the-blank models for impor-
tant organizational matters. The American Bible Society was, according 
to one of its organizers, William Jay, nearly a replica of the national bible 
society in Britain. When he offered up a model constitution for the new 
society, it was, he said, ‘With a few immaterial alterations, required chiefly 
by local peculiarities’, a ‘literal copy of that of the British and Foreign 
Bible Society’.7
Experiences and models from one kind of institution—particularly, the 
charitable ones formed in large numbers in the immediate wake of the 
Revolution—would find their way into other, more inward-looking asso-
ciations, such as literary societies. This is especially apparent in women’s 
groups, such as Charlestown’s Social Circle in 1845, which looked as much 
like a typical benevolent society as it did a reading club when its members 
elected as their lead officer a ‘first directress’, a term most commonly used 
in fundraising and socially active societies. And ‘annual reports issued by 
the literary societies at Townsend, Charlestown, and New-Hampton semi-
naries’, according to historian Mary Kelley, ‘read as if they were records 
of a voluntary association dedicated to benevolence’. There were, then, 
obvious organizational parallels across truly diverse forms of collective 
organization.8
Recent scholarship has begun to reveal that voluntary association 
spread as a technology, through the medium of print, by correspondence 
among societies, and by personal experiences of people who participated 
in multiple associations or who travelled to new communities. In the first 
third of the nineteenth century, methods of creating organized, more-or- 
less permanent societies that would persist even if the original members 
were replaced by new ones found their way from community to commu-
nity. The New Haven Mutual Aid Association, for instance, even included 
their influences in the preamble to its own constitution, noting that ‘we 
have formed ourselves into a society, (for the general plan of which we 
are indebted to a similar one now existing in Newark, N.J.) and we, the 
subscribers, do adopt the following Constitution and By-Laws for our 
government’.9 Sample constitutions, published annual reports, correspon-
dence between and among voluntary organizations, the creation of auxil-
iary societies (in some cases, auxiliaries comprised other auxiliaries!)—all 
of these would help to produce an associational world of remarkable con-
sistency marked by a nearly ubiquitous embrace of rule-bound ways of 
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working together. Those who joined were there because they chose to be, 
with articles of organization and bylaws telling each (would-be) member 
from the outset what would be expected of him or her.10
In short, the people themselves found a solution to the problem of 
how best to combine their efforts. In their emphases on rules, laws, and 
constitutions that they used to give shape to a great many of their own 
social relationships, many Americans were expressing a belief that it was 
their own and self-made constitutions and rules that would bind them 
together. The emerging American practices of association, in both men’s 
and women’s associations, were integrally related to the broader culture of 
legality of the early United States. Particularly important was the idea that 
human relationships not only were governed by law but they ought to be 
so governed. A constitution would be and should be abided by, operating 
as a sort of fundamental law from which all associational power derived. 
In each meeting and in an everyday, commonplace sort of way, American 
men and women would act in ways that showed that they believed their 
own constitutions mattered, as guides for how to act cooperatively and as 
limits on what the group could and could not do. Problems and disputes 
that tested the viability and durability of their own self-governance would 
undoubtedly arise, to be sure, but a vocabulary for dealing with potential 
or actual conflicts was already at hand.
Law and aMeriCan voLuntarisM
Moments of contest in which discontented people would turn to an out-
side legal authority to adjudicate an internal dispute amplified and under-
scored post-Revolutionary Americans’ widespread embrace of law- minded 
ways of cooperating. Though it was a development arising out of individ-
ual moments of conflict, not consensus, there would come to be a widely 
shared belief that the internal workings of private associations must ulti-
mately be open to public scrutiny, that they must fall within a larger frame-
work of legal superintendence, and that that legal framework was one that 
prioritized the rights of the individual over and above the authority of the 
association. Imperatives towards a legalistic way of  thinking about volun-
tary membership, then, came from within and from without, each rein-
forcing the other.
Legal structures, practices, and remedies that had their origins long 
before the American Revolution provided some of the ammunition with 
which many of the conflicts between member and group would be fought, 
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particularly the charter of incorporation and the writ of mandamus. Despite 
the more-or-less unquestioned belief in the idea that the greatest threats to 
personal liberty could be found in the exercise of public power, the citizens 
of the early American republic quickly came to see that private authority—
even authority created by the voluntary affiliation of American citizens 
into a formal association—might also array itself against the liberties and 
against the happiness of the people or, as it happened, of a single person.
In a handful of instances early in the nineteenth century that had pow-
erful consequences for the future of American civil society, members of 
voluntary associations would seek judicial intervention in what were essen-
tially private, internal disputes. They would seek court-ordered remedies 
to the violations of their rights as members. Some of the rights that those 
discontented members invoked were ones defined in the articles of asso-
ciation (again, usually called ‘constitutions’) of the group itself, but many 
were not. Some were creatures of the common law, which offered some 
useful terms and concepts for those who sought to keep private, associa-
tional authority within positive bounds. And some of those rights were 
products of the American Revolution, of a republican belief in the idea 
that no governing power, public or private, could pretend to hold certain 
kinds of unchecked authority over anyone, even one who had voluntarily 
chosen to be there.
Charters of incorporation were important to this development. After 
the Revolution, countless voluntary organizations for many and diverse 
purposes were chartered by the states in which they were formed. The 
nation’s first general incorporation laws, allowing charters of incorpora-
tion to be issued as a matter of routine (rather than special legislative 
action), appeared in New York and Pennsylvania, including an important 
1791 Pennsylvania statute that allowed religious and charitable organiza-
tions to be chartered essentially at will. The eventual embrace in post- 
Revolutionary America of the chartered corporation as a form of collective 
action that was both effective and well suited to a republican govern-
ment is an important part of the story being told here. We know that 
the protection of corporate charters from unilateral revision at the hands 
of governments, by classifying those documents as contracts protected 
constitutionally from arbitrary amendment, was a means of securing the 
pluralism of civil society from the state. But the charter was not merely 
an instrument of private corporate autonomy. It was, at the same time, 
an instrument of public authority and a means of public supervision. It 
facilitated the penetration of civil society by public norms and allowed 
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legislators and jurists to set and enforce limits to the legitimate exercise 
of corporate authority over members. And there was virtually no form 
of joining together that did not become increasingly ‘chartered’ in the 
decades immediately following the American Revolution.11
Judicial actions on behalf of individual members in these chartered 
institutions hinged on the willingness of American courts to embrace the 
use of the writ of mandamus as a point of entry in the associational life of 
the early United States. For English jurists, mandamus had long been seen 
as a prerogative writ, an order emanating directly from the authority of 
the king. The preeminent eighteenth-century scholar of the common law, 
William Blackstone, described it as ‘a command issuing in the king’s name 
from the court of king’s bench, and directed to any person, corporation, 
or inferior court of judicature, within the king’s dominions; requiring 
them to do some particular thing’. It was a flexible means of addressing a 
vast array of injustices. In the growing numbers of internal disputes within 
municipal corporations in seventeenth-century England—most particu-
larly, in the decades of and surrounding the English Civil War—the court 
of King’s Bench could use the writ of mandamus as ‘an effective instru-
ment’ that allowed not Parliament or the king, but the courts to become 
‘a powerful arbiter’. The result was stability. When internal mechanisms 
for resolution failed, repeatedly, conflict could be channelled into legal 
modes of resolution. Litigation replaced disintegration. And mandamus 
became the chief means by which a dispute between a member of an incor-
porated organization and the larger group could be resolved.12
All of the themes being explored here in the context of American civil 
society—a growing law-mindedness among American joiners and organiz-
ers, a wariness of associational threats to personal political autonomy, and 
the importance of legal forms and institutions in determining the internal 
workings of post-Revolutionary private associations—culminated in the 
showdown between John Binns and William Duane, two Irish newspa-
per editors in early-nineteenth-century Philadelphia. After being expelled 
from the St. Patrick Benevolent Society, Binns took his case to the court of 
public opinion, via repeated newspaper pieces denouncing the tyrannical 
habits of his former associates, and then to court. Binns’ argument there 
began with the fact that the St. Patrick Benevolent Society was incorpo-
rated, and he petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the club to 
readmit him. When Chief Justice William Tilghman sided with Binns and 
ordered that his expulsion be declared null and void, he cited a 1768 opin-
ion by Lord Mansfield in the English case of Rex v. Richardson (invoked 
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here, influentially, for the first time in an American courtroom) and held 
that all chartered corporations were subject to judicial superintendence, 
including those joined solely by people who wished to create a society 
of collegial and mutually supportive volunteers. Binns’ ‘right of mem-
bership’ had been violated arbitrarily, and the court would not allow his 
expulsion to stand. ‘I consider it as a point of very great importance, in 
which thousands of persons are, or very soon will be interested’, wrote 
Tilghman, ‘for the members of these corporations are increasing rapidly 
and daily’. And their ‘right of membership’ was ‘valuable’—valuable to 
Binns and to countless others—and was ‘not to be taken away without an 
authority fairly derived either from the charter, or the nature of corporate 
bodies’. The rights were valuable to individuals; the preservation of those 
rights by legal enforcement was invaluable to a thriving civil society. The 
Pennsylvania judiciary as well as jurists around the country seized on this 
principle. As Justice John Bannister Gibson would put it in 1822, the 
courts of the commonwealth would come to stand as a ‘superintending 
power’ over all the ‘inferior associations’ of American civic life.13
In the several years immediately following the Binns-Duane quarrel, 
Pennsylvania courts decided a series of cases arising out of membership 
disputes in associations formed exclusively for mutual financial aid. And 
these were developments that had important, even national, implications. 
When James Kent discussed ‘the various causes that have been adjudged 
sufficient or insufficient for the removal or disfranchisement of a member 
of a corporation’ in his Commentaries on American Law, for instance, he 
cited only Stewart Kyd’s eighteenth-century English treatise on corpo-
rate law, Commonwealth v. St. Patrick Benevolent Society, and two other 
Pennsylvania cases that immediately followed. Disputes that might at 
first glance appear to have centred on narrow points of law prove to have 
been deeply grounded in post-Revolutionary ideas about majority rule, 
personal rights, and the perceived dangers of arbitrary authority. Those 
ideas shaped American civil society no less than they shaped the political 
structures and practices of the most vibrant democratic republic then in 
existence.14
The mutual benefit societies that found themselves defending their 
associational practices in American courts were, in fact, common in both 
the United States and Great Britain, formed as a way for individuals of 
no great means to deal with unforeseen hardships, to prepare for the 
costs associated with their own death and burial, and to provide for their 
families. It was clearly to the advantage of those who organized these 
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groups to choose their fellows carefully and to take those steps necessary 
to maintain a certain level of collegiality and financial stability. And thus, 
unlike other varieties of concerted action in the early American republic, 
the internal workings of mutual benefit societies did not become increas-
ingly formalized and procedurally precise in the early nineteenth century, 
for both in Great Britain (where they were usually called ‘friendly soci-
eties’) and in North America these societies were already, by the mid-
eighteenth century, astonishingly detailed and specific in their descriptions 
of the rights and duties of membership. As Conrad Wright has noted, 
the forms and practices did not represent much of a break with the past. 
In early- nineteenth-century Philadelphia, about 100 such groups existed, 
numbering usually from 60 to 100 members, with similar initiation fees 
and monthly dues of about 37 cents each month that entitled a member 
or his family to support in case of sickness or death.15
Nearly all of the city’s mutual aid groups had been incorporated under 
Pennsylvania’s 1791 general incorporation act. In the months and years 
immediately following the 1810 decision in Commonwealth v. St. Patrick 
Benevolent Society, the first cases involving members of such groups found 
their way into Pennsylvania courts. The first came when Joseph Vanderslice 
was expelled from the American Beneficial Society, and he sought a court- 
ordered readmission. Both sides argued the facts and the justice of his 
expulsion, with Vanderslice even submitting into evidence a copy of the 
constitution and rules of the society and swearing that he had ‘not in 
any particular committed a breach thereof’. Though there is no recorded 
outcome in this case, it was clear that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
was willing to hear and adjudicate the dispute. In the next few years, more 
cases of precisely this sort would find their way into Pennsylvania court-
rooms. In one such case, Charles Hepburn sought mandamus not because 
his expulsion was unjust, exactly, but simply because he had never been 
given notice and a chance to defend himself. He believed that his not hav-
ing been told that his expulsion was to be voted on was, in itself, enough 
to make his removal void and illegal. It was not the last time that broader, 
extra-associational standards of fairness—and not simply fine-pointed 
details of procedure derived from charters or bylaws—were invoked to 
resolve internal disputes within the ‘self-created’ associations of the early 
national United States. In 1810s Pennsylvania, the act of seeking redress 
in court for questions regarding membership in private societies became 
increasingly common and, judging from the phrasings found in petition 
after petition, even routine.16
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Something else would become almost routine: the complaining mem-
ber won. Time after time, courts would order a compulsory readmission. 
William M. Stewart was one exception that, in the eyes of a Pennsylvania 
chief justice writing some 40 years after Stewart’s case, proved the rule. 
He falsified a bill, turning four dollars into 40, and sought compensa-
tion. He was found out and expelled. And then he called for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the society to restore him to ‘the standing and 
rights of a member of the Philanthropic Society’. Stewart’s argument 
failed. ‘If this was not forgery, it was very like it’, wrote Tilghman. The 
case, though, left its mark on the emerging common law of membership. 
The court did not equivocate on its power and its willingness to look 
into the case. It even took into evidence a copy of the minutes of the 
Philanthropic Society from all of the meetings in which Stewart’s case 
was discussed. And two of the most influential treatises of the nineteenth 
century, James Kent’s Commentaries and Joseph Angell and Samuel 
Ames’ Treatise on the Law of Private Corporation, would refer to it as 
important in helping to establish the legal requirements for a member’s 
expulsion. What is most remarkable about the case is how anomalous the 
outcome, the court’s ultimate approval of the expulsion of a member 
of a private society, actually was. Writing in 1864, another chief justice 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, George Washington Woodward, 
attempted to chronicle the long history of cases in English and American 
law regarding expulsions and the contested rights of membership. For 
him, Stewart’s case provided something ‘very rare in the authorities, an 
instance of expulsion that was sustained’. In reported appellate cases, 
courts rarely hesitated to compel the readmission of a member they 
believed had been wronged.17
In one notable case in the decade following Commonwealth v. St. 
Patrick Benevolent Society, a mandamus hearing about an expulsion from 
the Pennsylvania Beneficial Institution, the highest court in Pennsylvania 
would determine that John Hansell had a right to expect ample notice 
and a fair hearing when his membership status was under review. As 
Chief Justice Tilghman would say directly, ‘no man should be expelled 
in his absence without notice’. Lacking such notice and a fair process of 
 expulsion, Hansell must be readmitted. The English common law govern-
ing municipal corporations helped to lay the foundation for Tilghman’s 
opinion, but here he was deliberately extending that principle to protect 
the rights of individual members of the vastly growing assortment of vol-
untary societies of the commonwealth.18
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These developments would have national reach. In a case involving a 
profit-seeking business corporation in North Carolina a few years later, 
that state’s Supreme Court held that there were certain rights of which no 
person should be deprived, important among them the principle that ‘no 
man shall be condemned or prejudiced in his rights, without an opportu-
nity of being heard’. The member of the canal company was compulso-
rily readmitted by mandamus. The young nation’s private societies, when 
deciding a case involving one of their own members, were and ought to be 
treated as courts of justice. And they should be held to exacting standards 
not unlike those that governed the conduct of any judicial tribunal. One 
of those—the right to be heard in one’s own defence—was fundamental, 
and no member was to be deprived of it under any circumstances.19
The idea that membership was and ought to be a relationship defined 
by law—and, when push came to shove, secured by courts of law—devel-
oped into a robust and full legal reality over the course of second and third 
decades of the nineteenth century. Writers and compilers of American legal 
digests and treatises in the 1820s (such as James Kent) and the 1830s and 
1840s (such as Angell and Ames, David Hoffman, and others) would cite 
and describe Commonwealth v. St. Patrick Benevolent Society, usually along-
side the Pennsylvania mutual benefit society cases that followed, as estab-
lishing the idea that expulsion from incorporated voluntary associations 
was something that could be legitimately challenged in court. Participants 
in these associations were not there at the pleasure of their fellow members. 
These were law-minded and law-bound relationships, not affectionate and 
emotional ones. The rights of membership, which included such things as 
the right to notice and to fair hearings regardless of whether such principles 
were spelled out in the articles of agreement, were guaranteed by law.20
In short, by the 1830s American associational life had become less a 
multitude of jurisdictions and more a wide array of opportunities for indi-
vidual voluntarism that all fell within a larger body of law. The jurispru-
dential efforts to define and delimit the power of voluntary associations 
over their members helped to place the voluntary association of the early 
American republic on an unquestionably liberal foundation, as courts 
proved willing to bring the associational activities of Americans within the 
embrace of a larger regime of civil rights. And, in states north and south, 
a surprisingly consistent and culturally resonant system of law governing 
voluntary membership came into being in the early decades of the nine-
teenth century. Early American civil society rested on a post- Revolutionary 
commitment to the principle that civil rights and fair procedure should be 
brought to bear in increasingly diverse areas of social activity.21
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And it is here that the law and the everyday practices of civic asso-
ciation came together to produce something fruitful for the future of 
American democracy. Perhaps, we have been wrong to emphasize the 
themes that Tocqueville first noted in his 1831 travels through the United 
States, that private, voluntary associations served as the training ground 
for democracy, both a space and a process by which people learned to 
honour one another’s voices and perspectives. The legal history of these 
societies suggests that an even greater significance lies in the ways that 
these associations ultimately became the training ground for something 
no less valuable to the success of the American democratic experiment: 
increasingly formal, law-minded, and procedurally consistent relations 
among people.22
There has been a tendency to describe a move over the course of the 
nineteenth century from more democratic and popular modes of assembly 
and collective action towards more bureaucratized, procedurally oriented, 
and centrally coordinated forms of organization, particularly in the case of 
political associations, but the American experience might suggest that this 
dichotomy can be overstated. The post-Revolutionary American experi-
ence puts on display some ways in which civic associations were marked 
by procedural regularity and law-minded ways of collaborating from quite 
early in their history, and, more important still, that development occurred 
for reasons arising out of a shared legal and political culture that saw the 
protection of personal rights as a fundamental purpose of government and 
law, something that the first generations of American citizens saw as abso-
lutely essential to the health and vitality of their republic.
It was owing to those law-bound and law-minded ideas about vol-
untary association of the post-Revolutionary era that such groups, in 
time, came to be seen as a means to strengthen, not weaken, a demo-
cratic republic. And the hand of the state, as expressed in courts of law, 
played an important role. Individuals aware of the importance of their 
own rights and confident that they could find protection in court found 
themselves helping to develop a jurisprudence that reflected the priorities 
and practices of a post-Revolutionary world of voluntarism and collective 
action. In time, the association came to be seen as a means to empower, 
not threaten, the individual. Our understandings of the essential ele-
ments that allow a civil society to develop in the first place—across time 
and space, in the histories of nineteenth-century Europe and the United 
States as well as in emerging democracies around the world today—must 
include a closer attention to the history of what Americans came to call 
‘the right of membership’.
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CHAPTER 6
Organizing in a Moment of Madness: 
Political Meetings and Clubs in 1848
Geerten Waling
IntroductIon
1848 was a political laboratory. Within a few months, dozens of revo-
lutions and revolts broke out on the European continent. 1848 was a 
‘moment of madness’: one of the rare occasions in history in which there 
was widespread sentiment that ‘all was possible’.1 Contemporaries labelled 
1848 as the ‘springtime of the peoples’. As the revolutions created the 
freedom of the press, assembly and association, politics immediately 
dominated the public sphere and entered the everyday life of millions of 
citizens. Besides the explosion of political expression in its printed forms 
(such as newspapers, pamphlets and posters), physical participation in pol-
itics became both accessible and fashionable. Suddenly, massive audiences 
gathered around open-air stages in parks and squares to listen to politi-
cal speeches and to discuss the course of the revolution and the politi-
cal future of their countries. For similar reasons, thousands of euphoric 
and ambitious citizens started to establish and visit revolutionary clubs 
in  overcrowded cafés, theatres and public buildings.2 The political meet-
ings and clubs of 1848 were rather new and undefined experiments in the 
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realm of political organization. These experiments could come about only 
in a revolutionary moment, and yet they would reshape Europe’s political 
culture.3
Scholars who study nineteenth-century popular politics mostly focus 
on a single form of political participation. Either they look at the politi-
cal meeting to explain the expanding and changing political culture in 
the nineteenth century4 or they study associations as institutionalized 
political organizations to grasp the influence of the emerging civil soci-
ety and the development of party politics.5 When we look at the revolu-
tions of 1848, this division becomes problematic because it obscures 
how interwoven the two forms could be, especially in a revolutionary 
‘moment of madness’. Not only did meetings and clubs occur simulta-
neously and in the same cities but they were also organized and visited 
by more or less the same people. Many clubs even emerged from ad 
hoc meetings and, in turn, some of the mass meetings were initiated 
by clubs. The two forms should therefore be studied integrally. A rev-
olutionary meeting should also be considered as a form of organiza-
tion, and, the other way around, a revolutionary club should be seen as 
another way of ‘organizing democracy’. Thus, meetings and clubs were 
two sides of the same coin, and as such they represent the expanding 
political participation of ordinary citizens in the early days of modern 
democracy.
The two case studies in this chapter substantiate and illustrate these 
claims: the February Revolution in Paris and the March Revolution in 
Berlin.6 Paris was the central locus of the 1848 revolutions, and the 
nascent Second Republic hosted the most extensive public debate of 
Europe. Its sizeable club movement, with hundreds of clubs and asso-
ciations being founded in a period of only three months, shows how 
actively and how physically the common Parisians participated in that 
debate.7 What happened in Paris was an immediate source of inspira-
tion for cities and towns all over the continent, including for Berlin. 
After the subsequent March Revolution, the Prussian king managed 
to bend without breaking, by diverting the popular anger towards the 
army and promising democratic reforms. Nevertheless, Berlin expe-
rienced a vibrant ‘moment of madness’ in which political meetings 
and clubs were organized with an enthusiasm comparable to that of 
Paris.8 Examining the two cases gives us a broader understanding of 
the importance and peculiarities of political organization in 1848 on a 
European scale.
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MeetIngs on the BrInk of revolutIon
In the years before 1848, when economic, political and social crises raged 
across the continent, oppositional forces obtained little if any parliamen-
tarian power. Nonetheless, reformers gathered in unauthorized political 
meetings, where demands for democratic reform were formulated on 
behalf of ‘the people’.9 In Paris, the revolution was preceded by a series of 
reform banquets: political dinners that grew particularly influential from 
mid-1847 onwards. The political banquet was a form of organization in 
between conversations around the dinner table and plain political rallies. 
Vincent Robert, in his elaborate study on the French ‘era of banquets’ 
(1818–1848), designates the banquet as a form of ‘quasi-association’ 
or ‘association in dotted lines’.10 Banquets circumvented the strict Code 
pénal, the Napoleonic law that prohibited every unauthorized association 
formed to discuss religious, literary, political or any other sort of affairs 
on a regular basis.11 A banquet offered the possibility of openly assem-
bling a large number of guests in public or semi-public places, in a non- 
hierarchical mixture of ranks, classes and professions. Despite the lack of 
an official political agenda, the dinners had the unmistakable purpose of 
facilitating political debates. The authorities kept a close eye, but tolerated 
the festivities.
The banquets expressed the desire of French republicans to build an 
opposition outside parliament, in a civil society that was not allowed to 
play a political role according to the Jacobin model that had dominated 
in France since the French Revolution. That model rejected intermedi-
ary bodies between individual citizens and the state because they were 
seen as a threat to the single, unified society. However, Pierre Rosanvallon 
states that the focus on the Jacobin model conceals the ‘other history of 
France’: a multitude of efforts to organize and associate despite all bans. 
The banquets, although not mentioned by Rosanvallon, could be seen as 
an example of these efforts.12
Another example would be the underground associations in which 
Parisians, mostly sub-bourgeois radicals and early socialists, started to 
organize themselves in the 1830s and 1840s. These ‘secret societies’ had a 
revolutionary, often conspiratorial character.13 One of the most influential 
societies, the Société des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, protected 
itself from persecution by adopting a fragmented, cell-shaped structure 
and a semi-military hierarchy. The worlds of the banquets and the secret 
societies were not completely separated. The reformist ideas in the  banquet 
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movement could count on support from the ranks of the secret societies 
and the workers’ organizations, such as the newspaper L’Atelier.14 Both 
worlds struggled with the repression of political meetings, and some ban-
quet organizers had been active in secret societies before.15 But unlike 
the underground organizers, most banquet initiators rejected secrecy and 
conspiracy and respected the public order. Nevertheless, both visiting 
a banquet and joining a secret society meant participating physically in 
political affairs, discussing them, setting goals and formulating demands. 
As such, these occasions would prove effective breeding grounds for 
future republican politicians.16 Ironically, it was the banquet movement, 
which was by no means advocating revolts and revolutions, that brought 
about the February Revolution. A long-planned banquet of a Parisian sec-
tion of the National Guard on 22 February 1848 was prohibited by the 
government. Subsequently, the agitation among both the National Guard 
and the people of Paris resulted in the riots and barricades that would 
chase King Louis Philippe out of the Tuileries two days later.17
In Berlin, the outbreak of the March Revolution was similarly the effect 
of political meetings (among other factors). A range of mass meetings in 
the weeks before had challenged the government’s legitimacy. Prussia was 
the most authoritarian and the most restrictive of all German states in 
the repression of the freedom of print, assembly and association.18 In the 
years before 1848, some local workers’ associations had begun to organize 
networks, but any meetings of a political nature were out of the ques-
tion.19 Underground networks were not as developed as in Paris and were 
mostly initiated from the outside, such as the local branch of the interna-
tional Communist League. For the people of Berlin, things changed on 29 
February 1848, when news arrived from Paris. As trains brought in con-
fusing messages about the February Revolution, Berliners filled the cafés 
and bakeries to read the newspapers or, for the illiterate, to listen to them 
as they were read out loud from stages.20 An important news hub was the 
Berliner Zeitungshalle, a literary society established in 1846 that by 1848 
had become the hangout ‘of all politically thinking men’. The news from 
Paris caused its clientele to ‘politicize with a freedom that until then had 
been unheard of in Berlin’.21
The early spring drew crowds from the city out into the public park of 
the Tiergarten. There, at a recreational hotspot called the Zelten, Berliners 
celebrated the end of winter with beer and cigars, while discussing the 
news from Paris and the chances for reform in Prussia.22 At first, doz-
ens of people joined the spontaneous gatherings, but in a matter of days, 
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the Tiergarten music stage had been turned into a rostrum, from which 
speakers addressed an audience that soon expanded to several hundreds. 
On 6 March, a group of students gathered in a chaotic meeting in one 
of the Zelten cafés, where they decided to send a request to the Prussian 
king.23 As the discussion was resumed the next day, 600 people appeared. 
The meeting lasted for four hours and ended with the decision to ask the 
king for equal political rights and free elections, as well as for the freedom 
of expression, press, assembly and association. These would appear to be 
common demands in the 1848 revolutions. A deputation of ten was com-
missioned to elaborate a draft request and to present it at the next Zelten 
meeting.24
As the deputation of ten met the next day in the Zeitungshalle, an 
unexpected visitor showed up: the chief of the Berlin police force, Von 
Minutoli. In the secret conversation that followed, the Prussian aristocrat 
Von Minutoli supposedly stated that he had nothing against the publica-
tion of the request, nor against ‘a[nother] popular meeting’, but that he 
wanted to discourage the organizers from actually marching to the king 
and handing him the request (let alone doing that while being escorted by 
a crowd of angry citizens). If such a thing were to happen, the police and 
army would intervene with all necessary means to break up the proces-
sion. Earlier that day, Minutoli had agreed upon this approach with the 
king in person. The conversation in the Zeitungshalle was game-changing 
because it implied that, according to the recollections of the Prussian gen-
eral Karl Ludwig von Prittwitz (1790–1871), the Berlin police force at 
that moment had submitted itself to negotiations ‘with the embryo of the 
revolution’.25
Instead of a discouragement, Von Minutoli’s warning to the Zelten 
reformers was in fact an inadvertent encouragement. The authorities rec-
ognized the existence of the opposition articulated in the Zelten meetings, 
outside the realm of state politics. The organizers, middle-class intellec-
tuals with radical democratic ideas, succeeded in reaching out to a large 
audience. As the political awareness of the Berliners increased, the meet-
ings grew bigger and the orators soon acquired heroic reputations.26
Two weeks after the first Zelten meeting, the force of public opinion 
suddenly seemed insuppressible and asserted concrete political influence. 
The Zelten request to the king was transformed into a petition, with 6000 
signatures by 10 March.27 On 13 March, the first warm day of the year, 
more people than ever joined the Zelten meetings. A spontaneous protest 
march towards the city palace led the Prussian army to disperse the crowd 
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as it entered the Brandenburg Gate. Berlin was now close to an insur-
rection, with the Zelten as the main fire source.28 News from the revo-
lution in Vienna (13 March) seeped through and stirred the sentiments 
even more. On 18 March, the Prussian king finally broke his silence and 
publicly conceded to the reformers’ wishes before a worried crowd on 
the palace square. But this concession appeared to be too late: the situa-
tion escalated and barricades were built all over the city. After one violent 
night, the king withdrew his troops from the city, appointed new ministers 
and sought peace with his ‘dear Berliners’.29
We have seen how large-scale public meetings stood at the basis of the 
1848 revolutions in Paris and Berlin—as was the case in so many European 
towns and cities.30 On the brink of revolution, lacking a civil society infra-
structure for political discussions, politically inexperienced people still 
gathered to discuss politics and formulate demands, rather than resorting 
to violence. However, the ad hoc character of the meetings should not 
suggest that they were unorganized. Reformist movements initiated and 
planned the meetings or turned spontaneous gatherings into structured 
assemblies by appointing leaders and speakers, setting agendas and invent-
ing procedures for speeches, discussions and votes.31 The agitation of the 
mass meetings culminated in the 1848 revolutions, but their history did 
not end there. The meetings laid the groundwork for the revolutionary 
aftermath, by reinforcing the demand for freedom of the press, assembly 
and association. The heydays of popular politics had only just begun; the 
promises of the revolution now demanded effective participation of the 
people in institutionalized meetings.32
cluB fever In ParIs
After their respective February and March Revolutions, political meet-
ings and associations were tolerated and soon legalized in both Paris and 
Berlin.33 Within days, revolutionaries established hundreds of political 
clubs with varying shapes and missions. Paris was the first city where such 
a club movement emerged, starting on 24 February, the day of the regime 
change. The reflex of founding clubs reflects earlier organizational experi-
ences in moments of revolution. The most notorious examples were the 
radical Jacobin clubs from the French Revolution (1789–1795), but they 
were remembered as violent and all too powerful.34 During the Restoration 
decades, new ideas were formed about a less threatening model of politi-
cal organization. In his now-forgotten essay On the necessity to form clubs 
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(1830), the French republican writer Théophile Dinocourt (1791–1862) 
proposed to reinvent clubs as a means for fundamental democratic reform. 
For him, clubs were political associations that could help build and pro-
tect a republican system all over the country: ‘France is one immense 
jury, assembled by its right to judge the acts of government’.35 Dinocourt 
refuted the anti-associational Jacobin model and instead praised public, 
political meetings where the acts of government could be checked and 
judged by committed citizens. Clubs were desirable and necessary institu-
tions to enable free and fair elections and a free press, and to stop and pre-
vent the abuse of power by any government. Also, Dinocourt wanted the 
clubs to function as ‘schools’, where citizens could learn about politics, 
about their rights and duties and about a ‘public morale’ that France had 
always lacked. The clubs had to become the expression of the ‘immoveable 
will’ of the people as a counterbalance to the ever changing and deceiving 
realm of state politics.36
Eighteen years later, Dinocourt’s vision of clubs as essential institu-
tions in a democratic republic would resonate in the 1848 clubs.37 As 
in his blueprint, the clubs appointed boards, drew up club constitutions 
and statutes, scheduled sessions on fixed weekdays (some clubs met on a 
daily basis), agreed on a membership administration, sought contact with 
other clubs and with newspapers and the Provisional Government. In the 
first weeks after the February Revolution, ‘club fever’38 struck Paris, as 
50,000–70,000 inhabitants, about 20 per cent of the adult male popula-
tion, started to frequent club meetings. Of the about 300 hundred clubs 
in 1848, some 60 per cent had been founded in the very first month.39
Night after night the clubs gathered in ballrooms, theatres, cafés, 
schools, barracks, hospitals and churches, which they rented, appropriated 
or obtained with help from the government.40 ‘A great number of clubs 
has been formed in the capital: the political life now lies there entirely; a 
persistent movement reigns there. A flaming patriotism inspires all of their 
members. […] What a magnificent show!’41 The first edition of club daily 
La Voix des Clubs opened in overt euphoria. ‘The clubs’, the editors stated, 
‘are the demonstration of reason; they are the elaboration of popular judg-
ment; they are the tongue of the masses; they are the Republic, which 
makes itself heard by thousands of voices combined’.42 In this view, the 
Parisian clubs were not only a representation or reflection of the French 
population but even a direct echo of the ‘voice of the people’. The clubs 
announced a new form of citizenship, which promised the political partici-
pation of all adult, male citizens.43
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In the experimental phase between February and April 1848, it was 
self-evident that all clubs would be accessible for every citizen, provided 
that he was trustworthy and loyal to the new republic.44 For a proper, 
democratic citizen, visiting a club was even a duty, as the founders of the 
moderate republican Club des Hommes Libres stated in their founding 
manifesto: ‘be it to mutually enlighten oneself about the scope of one’s 
rights and one’s duties, and about which choice to make in the next elec-
tions, be it to draw the attention of national assemblies to the great social 
issues that are currently at stake, be it finally (and that is the most essential 
point) to establish a popular forum where the reforms of political institu-
tions, which have diverted from their true destination, will be discussed’.45 
Political participation on a large scale was needed to shape the new era that 
dawned. The clubs can be seen as an institutionalization of the rostrum, 
and as a ‘popular forum’, catering to the need to discuss politics.
The accessible and broad nature of this forum should lead us to think of 
the clubs as ‘institutionalized popular assemblies’, rather than associations 
in the sense of the limited and more defined voluntary associations that 
had emerged in Europe in the previous decades. These (mostly middle- 
class) associations had explicitly excluded specific groups or individuals 
through their rules or their high membership fees. In 1848, following 
practices in the United Kingdom, the concept of ‘association’ on the 
continent acquired the character of a political, broadly accessible form of 
organization.46 However, the term ‘association’ in 1848 is used almost 
exclusively for labour associations, established to pursue the socialist ideal 
of the ‘organization of labour’. In eighteenth-century England, ‘club’ 
already referred to ‘informal organizations’, in contrast to ‘union’ or 
‘association’, which were organizations that represented a specific group 
and fulfilled an advisory task. The clubs may have been associations in 
the institutional sense—featuring a board, committees, membership and 
so forth—but their meetings and their role were more similar to those 
of popular assemblies, constituting the ‘organization of politics’, and in 
that sense, of organizing democracy. The terms ‘club’, ‘popular assembly’ 
(assemblée populaire) and ‘popular society’ (société populaire) were used 
interchangeably for one and the same phenomenon. For example, the 
newspaper La Voix des Clubs bore the subtitle Journal quotidien des assem-
blées populaires.47
Not only were the clubs of 1848 more accessible than associations, 
they lacked a closely defined rank and file and did not aim to represent the 
interests of a single group but also claimed to be the voice of the entire 
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people. In most cases, the clubs were founded in the climax of the February 
Revolution—and their faith was attached to the faith of that revolution. 
Hence, building a sustainable institution for the long term is rarely men-
tioned as a priority in reports and publications of the clubs. The clubs 
were rooted in the revolutionary moment of 1848, which had brought 
about an urgent desire for political participation in popular assemblies. 
Meeting was the concrete goal, but it also became, by way of the clubs as 
institutes, a symbol and a power in itself: ‘The voice of the people is the 
voice of God. […] Brothers! On to the clubs; clubs everywhere, may the 
clubs enlighten France. Everything for the People and by the People’.48
The largest and most visible clubs were the ones led by experienced 
revolutionaries like Blanqui, Barbès, Cabet and Raspail, who had been 
activists in the secret societies of the 1830s and 1840s. They adhered to 
some form of refurbished Jacobin radicalism, early socialism or early com-
munism. Their meetings were attended by thousands of visitors every 
night, a fan base that stemmed from the pre-1848 underground net-
works. These ‘name clubs’ had an authoritarian organizational structure, 
in which the charismatic personality of the leader both attracted visitors 
by the thousands and secured some form of order in the crowded and 
chaotic meetings.49 Besides ardent speeches by the leader or by talented 
guest speakers, no other form of discussion was possible in the massive 
crowd. Acclamation represented the only way audience members could 
make their views known at these events. With regard to the club of Cabet, 
for example, which received about 5000 visitors on its opening night in 
the week after the February Revolution50, La Voix des Clubs reports com-
plaints about the lack of proper procedures and the endangered value of 
the club meetings,51 but also admiration for the strict organization and 
‘moral guidance’ of Cabet.52
While the ‘name clubs’ structured their organization in this authoritar-
ian fashion, smaller clubs structured their meetings according to a more 
egalitarian model. In the Club des Hommes Libres, for example, a small 
club of rather unknown initiators that was founded in March in a ballroom 
close to the Louvre, the procedure and content of every club meeting was 
subjected to extensive discussions and multiple voting rounds. At one of 
its first meetings, a manifesto stating the principles of the club was read 
out loud several times and the assembly approved every single paragraph 
by another vote, after which the members one by one endorsed the docu-
ment with their signatures. A similar procedure was followed to adopt 
the rules and regulations for the meetings of these Free Men. The next 
ORGANIZING IN A MOMENT OF MADNESS: POLITICAL MEETINGS AND CLUBS... 
 meeting, after thorough consideration, they elected a club president—
albeit for the term of only two weeks.53 As a consequence of the focus on 
equality and democracy, the level of active participation for average club 
members was much higher in the Club of Free Men than in authoritarian 
clubs, but the leverage of such a small and unwieldy organization must 
have been disappointing.54
When examining the 1848 club fever, we should take into account the 
specific revolutionary situation of 1848 as a ‘moment of madness’.55 The 
revolution had not only facilitated the apparition of clubs as political insti-
tutions (by means of the freedom of assembly and association) but had 
also necessitated them.56 Insecurity about the course of the revolution 
and about the viability of the Second Republic led to a demand for semi-
institutionalized popular platforms to debate reform, to check the policy 
of the Provisional Government and to prepare the April elections. In these 
matters, the clubs had two unique features to offer. First, clubs offered 
all citizens a chance to participate in an immediate way in politics: to dis-
cuss urgent matters, to vote for resolutions, to organize petitions and to 
address the government. Second, the club movement as a whole claimed 
to be a more genuine and legitimate representation of the people, in the 
absence of a legitimate parliament, an elected government or other demo-
cratic institutions between the February Revolution and the end of April.57
Voicing the demands of the people was the chief mission of the clubs. 
As an oppositional force, they formed a counterbalance to the Provisional 
Government in the first months after the revolution—just as Dinocourt 
had desired in 1830. Clubs did so by sending petitions, addresses and 
delegations to the Provisional Government, but also by organizing (and 
participating in) mass demonstrations on 17 March, 16 April and, eventu-
ally, a failed attempted coup d’état on 15 May.58 The claim of representa-
tion was particularly visible in the run-up to the April elections, when the 
clubs played an active role as electoral committees by inviting candidates, 
discussing the candidacies, drawing up lists of candidates and checking on 
the credibility of the candidates and the fairness of the procedure.59
cluBs In revolutIonary BerlIn
In Berlin, political clubs evolved from the popular assemblies 
(Volksversammlungen) that also continued to take place after the March 
Revolution. The meetings that had demanded reform now faced a moment 
of revolution, including the euphoria and insecurity that were connected 
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to it. On 23 and 25 March, two turbulent mass meetings took place in 
the concert hall of the Hotel de Russie on Unter den Linden. On the 
agenda was, in addition to the demands for political and social reform, the 
future of the reformist (and meanwhile: revolutionary) movement itself. 
A group of radicals, democrats, agreed to found a Politische Club (from 
May onwards: Demokratische Club) and the moderates, constutionalists, 
followed later that week with their own platform: the Constitutionelle 
Club.60 In the separate club meetings that followed, provisional boards 
were formed, an administration was set up and public venues were desig-
nated as locations for the frequent club meetings.
The resemblance with Paris suggests that the idea of establishing clubs 
must have been influenced by what was known of the club fever that was 
raging in Paris, but direct references to the transfer of this organizational 
repertoire are hard to find.61 Club founders, rather than risking negative 
associations with French revolutionaries, legitimized themselves by refer-
ring to what was actually needed in the situation in Berlin. A proposal 
for what was to become the Politische Club—a blueprint that resembled 
Dinocourt’s plea for clubs—was prepared between the two meetings by 
the democrat Julius Hoppe:
To secure the fruits of the Revolution, for their perfect execution the estab-
lishment of a political club is imperative, so the fighters for freedom will 
not waste or lose their strength individually as happened before, but get to 
know one another and will strive ever more unanimously and powerfully 
for that goal, which will appear to be the common goal after the first [club] 
meeting.62
In Hoppe’s plan, the club would make the ‘political voice’ of the Berliners 
heard as a counterweight against the rule of ‘bureaucracy, militarist aris-
tocracy and bourgeoisie’.63
Over the course of 1848, the Berlin clubs underwent a process of 
institutionalization and professionalization. The Politische Club adopted 
an official club constitution on the occasion of its transition into the 
Demokratische Club in May, stating the main goals and procedures of 
the club in nine articles. A second, much more elaborate constitution of 
32 articles was adopted in September.64 The Constitutionelle Club had 
apparently started with only a three-article constitution on 31 March, 
but became increasingly fanatic in the appointment of committees, the 
 regulation of debates up to the tiniest detail and the overall deployment 
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of ‘parliamentarian’ habits.65 The club was openly criticized for that ‘leth-
argy’ by outsiders and insiders alike.66 Both clubs adopted significantly 
‘egalitarian’ procedures, based on joint decision-making and a modest 
leadership.
In the Berlin club movement, the authoritarian club model was more 
rare than in Paris, but Berlin already had an earlier form of authoritar-
ian mass meeting, namely the ongoing outdoor popular assemblies. While 
more and more clubs were being founded, the Volksversammlungen con-
tinued to take place in the Zelten and now also in other public areas. The 
Zelten organizers deemed it necessary to institutionalize their meetings in 
a club: the Volksverein unter den Zelten. That club adopted as its goals 
the armament of the people, representation of the people and education 
of the people.67 The decision to start their own club suggests that for 
popular meetings, the clubs were a desirable innovation in the practice of 
political meeting. However, Berlin remained a stage for popular political 
meetings as well over the course of 1848. Dozens of clubs, varying in 
shape, scale and ideology, appeared all over Berlin. These popular assem-
blies were often initiated by a club, or by a collective of clubs. The themes 
on the agenda concerned mostly public safety in Berlin then under threat 
by revolutionary violence, on one hand, and by a counterrevolution by the 
Prussian army, on the other.68
Although the Volksversammlungen were no longer the main stage of 
political participation between April and November 1848, they certainly 
served as an addition to the clubs. More than offering a stage for political 
discussion, as was their role in the early March days, the open-air stages for 
bigger audiences became a source of legitimacy for a political struggle that 
had its centre of gravity elsewhere: in the clubs and in printed pamphlets 
and newspapers. The availability of organized club meetings—gathering 
on fixed weekdays, at fixed locations, backed-up by a central administra-
tion of funds and membership—must have reduced the attractiveness of 
and need for holding stand-alone mass meetings. Instead, these meetings 
became vehicles for acquiring mass support for political standpoints that 
had already been formulated in clubs.
conclusIon
The explosive expansion of the public debate in 1848, both in scale and 
in political character, familiarized and engaged ordinary citizens with poli-
tics. The euphoria, uncertainty and anxiety that were typical for a moment 
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of revolution enabled experiments in political participation and organiza-
tion, such as the meetings and clubs discussed in this chapter. Ad hoc 
mass meetings and political clubs are often seen as two different forms of 
political participation, but 1848 shows how the two can be present simul-
taneously and can share similar goals. The meetings and clubs of 1848 
both aimed at democratic surveillance during the elections, formulating 
demands for political and social reform and seeing to a proper execution 
of these demands by the addressed authorities.
The fluid character of political participation in 1848 is underlined by 
this dual case study of Paris and Berlin, which showed that the revolu-
tionary clubs in fact performed as ‘institutionalized popular assemblies’ 
all along. We have also seen that the meetings in Berlin were not as ad 
hoc as they seemed. Firstly, they were planned in advance by committees 
and authorized by the government. Secondly, they transformed into clubs: 
with the famous Hotel de Russie meeting as a cradle for at least three 
clubs, but also with the Volksverein as a more direct institutionalization 
of the Zelten meetings. Thirdly, mass meetings were soon initiated by 
the clubs, whenever they sought support from a larger crowd than their 
own rank and file. So if we try to look through the eyes of a Parisian or a 
Berliner living in 1848, we might not see much difference between meet-
ing and association—but rather a range of ill-defined, but new and excit-
ing experiments with bottom-up political participation.
Another difference apparent from the comparison is the level of radical-
ism of the club movements in both cities. In Berlin, where the old mon-
archy had remained largely intact, the clubs assumed the role of reformist 
societies, oppositional bodies demanding reform from the authorities. 
This continuity explains why some of the prerevolutionary meetings 
transformed into clubs in the week after the revolution. In Paris, the club 
movement was seen as a support mechanism for the revolution and for the 
Provisional Government of the new republic. The revolutionary eupho-
ria called for immediate action by strong, experienced leaders. Those 
leaders were the ones who led the sizeable ‘name clubs’ in Paris with an 
authoritarian meeting procedure. The smaller clubs with the egalitarian 
model operated more in the background. In Berlin, the large crowds (of 
 thousands) visited the mass meetings, whereas the clubs with a rank and 
file of merely hundreds adopted the egalitarian model.
In both cities, the call for representation was urgent in 1848, which 
explains why the clubs, by offering both participation and representation 
of ‘the people’, assumed an almost parliamentarian role. In Paris, the clubs 
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lost their raison d’être, influence and support after the parliamentary elec-
tions of April. A short radicalization in May and June did not prevent, but 
rather accelerated, their downfall and also the suppression by the authori-
ties. The clubs in Berlin, as reformist and debating societies, had a longer 
lifespan—until the restoration of Prussian royal authority in November 
1848. But already in the summer, even conservatives had started to imple-
ment political organization as a means to reclaim the power that they had 
lost in the revolution. They adapted to the new domain of political com-
petition: the public debate.
The two forms of democratic participation discussed in this chapter 
cannot be fully understood when studied separately, as is often done in 
literature. The democratic experiments of 1848 are not easily separated 
in terms of ad hoc versus institutionalized, open versus closed or meet-
ing versus association. Neither should we analyse them as stages in the 
development of organizing democracy, for the one form did not replace 
or succeed the other. When we consider them integrally, in their quality as 
democratic experiments in a very specific moment of revolutionary mad-
ness, they can shed light on the complex processes of the politicization of 
the people and the popularization of politics, which were so significant for 
nineteenth-century Europe.
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CHAPTER 7
The Democratic Framing of Protest 
in the Age of Revolution: The Language 
of Civil Rights and the Organization 
of Petitions and Demonstrations in Belgium, 
1830–1848
Gita Deneckere
IntroductIon
In this contribution, I analyse the organization of popular protest in Belgium 
during the Age of Revolution 1830–1848. I argue that the language of 
civil rights as inscribed in the Belgian Constitution of 1831 played a major 
role in the ways people without formal representation in parliament orga-
nized and expressed themselves politically during that time. Civil rights 
discourse—formulated in the US Declaration of Independence of 1776, 
the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789 and derivative 
texts—has had a worldwide impact that continues to this day.1 During the 
1830–1848 period it was used and appropriated all over Europe by radi-
cal movements and organizations to demand justice and recognition for 
men and women who were excluded from formal political participation.2 
G. Deneckere (*) 
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
The language of civil rights is, in my view, a ‘universalizing’ rather than 
a ‘universal’ discourse—it can generate various interpretations depending 
on local and, therefore, historical contexts. The study of the impact of civil 
rights discourse on the way(s) popular movements in the nineteenth cen-
tury developed their organization and strategies is consequently not to be 
considered as a linear or teleological account of successes and continuing 
progress. Instead, we should be attentive to ambiguities and struggle, trial 
and error, paradoxes and contradictions.
The promises and ‘universal’ ambitions of liberty, equality and fraternity 
were, from the very beginning, thwarted by lack of freedom and institu-
tionalized inequality and contempt for women, slaves, workers and black 
people. In practice, the installation of the ‘universal’ ideals in the consti-
tutions and constitutional states of the nineteenth century was accompa-
nied by mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of those who enjoyed civil 
rights and those who did not. To give an example, all Belgians were offi-
cially equal in the eyes of the law—article 10 of the Belgian Constitution 
of 1831 says literally ‘all Belgians are equal before the law’—albeit not 
in terms of suffrage, to name but one major ‘inequality’. It was precisely 
from this contradiction between law and practice that the struggle for uni-
versal suffrage was born. But, this inequality notwithstanding, the Belgian 
liberal constitution offered space for citizens to participate in the public 
realm. This contribution analyses how and when people without suffrage 
made use of this space.
With regard to civil rights and liberties, the Belgian case is particu-
larly interesting: In the run-up to the 1830 revolution, which was the 
‘founding event’ of the Belgian constitutional state, civil rights and lib-
erties were a crucial and extremely important issue for various contend-
ing groups. Consequently, in terms of civil rights and liberties, the liberal 
Belgian Constitution written in 1831 would prove to be an enlightening 
example in nineteenth-century Europe. Citizens were permitted to peti-
tion, demonstrate, establish associations and freely express their opinions 
through written and spoken word. Although there were few restrictions 
on the constitutional freedom of association, nineteenth-century juris-
prudence showed plenty of reservations where workers’ associations were 
concerned. The right to strike was not constitutionally guaranteed in 
Belgium. Nevertheless, the penalization of strikes and labour unions did 
not preclude other forms of organization by workers and ‘ordinary peo-
ple’ in general. In this contribution, I endeavour to show how ordinary 
people who were formally excluded from democratic politics organized 
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and acted upon constitutionally guaranteed civil rights in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, long before the organized workers’ movements 
and workers’ parties emerged in the 1880s.3
the Importance of cIvIl rIghts dIscourse 
In the BelgIan revolutIon of 1830
The revolution from which Belgium emerged as a nation in 1830 was, 
like most revolutions, an extremely complex event, in which various social 
groups and organizations were involved, each with divergent and often 
conflicting interests and objectives. The Catholic clergy rallied with con-
servative landowners and merchants to regain lost privileges and power. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, progressive forces—liberal 
journalists, intellectuals, teachers, lawyers—struggled for a democratic sys-
tem with rights and freedoms—in the spirit of the French Revolution. The 
common enemy was the Kingdom of the Netherlands, established in 1815 
at the Congress of Vienna as a strong buffer state against revolutionary 
France. From the outset, the ‘re-union’ of the Northern and Southern 
Netherlands under the Dutch king Willem I of Orange met with growing 
tensions and opposition from the South. In the late 1820s, the resistance 
to King Willem I and his authoritarian policies led to a joining of forces 
in the ‘Monster Alliance’ of Catholics and Liberals and various forms of 
collective action, culminating in a wave of protest in the summer of 1830, 
when the common people were also mobilized.4
The opposition to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the rule of 
Willem I initially evoked civil rights set down in the Dutch Constitution of 
1815. If it is possible to describe a univocal goal, then that was, in general 
terms, the ‘redress of grievances’, a formula probably derived from the first 
amendment of the American Bill of Rights, the constitutionally guaranteed 
civil right ‘to petition the government for a redress of grievances’. The 
opposition’s programme was, indeed, framed in language that seems bor-
rowed from the American Bill of Rights.5 The British Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Lord Aberdeen, even summarized the Belgian revolt of 1830 in a 
letter to the Duke of Wellington, the leader of the Tory government, as 
follows: ‘The objective appears to be the redress of local grievances and a 
substantial expansion of the rights and privileges of the people’.6
Even if the phrase on the ‘redress of grievances’ echoes an early modern 
political vocabulary, the Alliance of Catholics and Liberals in the Southern 
Netherlands evoked the right to petition guaranteed by art. 161 of the 
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Dutch Constitution of 1815 to legitimize its actions. The familiarity with 
the use of this type of direct political expression was, of course, age old. 
The right to petition had been written into the French Constitution of 
1791 and was broadly recognized in the Southern Netherlands, annexed 
to France in 1792. Between 1792 and 1793, in particular, this type of 
extra-parliamentary action was used on different occasions to publicize the 
demands of groups lacking political representation. In 1829, it became the 
vehicle for the opposition in the Southern Netherlands to air its grievances 
against Willem I.7
The petition movements in March and October 1829 mobilized huge 
numbers of people. As in olden times, the petitions were addressed directly 
to the king, not to the States General (the Dutch parliament uniting North 
and South). The clergy in particular was very successful in collecting signa-
tures from ‘the masses’. Although the press was also very much engaged 
in the petition movement, with influential papers such as Le Catholique des 
Pays-Bas and Le Politique, the most effective stage from which ordinary 
people could be mobilized was indeed the pulpit. The impact of the highly 
active parish priests on their parishioners was far greater than the impact of 
the opposition press, whose reach was primarily restricted to the cities and 
the literate upper echelons of society. In 1829, in some parishes, the priest 
succeeded in mobilizing as much as three-quarters of the population for 
the ‘petition frenzy’. In March 1829, 150 petitions were signed by 50,000 
people. Six months later, almost 1000 petitions collected 360,000 signa-
tures, including a great number of small crosses, indicating a high level of 
illiteracy among the signatories. The petition movement was a top-down 
movement; the mobilization of the masses was intended to demonstrate 
that the basis for the opposition to Willem I was much larger than simply 
a ‘bunch of radicals’.8
The ‘bunch of radicals’ referred to the activities of the radical clubs 
as the mirror image of the massive petition movements. The ‘Jacobin’ 
clubs in the Southern Netherlands were influenced by the French example 
and primarily promoted urban solidarity, with mutual contacts between 
the cities. This created a network of radicalism with, as the most active 
nodes, the editorial staffs of opposition newspapers, chiefly of a Liberal 
bent. The headquarters of this network was Le Courrier des Pays-Bas; the 
central figure was the popular leader Louis De Potter, who, at the end 
of 1828, was sentenced to 18 months in prison and a fine after a con-
troversial press trial. His arrest was prompted by an alternative ‘king’s 
speech’, in which he called for ministerial responsibility and freedom of 
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education and language. De Potter continued to actively play on pub-
lic opinion from his prison cell. When, in 1830, his sentence was com-
muted to exile, a protest demonstration was organized against the hated 
Dutch Minister of Justice, Van Maanen. Through its repressive action 
and the censorship of the press, the regime created martyrs, which only 
increased their popularity and strengthened their leadership. De Potter 
became the face of the opposition, including the Catholics, who, like him, 
championed ‘freedom’: freedom of religion, education, press and speech. 
The Catholics in Belgium embraced the liberal constitutional liberties to 
defend their threatened position in terms of religion and education. The 
French priest Félicité de Lamennais led the way. The French Revolution 
produced results that were not all negative for the ‘liberal’ Catholics in 
Belgium—constitutions and civil rights could be employed to promote 
Catholic interests.9
The merging of Catholic and Liberal interests under the umbrella of 
‘rights and freedoms’ explains the broad support for the ‘liberal’ revolution 
of 1830 and the new nation state that was created in 1830. In February 
1831 the Belgian Constitution was adopted by the National Congress. 
It was a compromise between conservative and progressive forces, but 
as to the civil rights and freedoms that were embedded in it, it bore the 
hallmark of the radical clubs and intellectuals like De Potter. Freedom of 
speech, the right to assembly, the right to establish associations, freedom 
of the press and freedom of religion were solidly guaranteed by the state. 
In 1831, the Belgian Constitution could be considered the most liberal on 
the entire globe. It served as an example for liberal reformers throughout 
Europe and as a lever for protest and contestation in the young nation 
state itself.
from petItIons to demonstratIons In ghent, 
1831–1839
Between 1833 and 1839, the ailing cotton industry in Ghent formed 
the background for mass petitions from workers, who evoked the right 
to petition on several occasions. The petition movements were aimed at 
the Belgian parliament and the new Belgian king, Leopold I. In the slip-
stream of the petitions, huge mass demonstrations were organized. It goes 
without saying that the right to petition, that had proved to be such an 
important means of political expression in the warm-up to the Belgian 
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Revolution, had been included in the Constitution (art. 21). Various peti-
tions were organized in the aftermath of the Revolution and influenced 
legislation. The petitions prompted parliamentary discussions in all areas 
of social-political life (on free trade, municipal patents, religious freedom, 
the judiciary system and taxation, to cite just a few examples).
In 1833, 1835 and 1839, petitions and mass demonstrations were orga-
nized by Ghent textile workers, who, invoking their constitutional rights, 
demanded intervention and protection from the new Belgian state. The 
period between 1830 and 1839 was characterized by a latent state of war 
with the Netherlands. From military, diplomatic and economic perspec-
tives, it was a period of consolidation, largely determined by the European 
powers. The protracted conflict with King Willem I also caused economic 
depression and constant social unrest. There was a general consensus in 
Ghent, in all social strata, that—compared to the economic growth Ghent 
had experienced under Willem I—the Belgian government had let the 
industrial city down. In December 1833, Ghent’s workers for the first 
time expressed their complaints en masse—without taking to the streets. 
A petition from the working people of the factories reached Brussels. The 
petition was fixed to a piece of cotton measuring 35 ells and covered with 
no fewer than 12,000 signatures and crosses.10 Just four days after its con-
ception and translation into French, the petition of 9 December 1833 was 
read in Parliament.
The extraordinary form of the petition caused a stir in Parliament 
because of the enormous number of signatures and crosses. Some MPs 
questioned the authenticity of the workers’ grievances and suggested 
that the petition had not been organized autonomously by the workers 
themselves: Was it true that foremen had sacked workers to force them to 
sign the petition? Could the foremen have lowered themselves to ‘anti- 
governmental intrigues’? Was it possible that the petition had become 
a parody of the political instrument that had been so important for the 
Belgian Revolution?11
Indeed, the workers were egged on by the cotton manufacturers, but 
what is of importance here is that they believed petitions would make 
more of an impression than the industrialists’ lobbying in political circles. 
The petitions were written from the perspective of the workers them-
selves, who framed the social consequences of industrial stagnation in 
heartbreaking terms. First, the workers had seen themselves forced to 
pledge their Sunday clothes, footstove, cupper saucepan, woolen blankets, but 
now they had also lost their jobs and hence their bread: our lean day’s 
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wage is the only possession we still have in this world. The illiterate work-
ing people pretended not to understand the causes of their misery and 
not to know how to relieve it. What they saw was that their cotton no 
longer found external markets. The shops in Ghent were full of cheaper 
English, French and Swiss cloth. The cotton workers pleaded for work 
and suggested that the government take protectionist measures to shield 
the internal market.
In the end, the members of parliament were convinced of the authen-
ticity of the petition, and their response indicates mass petitioning was 
accepted as a democratic means of expression and claim-making rather than 
a revolutionary protest. The liberal Minister of Internal Affairs, Charles 
Rogier, announced that he would take the petition seriously and would try 
to find remedies for the justified complaints. The petition resulted in the 
establishment, with financial support from the government, of the Société 
de l’Industrie Cotonnière in 1834, a new commercial enterprise promoting 
the export of Flemish cotton.12 Obviously, this measure first and foremost 
served the interests of the manufacturers. But the concession to the peti-
tion encouraged the Ghent workers to continue this course of action.
In February 1835, the cotton spinners formulated a new petition, 
aimed at the governor, with the polite request to use his influence with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the House of Representatives to plead 
the cotton workers’ case again. The workers demanded a law that, if it 
did not exclude cotton imports, at least ensured reciprocity in customs 
laws in relation to countries that were flooding the Belgian market with 
their goods.13 While the petition of December 1833 was simply sent to 
Brussels, a petition march lent strength to this new petition. As the pre-
vious petition had raised doubts as to the authenticity of the workers’ 
grievances, the idea now was to prove its authenticity by demonstrating 
just how many workers supported the new demands. In the organization 
of this mass demonstration in Ghent, we observe that the workers under-
stood that some form of visible ‘proof’ of their broad support and peaceful 
intentions would help to consolidate their constitutional right to petition 
parliament. The mass demonstration in 1835 was indeed intended literally 
as the living demonstration that the petition was the authentic expression 
of the complaints of the workers and no one else.
The archives enable us to observe the organizing of the petition and 
the demonstration, as the Ghent police and local military authorities were 
now alerted and wrote detailed reports to their superiors. The cotton 
workers had formed an ‘association’14 led by their masters and foremen. 
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Each Sunday or Monday they gathered in a pub, Het Vosken [The Fox]. 
The hierarchical organization of the shop floor was extended outside the 
factories. The weekly membership contributions of masters and foremen 
were for instance four to eight times higher than the contributions of the 
‘ordinary’ workers. The overt goal of the association was to frequently 
send petitions and deputations to government to obtain the prohibition 
of foreign cotton in Belgium. The membership had to become as numer-
ous as possible to put as much pressure as possible on the government. 
Remarkably, the cotton workers solicited a lawyer, Eugène Van Huffel, to 
frame their petition in well-formulated phrases. He could not write what 
he pleased, however: The text of the petition was read aloud to the numer-
ous workers present in Het Vosken on 9 February 1835 and needed to be 
approved by their votes.15
To demonstrate that the grievances were genuine grievances of the 
workers, the next day, a petition march of around 2000 workers took to 
the streets of Ghent: Each foreman led his own ‘contingent’ of 10–15 
workers.16 By disciplining the workers, the demonstration proved to the 
bystanders that their expressions of grievances were to be understood 
within a democratic frame, rather than as a spontaneous or revolutionary 
outburst. The demonstration was an early example of what Charles Tilly 
has called WUNC display in relation to collective action: the display of 
Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment as a prerequisite to suc-
cessfully conveying a political message in democratic regimes.17
The timing for the petition and demonstration in February 1835 was 
excellent: 24 Flemish MPs had just handed in a bill to protect the Flemish 
textile industry by means of protectionist legislation. They used the petition 
of the Ghent cotton workers to accelerate parliamentary decision-making. 
The eloquence of the petition was—as in the year before—striking. With 
a newfound boldness, the workers reminded the representatives of their 
mandate. Give us work and don’t forget that you did not get a mandate to 
promote the interests of other countries, but to defend the interests of your fel-
low citizens and to let them enjoy all the prosperity of this rich and beautiful 
country. The workers also asked the MPs to imagine what they would do 
if the factory workers enjoyed full citizenship and the democratic right to 
send their own representatives to parliament. They nevertheless signed 
off with a traditional deferential phrase: Vos très-humbles serviteurs. Their 
approach once more convinced parliament. The parliamentary Petition 
Commission concluded that the bill of the 24 Flemish MPs had to be 
taken into account.18 In September 1835 the liberal Minister of Finances 
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promised that Parliament would prepare legislation to provide the textile 
industry with an internal market.
During the severe ‘cotton crisis’ in the autumn of 1839, the pattern of 
organizing a petition and an accompanying demonstration needed to be 
repeated, as the government had not fulfilled the promises made in 1835. 
This time it took a violent workers’ revolt to shake the Belgian authorities 
into action. The intricacies of the Ghent ‘cotton revolt’ are too entan-
gled to untwine within the scope of this contribution.19 What interests us 
here is that the workers also in this context evoked the right to petition, 
but to underline the fact that they had lost faith in parliament, they now 
addressed their demands to the king. In July 1839, the spinner Cesar Van 
Moerkercke wrote to King Leopold I that the unfortunate position of the 
Ghent factory workers was due not to the Belgian Revolution but should 
be attributed to the conduct of the manufacturers. The petition was a 
strikingly pointed complaint, which clearly sets out how mechanization 
was disrupting craft traditions and how that was perceived by the work-
ers. They saw the manufacturers lining their pockets in their name and 
with their sweat. The subsidies from Willem I had been used to invest in 
machines, which reduce hundreds of us to beggary by the day. The workers 
had to suffer the wage cuts and injustices in silence, as they had no one 
to turn to. The foremen dismissed them; the Council of Prud’hommes20 
was composed of manufacturers and ‘higher up’ they were seen as trouble-
makers. Instead of employing the democratic language of civil rights and 
mandates, the workers used more traditional language, putting limitless 
trust in the king: Wij aenzien U als onzen enigen troost, wij smeeken U als 
onzen vader, wij werpen ons aen uwe voeten als uwe kinderen, hebt medeli-
jden met onzen toestand. [We look to you as our only solace, we beg of 
you as our father, we throw ourselves at your feet like your children, have 
compassion for our plight]. In return for that royalism, Van Moerkercke 
asked for measures and, in particular, a fixed minimum wage. The plea fell 
on deaf ears, as witnessed by the curt reply from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: Impossible.21
When petitioning alone had proved insufficient to move the govern-
ment, other forms of protest and organization were employed, such as 
a march on the provincial governor’s office with the request to act as 
the workers’ spokesman in Brussels. In 1839, as in 1834 and 1835, a 
new mass petition asking for protectionism (in two languages, Flemish 
and French) was edited, with the help of a lawyer. In no time the cotton 
workers mobilized massive support for their plea. The signatures on the 
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original petition filled 158 pages: 12,000 people signed or put a small 
cross behind their name.22 The mass demonstration that was to carry the 
petition to the governor was extremely well organized, displaying the dis-
cipline, numbers and worthiness of the workers. As in 1835, the masters 
and foremen took the lead. In preparation for the demonstration, they 
organized several meetings with up to 700 participants in Den Groenen, 
a pub with enough room to gather all these people. The option of going 
on strike was heavily debated but eventually discarded—the masters and 
foremen wanted to remain within the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of protest and democratic expression. The pressure from the lower strata 
of the working class to get to the streets was channelled deliberately into 
constitutional forms of protest.23
On 2 October 1839, the Vrijdagmarkt, between 8 and 9 in the morning, 
was already packed with people. More than 6000 and perhaps 10,000 fac-
tory workers had heeded the call to demonstrate. The number of women 
participants was remarkable. In 1839 roughly 9000 cotton workers were 
employed in Ghent itself. So almost all Ghent cotton workers took part in 
the demonstration. They were hierarchically positioned, by factory, with 
the foremen in front of their workers. The governor received a delegation 
with the petition and responded favourably to the request. He promised to 
mediate in Brussels and asked the cotton workers in turn to go calmly back 
to their factories. In vain. The order and discipline of the mass demonstra-
tion was thwarted by less docile groups of workers who took to the streets 
and started a row that would lead to the Ghent ‘Cotton Revolt’ of 1839.24
the freedom of assocIatIon and assemBly
The police pointed to the meeting movement of Jacob Kats as being 
responsible for the uproar and violence in Ghent. However, the radical 
movement was doing anything but inciting the workers to use violent and 
unlawful means to express their grievances. The authorities’ fear of politi-
cal disorder explains their excessive interest in the radicals, whose inten-
tions were fundamentally aimed at bringing the workers into the legal 
frames of civil society.
The radical movement in Belgium had its roots in the revolution of 
1830.25 Louis De Potter was one of its leaders. The radicals were repub-
lican minded and profiled themselves as champions of Belgian patriotic 
sentiments. At the same time, they constituted the core of early nineteenth- 
century opposition to the Belgian state. They had indeed expected more 
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from the revolution than what was realized. The new political elite in 
Belgium who took power in 1830 had resisted giving all Belgians full 
citizenship. Only 1% of the male population who paid a certain amount of 
taxes had the vote, while the phrase ‘all Belgians are equal before the law’ 
was one of the constitutional pillars of the new nation state. The political 
mission of the radicals was aimed at making the disfranchised conscious 
of their basic rights. They operated mainly in Brussels, but in the 1830s 
also tried to ‘recuperate’ the discontent of the cotton workers in Ghent, 
described in the previous section.
The radicals tried hard, but they rarely succeeded in connecting with 
the workers. They did not act as spokesmen of the workers’ grievances 
but rather as political intermediaries, who tried to convey the language 
of constitutional democracy to groups that were, as yet, excluded from 
participating in elections and representative institutions. The right of asso-
ciation would prove to be the basic right on which the radical democrats 
insisted from the beginning. A pamphlet dating from 1834, addressed to 
the workers of Ghent, Aan de werklieden van Gend, with an Ontwerp van 
Associatie [Association Bill] should be seen in that context. The radicals 
had noticed how the Ghent workers had in December 1833 evoked the 
constitutional right to submit petitions to the government. According to 
the pamphlet, by taking this step, they had done well and heralded some 
progress: It is the first sign you have given in twenty years of wanting to make 
use of your political rights. They felt, however, that the workers were being 
used by the manufacturers and encouraged them to take matters into their 
own hands. After all, the Constitution also provided for the right of asso-
ciation: Yes, you are formally guaranteed that right by law. Referring to the 
modern workers’ associations created in England and France, the pamphlet 
stated that the workers should unite and form associations as a means to 
become stronger and to make sure their grievances would be heard. The 
radicals also warned the workers not to use unlawful forms of actions, like 
coalitions: It is strictly forbidden to all members of the association to “coal-
ize” or rise up against their masters, factory owners or foremen. The French 
penal law that remained in force from 1810 to 1867 in Belgium punished 
‘coalitions’ between masters with the aim of lowering workers’ wages (art. 
414) and—above all—coalitions between workers with the aim of raising 
their wages (art. 415).26 Also ‘gatherings in public places without organi-
zation and stirred by blind anger’ had to be replaced by formalized actions 
headed by recognized leaders to whom the members of the association 
should obey and show respect.27
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There are no indications that the message of the radical movement 
had been absorbed by the mass of cotton workers in Ghent by 1834. 
Spreading democratic ideas through public meetings would prove to be 
somewhat more successful. The radical democrats were closely affiliated 
with the movement of a popular teacher and playwright, Jacob Kats, 
who operated primarily in Brussels.28 His first public meetings date from 
August 1836. In Den Waren Volksvriend [The True People’s Friend], 
Kats’s newspaper, the objective was formulated as follows: The sole purpose 
of the meeting is to establish a meeting or association for all working classes 
according to the example of the English or Swiss workers, and has no objective 
other than to enlighten and civilize one another, with the aim of obtaining 
the right to no longer be rejected by others as villains or bad people.29 The 
parallels between the meeting movement in Belgium and the London 
Working Men’s Association, set up in 1836 by William Lovett and Henry 
Hetherington, are obvious: taking action within the frames of legality, 
in view of education, ‘enlightenment’ and discussion, to form a moral, 
reflecting, yet energetic public opinion; so as eventually to lead to a gradual 
improvement in the condition of the working classes, without violence or 
commotion.30
Jacob Kats’s meeting movement, making use of the English example 
and eclectically inspired by Utopian socialism (Saint-Simon, Buonarotti, 
Babeuf, Fourier), strove for the recognition of the disfranchised workers 
as respectable citizens. The struggle for social justice and democracy was 
closely intertwined with the radical movement and not in the least revolu-
tionary or even inflammatory. Den Waren Volksvriend was on the contrary 
permeated by a moralizing discourse of respectability and moderation that 
also guided the organization of the meetings themselves. Legality was, not 
surprisingly, the key word. Article 19 of the Constitution was constantly 
and often literally referred to in Den Waren Volksvriend as legitimation of 
the meetings: The Belgians have the right to gather peaceably and without 
arms, as long as they behave in accordance with the laws, which can regulate 
the exercise of this right without, however, subjecting it to prior permission. 
This provision does not apply to meetings in the open air, which remain fully 
subject to the police laws.
Judging by the traces in the police archives, after a few clashes with 
the police during the first year, Kats’s meetings in Brussels actually caused 
surprisingly few disturbances. In July 1838, the Brussels police decided 
there was no point in continuing to engage mouchards, or secret police, 
to supervise the meetings. Kats’s role during the Ghent Cotton Revolt of 
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1839 also provides evidence of the fundamentally law-abiding attitude of 
the meeting leaders in their interactions with the working people. They 
kept to means of protest provided for by law: a series of meetings (not in 
the open air) and yet another petition to parliament, emulating the tradi-
tion of mass petitioning that already existed among the factory workers. 
At first, Kats’s meetings were not very popular in Ghent. Kats did not 
master the local dialect and his speeches did not get through.31 But this 
changed at the end of September 1839 when social unrest was spreading 
through the city. The meetings in De Vier Colonnes [The Four Columns] 
now attracted hundreds of cotton workers, to the great satisfaction of 
Kats and his allies. We approve that you are yourself organizing to raise your 
voice in order to obtain work and food.32 The meeting leaders would do 
everything in their power to prevent violent derailments. They were the 
last to offer the workers their support when it eventually came to street 
demonstrations and violence in Ghent.
The same was also true in February and March of 1848, when Belgium 
was spared the wave of revolution that led to regime changes throughout 
Europe.33 On 7 November 1847, in Brussels, the Association Démocratique 
was established, a select core group of radical and democratic opposition 
forces. The meetings were public and accessible to non-members. The 
association’s means and objectives were—in line with the attitude of the 
radicals since 1830—entirely in accordance with the Belgian Constitution. 
Karl Marx, in exile in Brussels at the time, was its vice-president. He was 
not the only political exile who had affiliated himself with the movement: 
Adelbert von Bornstedt and Jacques Imbert were also members. The 
Association Démocratique refrained, however, from organizing a republi-
can/democratic revolt in Belgium. First of all, the bridge to the working 
classes was virtually non-existent. The European protest wave could have 
forged contacts between the radical democrats and the workers, but that 
did simply not happen. When the news of the fall of the July Monarchy in 
France and the announcement of the Second French Republic had filtered 
through to broad circles of the population, the Association Démocratique 
did not seize the opportunity to organize any significant movement in the 
Belgian capital or elsewhere in the country.
On Sunday 27 February 1848, the gathering of the Association 
Démocratique in La Cour de Bruxelles attracted a great deal of popular 
interest. The Belgian radicals congratulated the French revolutionaries 
but, at the same time, approved resolutions for protecting Belgian neu-
trality, public order and Belgian nationality.34 After all, the Association 
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Démocratique recognized the use of only legal means. Eighteen years on, 
even the small group of radical democrats and malcontents from 1830 
were not aiming at a continuation of that revolution. Our people behave 
beautifully, even such an absurd old fellow as De Potter preaches national 
union and devotion to the national existence of the country, King Leopold I 
would conclude in a letter to Queen Victoria.35
conclusIon
Although 99% of the population of Belgium was excluded from citizen-
ship and suffrage in the Age of Revolution between 1830 and 1848, ordi-
nary people engaged in politics in diverse ways. My contribution focused 
on the impact of the language of civil and constitutional rights in that 
process. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, we saw how 
people without formal representation started appropriating the language 
of civil rights and liberties in order to make their claims and grievances 
heard. The struggle for and the enforcement and constitutional guarantee 
of civil rights was a major precondition for the emergence of civil soci-
ety in Belgium. This struggle generated well-organized forms of popular 
protest long before the formation of the organized workers’ movement 
and mass parties at the end of the nineteenth century. Even though the 
protest forms themselves were not necessarily new, the way they were 
legitimated—through references to constitutionally guaranteed civil 
rights—was a sign of adaptation to the new forms of democratic politics 
of the nineteenth century. In line with Charles Tilly’s WUNC-acronym of 
demonstrating Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment, most radi-
cals and workers refrained from any language or protest form that could 
be associated with violence and revolution, opting instead for disciplined 
behaviour and rights-based discourse.
The fact that the demands and complaints of ordinary people could 
be legally brought into the public sphere was an important element that 
legitimized their actions. The examples in this contribution show how 
the dynamics of appropriation and subversion of the civil rights discourse 
in nineteenth-century politics acted as a lever for protest and popular 
assemblies. Since the proclamation of the liberal Belgian Constitution in 
February 1831, we can see how the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
and liberties were deftly subverted by taking the language on liberty and 
equality literally. Precisely because of their universal ambition, the found-
ing texts of democracy, the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen 
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and its derivatives, like the basic set of rights and liberties in the Belgian 
Constitution, generated new frames of protest and organization that 
aimed at bridging the gap between the universal ideals of democracy and 
the harsh reality of deprivation and disenfranchisement. On various occa-
sions, ordinary people and the radical movement that claimed to speak 
in their name referred to the gap that existed between the ‘legal’ and the 
‘real’ country. No matter how short lived their organizations often proved 
to be, they oriented people without suffrage to the basic structures of civil 
society by evoking rights whose exercise was guaranteed by the constitu-
tion: most importantly, the right to petition and the right to freedom of 
association and peaceful assembly.
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CHAPTER 8
Brilliant Failure: Political Parties Under 
the Republican Era in France (1870–1914)
Nicolas Roussellier
The emergence of mass politics in France was in many ways a striking 
paradox. On the one hand, in the long nineteenth century, the idea pre-
vailed that France was at the forefront of modern politics. This idea was 
shared by all political currents despite the variety of interpretations, either 
positive or negative. On the conservative side, the succession of revolu-
tions from 1789 to 1871 was seen as a lethal disease. France as a political 
country was apparently unable to overcome the instability triggered by 
the Revolution and by the King’s death. The conservative interpretation 
was often joined by large sections of the Liberals, who had entertained 
from the beginning a rather ambiguous vision of the revolutionary era,1 
praising its principles but fearing the popular violence associated with the 
event. The propensity for revolution, however, was interpreted by the 
European left as proof that France was the political nation par excellence. 
French politics was a laboratory for modern politics, and the French were 
the avant-garde of mass politics. The uncertainty and turmoil that France 
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was experiencing through popular surges were not signs of an irreparable 
decadence but proof that the country was always trying to go further on 
the road leading to a ‘true’ Republic. That was notably the ideal envi-
sioned by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and by the majority of the socialist 
left around 1848–1849 and again around 1870.2 The French were the 
‘chosen people of the Revolution’.3 Besides, after the political stabilization 
from the 1870s onwards and the electoral triumphs of the Republicans in 
1877 and in 1881, France enjoyed a special status in fin de siècle Europe. 
France was the only large country in Europe that was a republic amidst old 
monarchies and authoritarian or semi-authoritarian empires.
The enviable status of France at the vanguard of modern politics began 
to deteriorate and even to reverse at the end of the nineteenth century. In 
this process, the new ‘political science’ played an important role. Between 
1870 and 1910, political science, both in Europe and in the USA, tended 
to underline the flaws of the French Republican system. To praise its quali-
ties seemed no longer accurate in the face of new political challenges. The 
French Republic was characterized by the instability of its governments 
and the fragmentation of political groups.4 Compared to other political 
systems, particularly the British regime, the French Third Republic was, 
according to new political scientists, excessively centralized. ‘Jacobinism’ 
and the roles of the State and the Administration were part of an ‘evil’ 
that the French Republic had failed to overcome and, in some ways, had 
even worsened. The comments of Walter Bagehot, for instance, about 
the early Third Republic were very ambivalent. On the one hand, he did 
not want to appear too negative. As a good liberal he praised the French 
liberal Adolphe Thiers and his efforts to become an equivalent of a French 
Premier (between 1871 and 1873). On the other hand, Bagehot was not 
very optimistic. The French political class had shown many times that 
the country was not ready to comply with the conditions required for 
the proper functioning of a (British-style) ‘parliamentary government’. In 
particular, the French did not have the ability to listen to the arguments of 
their opponents, let alone to accept dissident interpretations. They were 
unable to undertake a reasonable and productive discussion.5 This inca-
pacity would strike the Republic a fatal blow.
The forms and strength of political organizations played a crucial 
role in the debate about the deficient French political system. Political 
 scientists and historians tended to underline the fragmentation of par-
liamentary groups and political movements. According to them, the 
instability of governments and ministers was due to the absence of large 
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modern political parties, especially in the period of Republican experi-
ments (1848–1851 for the Second Republic and 1870–1914 for the first 
stage of the Third Republic). Even today, historians and political scientists 
alike are struck by the fragmentation of political groups by political activ-
ism6 or within the chambers of the parliament.7 According to the young 
political science, the dispersion of groups and factions and the absence 
of stable political parties were the causes of the repetition of ministerial 
crises.8 It fuelled the general image of weakness and political chaos often 
associated with French Republican politics. It also prevented France from 
gaining the status of a genuine ‘parliamentary government’ based on the 
criteria that were beginning to be fixed and canonized by the European 
constitutionalists and specialists of Public Law.9
The absence or weakness of French political parties was not only a 
topic of discussion among scientists and academics but also the constant 
obsession of leading French political actors. From the nineteenth century 
until the middle of the twentieth century, French politicians like Léon 
Gambetta, Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, André Tardieu and Michel Debré 
bemoaned the lack of organized parties. The British example of Whigs 
and Tories was widely praised by French politicians despite their ignorance 
of the actual functioning of British politics. There were many attempts 
at creating organized and modern political parties, notably in the 1870s 
(with Gambetta) or in the 1890s (with Waldeck-Rousseau). All these 
attempts ended in failure. The ‘French problem’ was seen as a counter- 
model in the evaluation of political systems. Influenced by foreign experi-
ences that seemed more stable but also by the French liberal tradition, 
prominent French political scientists and jurists like Adhémar Esmein and 
Raymond Carré de Malberg thought that the French Republic had fol-
lowed a deviant path of parliamentary development. They preferred the 
‘rule of law’ (Etat de droit) and its constant progress based on the activity 
of the Council of State and its jurisprudence, and did not like the existing 
political and legislative regime.10 The French parliamentary system was 
incomplete because it was not based on disciplined political parties. From 
this point of view, the Fifth Republic was presented as the constitutional 
regime that put an end to that curse. The Gaullist Constitution, at last, 
had found the key to the ‘true’ way of the parliamentary regime. Michel 
Debré, for instance, one of the two ‘founding fathers’ of the new Republic 
along with De Gaulle, introduced the new Constitution of 1958 not as 
a decline of the parliamentary system but as a way to restore it on a solid 
and efficient basis.11
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However, the peculiarities of the Republican forms of political organi-
zations should not be seen as anomalies but as part of a particular political 
experience. If large and organized political parties did not exist in France 
(or were very awkwardly shaped and weakly disciplined12), how can we 
explain the fact that French politics was able to develop in a continuous 
and rather flourishing manner, notably under the Republic? How did the 
French Republic achieve democratic ‘performances’ quite comparable to 
the ones obtained by other democracies based on modern party systems. 
Why was there, for example, a high electoral turnout, a successful politici-
zation of the masses and political pluralism? In other words, what system 
did replace the nation-wide political parties? Should we stick to the the-
sis of ‘delay’ in the development of the French political life comparable 
to the economic and social backwardness found in the paradigm of the 
‘stalemate society’ proposed by Stanley Hoffmann 50 years ago?13 Or had 
French politics, in the absence of political parties, followed a specific path 
of political modernization that proved efficient in its own right?
Why DiD the Political Parties Fail?
The hesitation to even envision organization and discipline in the politi-
cal realm in general, characterized both the political culture of the right 
(carried by the monarchists and the Bonapartists) and the political culture 
of the left (embodied by Republicans of different hues including social-
ists). The major political traditions in France rejected the model of politi-
cal parties even if they did so for very different reasons. On the right, 
the dominant ideology has long maintained reluctance towards what the 
Italian political scientist Paolo Pombeni has called the ‘forme-parti’ or 
party model.14 The monarchists have experienced multiple political divi-
sions that have been traditionally simplified by the distinction between 
‘légitimistes’ and ‘orléanistes’.15 However that may be, they have all long 
rejected the organization of modern political parties. Their political ideal 
was the national ‘concord’: general reconciliation in respect and, for 
some monarchists, in devotion to the king. The fact that the monarchists 
(including Legitimists) were for most of the nineteenth century in the 
opposition did not prompt the formation of a party but an eschatological 
hope for the return of the king. The restoration of the monarchy was seen 
as an almost miraculous event that would silence the quarrels dividing the 
nation since the Revolution of 1789. It is striking to note, for instance, 
how the Legitimists circles behaved around 1871–1873 when several 
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attempts were made to put the count of Chambord (‘Henri V’) on the 
throne. Everything happened through negotiations between parliamen-
tary factions and the entourage of the royal heir. An agreement between 
aristocratic groups was supposed to play a key role. Neither a monarchist 
party with a minimum of coherence nor a political organization like a club 
was involved in that dubious enterprise. The attempt was not based on the 
political organization of the masses. And it failed.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, when political life became 
increasingly modernized, especially in urban areas, distrust if not rejection 
of political parties remained a key feature of the conservative and national-
ist political culture. Political parties were accused of dividing the ‘people’ 
and the ‘country’, and of weakening the State and therefore of jeopardiz-
ing France as a prominent power on both the European and the imperial 
stages. These ideas, which were still widespread around 1910, strongly 
influenced, for example, the young Charles de Gaulle. Even in the 1950s, 
the most popular politician of the Fourth Republic, along with Pierre 
Mendès France, was Antoine Pinay, the man who had built his whole 
career of local and national representative on the image of an ‘a-political’ 
politician. He rejected ideologies, constantly called for national ‘concord’, 
and was a staunch opponent of parties, which he saw as political machines 
incompatible with the ideal of liberty. During the Fourth Republic, he 
was a member of the Centre national des indépendants, a party that, as 
its name suggests, imposed little discipline on its members. It is clear that 
Antoine Pinay was the most popular politician of his time, in part at least 
because of his anti-parties stand.16
The ‘nationalist synthesis’, to borrow a concept of René Rémond, that 
appeared during the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s, did not help to rec-
oncile the French Right with the model of an organized political party 
willing to comply with normal or stable politics and with Republican and 
Constitutional rules. The Anti-Dreyfus fight led to the decline of the 
‘notables’, the modernization of the repertory of action and a deeper pen-
etration into the popular classes of the French Right.17 However, noth-
ing of this was going in the direction of organized political parties ready 
to accept the constitutional game. The modernization of the right-wing 
movements stimulated political activism like street activism but also intel-
lectual and cultural fights as launched by the Action française,18 rather 
than political parties. If one fraction of the Right within the parliamentary 
sphere had repeatedly tried to promote the creation of a major political 
party (peopled by moderates and conservatives), another important frac-
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tion had given their preference to anti-constitutional forms of political 
action, by recourse to extra-parliamentary agitation and rejection of elec-
toral competitions. These radical groups of the Right were not available 
for the formation of a conservative party on the British model, which had 
long been the dream of French moderates. In this context, the ‘league’ 
was widely praised as a form of organization that was able to challenge 
the party model, which appeared too conventional from a rightist point of 
view. It is sufficient to cite the Ligue des Patriotes or the Ligue de la Patrie 
française, two prominent actors in the anti-dreyfusard camp in the 1890s 
and the 1900s. The structure of the Ligue was preferred to the politi-
cal party because it allowed maintaining the traditional rejection of the 
Republic. It was seen as a better tool in promoting the cause of the mon-
archy in the case of the Action française, or the cause of an authoritarian 
and nationalistic type of Republic in the case of the Ligue des Patriotes, 
which was founded in 1882 and played a crucial role in the populist wave 
of Boulangism of the late 1880s. The modern frame of a league was also 
better adapted to the new urban and popular clientele than the traditional 
‘party’, which was more a sort of conglomerate of elected people and 
notables than a popular organization.
It was not until the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958 that the right- 
wing movements acceded to the status of ‘constitutional’ actors, support-
ers of the regime, and ready to adopt the modern model of political parties 
and its discipline. However, the organizational instability epitomized by 
frequent changes of party names has also characterized the history of the 
French right since 1958. The anti-party spirit remains a central feature of 
the political culture of the Right up to our time. This cultural trait explains 
partially the success of the National Front since the mid-1980s.
the leFt
Strong ambiguities had also existed in the camp of the Left. Yet, from the 
Revolution to the creation of the Third Republic, left-wing groups had 
seemed several times on the brink of the foundation of political parties. 
Forced to organize themselves in the opposition and sometimes clandes-
tinely, the groups of the Left had relied on the politicized fractions of 
the working classes all through the nineteenth century, which provided 
a context that could have been a good basis for the formation of politi-
cal parties. Indeed, the groups of the Left were also able to inherit the 
legacy of old forms of popular sociability, as Maurice Agulhon had dem-
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onstrated.19 The Left had a rich past of organizing in popular societies and 
political clubs, especially during the 1830s and the 1840s.20 Nevertheless, 
these clubs and associations had not succeeded in uniting themselves in a 
modern nation-wide political organization (under the Second Empire for 
instance). The catchword ‘Republican party’ was often used during the 
nineteenth century, especially between 1820 and 1870, but its meaning 
was not associated with a formal organization. It was rather a rhetorical 
expression to unite the numerous fractions of the Left, from moderate 
Republicans to socialists. The ‘Republican party’ had a strong resonance 
as a sentimental evocation but almost no actual reality in terms of political 
organization.
With the advent of the Third Republic in the 1870s, a change seemed 
plausible. Léon Gambetta tried to become the leader of a large and popu-
lar Republican party. The Republican party should change from a mere 
rhetorical or sentimental signification into a real organization, notably in 
the electoral field. This change should have led to unity and discipline 
of the Republican group within the National Assembly. The perspective 
envisioned by Gambetta was explicitly to foster a British-style political life 
characterized by the existence of two major parties: one moderate with a 
conservative leaning and the other more radical and progressive. The req-
uisite was that both parties should be Republican in their principles. They 
should support the constitutional regime of the Republic. Gambetta’s 
scheme implied that the Republicans first had to win a total victory over 
the monarchists and the Bonapartists. As a harbinger, Gambetta had 
undertaken a considerable electoral project by centralizing a large file of 
Republican candidates with their respective constituencies.21
However, Gambetta never succeeded in reaching the scale of a truly 
organized political party. That failure could partially be explained by polit-
ical circumstances and notably feelings of jealousy and distrust among 
other Republican leaders. Many of them had always been suspicious about 
the authoritarian tendency attributed to Gambetta. The experience of 
the Government of the National Defence of 1870–1871 during which 
Gambetta had been accused of behaving like a ‘dictator’ was often held 
against him. But the failure of Gambetta can be explained more convinc-
ingly by the existence of structural obstacles, both intellectual and ide-
ological, opposed to the formation of modern political parties. Several 
reasons can be invoked here. Firstly, a modern British-style political party 
entailed the acceptance of strong personal leadership. The role played by 
Gladstone at the head of the English Liberal party showed that only a 
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form of personal power could guarantee the internal unity of the party and 
its consistency in parliament. The majority of the French Republicans were 
not ready to accept this type of strong leadership. For many Republicans, 
lulled by the ideal of popular sovereignty and the idea of collegiate power, 
it made no sense to accept the kind of personal tyranny for the sake of a 
modern party that they had so strongly objected to with respect to mon-
archs or the idea of a strong president that they had fiercely fought against 
during the Second Empire. They rejected any absolute ‘personal power’ 
(pouvoir personnel).
Moreover, Gambetta’s idea was that the Republicans would organize 
themselves into two different parties after previously having vanquished 
or absorbed the ‘old parties’ of Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists. 
Yet, the Republicans never managed to eliminate the representatives of the 
former political regimes. The Right was beaten but retained strongholds 
almost everywhere in France.22 The ‘old parties’ that the Republicans 
tended to see as definitively condemned by History have often re-emerged. 
Monarchism, for instance, was usually seen as a species endangered around 
1890, and yet it enjoyed a process of renaissance with the success of the 
Ligue of Action française in the 1900s. The influence of both the Action 
française and its intellectual leader, Charles Maurras, lasted until the estab-
lishment of the Vichy Regime in 1940. The Bonapartists were fading away 
little by little in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, but in the 
twentieth century Bonapartist culture was successfully transmitted to a 
modern patriotic right-wing movement, mainly through leagues, first of 
the nationalists in the fin de siècle, then in several leagues of the interwar 
period like the Jeunesses Patriotes and eventually in the Gaullism of the 
RPF during the Fourth Republic.
The survival of the old parties posed a challenge for the Republicans, 
especially within the troubled game of the parliament. Under the Third 
Republic, the peculiar process of the formation of political majorities 
makes it difficult to draw clear boundaries between political groups.23 For 
reasons of parliamentary tactics, the Republicans often called for the unity 
of all Republican tendencies under the label of the ‘Republican party’ 
and against the anti-Republican Right. This propensity to favour politi-
cal majorities of a ‘Republican concentration’ (moderate Republicans and 
Radicals together) delayed the emergence of a moderate Republican party 
and another Republican party of a progressive type. When the moderate 
Republicans tried to build a majority (and possibly a political party) by an 
alliance with different groups of the Right, the more advanced Republican 
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fractions immediately accused them of betraying the Republic, as was the 
case with Méline in the 1890s. Thus, many moderate Republicans did not 
want to cross the line that might have led to the creation of a modern 
political party similar to the English Conservative Party. It would have 
meant cutting ties with the rest of the Republicans. Raymond Poincaré, 
for instance, was the leading political figure of the 1920s. Yet, despite the 
moral prestige he enjoyed around 1926–28, he had never envisioned the 
creation of a modern political party of the French Right or Centre Right. 
He still wanted to be remembered as a good Republican, that is to say as 
a man faithful to the Republican regime and its values, including laïcité. 
Most moderate Republicans did not feel at ease within a coalition that 
separated them from their Radical partners.
To borrow an expression from Freud, we could say that a Republican 
‘superego’ impeded many moderate Republicans from going beyond the 
boundaries of the old Republican identity of the defence of the regime, the 
defence of the State school system, the laïcité.24 Symmetrically, when the 
radicals of the Radical Party, which had been founded in 1901, decided to 
conclude an alliance with the Socialists, the moderate Republicans accused 
them of betraying the Republic. This accusation was an obstacle to the cre-
ation of a large party of the Left uniting Socialists and Radicals. Moreover, 
many Radicals who actually defended moderate ideas about economics 
and social issues did not feel at ease in an alliance with the Socialists. That 
was the case in 1924 with the ‘Cartel of the Leftists’ (Cartel des gauches) 
and even more in 1936 with the Popular Front (because the new alliance 
included not only the Radicals and the Socialists but also the Communists).
The French parliamentary game had long been characterized by politi-
cal majorities swaying from the centre-left to the centre-right. This parlia-
mentarianism à la française that blurred the map of political groups had a 
permanent impact on the French political system. The French Republicans 
were never able to choose between a large Republican party, which would 
have rallied all the Republican fractions, or the formation of two separate 
parties, one moderate and the other radical. The programme of Gambetta 
ended in a complete failure in the early 1880s. The Third Republic never 
became a Republic of parties.
The reluctance towards creating organized and disciplined parties 
also derived from the specific conditions of political life under the Third 
Republic. Alternatives to political parties were sometimes more efficient as 
was shown in the Dreyfus Case. The ‘dreyfusard party’ was not a political 
party but a configuration of networks including a family network around 
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the wife and the brother of Alfred Dreyfus, intellectual and academic net-
works as well as literary salons. These networks were in tune with the 
‘emotional dynamic’ that strongly connected dreyfusards.25 When several 
dreyfusards with a strong attachment to the rule of law launched an orga-
nization, it was not a political party, not an electoral machine, but a league, 
the Ligue des droits de l’homme. This league welcomed members of dif-
ferent tendencies of the French Left, mainly Radicals and Socialists. It 
played a role in the early twentieth century rather similar to the role played 
by the ‘Republican party’ in the nineteenth century.26
The call for unity among Republicans was not only a rhetorical tool. In 
the 1890s and 1900s and again in the 1930s, the defence of the Republic 
was seen as a necessity. The Republic as a regime, let alone as a ‘spirit’, had 
not been fully accepted by all political forces. The Republican Defence in 
the struggle against the Boulangism of the 1880s or in the Dreyfus Affair 
made the different Republican fractions collaborate in the same major-
ity and support the same government, whereas, at the same time, sev-
eral political parties were created, in particular, the Radical Party and the 
Alliance Démocratique in 1901. Torn between the Republican ideal and 
the affiliation to a specific party, Republicans were never clear about their 
allegiances. The identity of the Alliance Démocratique as a party remained 
weak,27 and the Radicals were sometimes allied with the centre-right and 
sometimes with the Socialists, but they were never strong enough to con-
stitute a solid majority by their own resources.
In 1901, the Law on the right of association offered a juridical struc-
ture that sustained the existence of political parties.28 For the first time, 
political parties could exist overtly. The newspapers began to publish 
reports of party congresses and to write about steering committees and 
other partisan demonstrations.29 Behind this modern façade, it was, how-
ever, very difficult to measure the actual strength of the different political 
parties, especially when we turn our attention to what was happening on 
the ground. The figures about membership are disputable. They are com-
monly overestimated, especially if one tries to count the exact number of 
individual and voluntary memberships. In many cases, at the local level, 
the committees, federations or sections did not have a perennial existence. 
That was true for the moderates of the Alliance Démocratique and the 
Fédération Républicaine as well for the Radicals. Political parties existed 
under the Third Republic, but hardly as true modern political organi-
zations. Even the Socialist Party (SFIO) which was compelled to adopt 
a rigid and disciplined form of organization in 1905 (under the pres-
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sure of the International) could not be compared to the German Social- 
democratic party (the SPD) which had in 1912 one million members and 
four million voters.
There was one more and very important obstacle on the road lead-
ing to the formation of political parties. Even when political parties 
were created (after 1901), they were not able to impose on their rep-
resentatives a minimal doctrinal coherence, let alone voting discipline 
within the parliamentary assemblies. Neither the moderate nor the radi-
cal parliamentary forces were based on discipline. Since the late 1870s, 
‘undisciplined’ moderate and radical Republicans had always repre-
sented between two-thirds and three quarters of the total of represen-
tatives. This lack of collective behaviour also existed in  local politics. 
There were numerous instances of local dissidence in the constituencies 
during electoral campaigns. The numerous cases of dissident voting in 
the Chamber and in the Senate were not felt as a shameful disease by 
the majority of the parliamentarians in the nineteenth century. On the 
contrary, dissidence was praised as a fundamental right of parliamentar-
ians. Parliamentarians cherished a spirit of independence and saw them-
selves as representatives of the people instead of party pawns. The lack 
of party discipline was part of the political identity of the moderates 
of the centre-right as well as of members of the centre-left, that is to 
say the two pillars of the regime. From the 1880s to the 1910s, it was 
not uncommon among Radicals and independent Socialists to reject the 
model of political parties as churches and sects imposing dogmas and 
unilateral discipline.
the sPecial Features oF French rePublican Politics
The French difficulty with forming modern political parties was neither an 
accident nor the mechanical effect of a French ‘backwardness’. The mod-
ernization of French political life under the Second and Third Republics 
is an indisputable fact, and it even continued under the Second Empire.30 
There were no flourishing major political parties as in Germany or in 
Great Britain, yet the French Republican system was characterized by a 
high level of political participation, electoral pluralism and an increase in 
competitive elections,31 and by the decreasing number of fiefs and decreas-
ing power of the ‘notables’.32 Despite everything, French society seems to 
have known a very high degree of politicization and a capacity to integrate 
the major part of the social classes.
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The absence of major political parties does not correspond necessarily 
to a failure of the process of political modernization. The failure of the 
political parties may instead be interpreted as a sign that another path of 
political modernization was followed. There is a political modernization 
worthy of the name that does not go through the organization of mass 
parties and disciplined parliamentary groups. To understand this political 
development, we must consider both the top of the political life and the 
base.
At the summit, the French parliamentary culture of the ‘freedom of 
conscience’ was shared by a majority of the representatives under the 
Third Republic. This ‘Parliament of the Eloquents’ had an external image 
of low governability, but the reality looks very different from the inside. 
Members of the Cabinet changed very often, but most of these changes 
were superficial. The ‘ministerial crises’ usually concerned only the presi-
dent of the Council and a few other members of the Cabinet; most of the 
time, these were simple political adjustments. Far from being a real politi-
cal ‘crisis’, these adjustments were used to adapt parliamentary alliances. 
Stability was based on the parliamentary majority, not on the continuation 
of the life of a Cabinet. This allowed the assemblies to impose their legisla-
tive demands on the executive that wanted to monopolize the decision- 
making process. This also allowed the Republican regime to enact a large 
number of fundamental reforms, such as the school laws of the 1880s, the 
first social laws of the late 1890s and the 1900s, and the law of Separation 
between Church and State of 1905.
But the basis of political life shows why the absence of organized 
and disciplined political parties did not justify the image of archaism 
of the French political system. Five factors can be underlined on the 
basis of many departmental monographs and other local studies.33 
Unsurprisingly, many authors have emphasized first and foremost the 
personal connections between the constituency and its representative. 
Interpersonal contact was crucial for the relationship between the local 
politician and the electors. Contrary to the common assumption, this 
was not the asymmetrical relation based on traditional domination by 
notables. In most cases, the ‘notable’ was not an archaic personage 
who exercised his authority through the simple effect of his economic 
and social superiority. In fact, after 1880, notables were able to con-
solidate their position by linking their personal qualities with horizontal 
networks. The authoritarian notable became a more democratic nota-
ble. Familial networks existed and were particularly powerful in some 
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constituencies.34 Clientele networks and networks of associations like 
agricultural cooperatives could be very efficient. Above all, political net-
works based on local government had given the ‘notable’ more control 
over his constituency than a political party could have provided. In this 
sense, the prominent position of radicals in a city like Béziers should 
not be explained by the strength of the Radical Party at the national 
level (which lacked a common platform and a stable identity) but by 
the capacity of radicals to organize themselves at the local level as a 
‘party of associations’, which counted among others the local section 
of the Ligue des droits de l’homme, the local section of the Ligue de 
l’Enseignement, the free-mason lodges and the local organization of the 
‘Jeunesses laïques’.35 Through this system of local politics, the radicals 
of Béziers were able to resist the nationalization of political life and the 
authority of political parties until the 1970s.
A politician of the Third Republic could not retain his position if he did 
not compile political mandates like ‘Russian dolls’.36 His success would 
have been unlikely without the support of the Administration, in par-
ticular the help of the prefect with whom he constituted a ‘departmental 
condominium’ as for instance in the department of Loiret which became a 
stronghold of the Radical party.37 In other constituencies, the Church and 
the local aristocracy provided decisive support.38
The mayors and the members of the departmental councils had usu-
ally no interest in putting themselves under the yoke of a political party 
organized at the national level. As a result, the French political parties 
resembled an archipelago of departmental federations, which were them-
selves patchworks of local committees or networks. That was true for the 
Radicals and for the moderate Right, but it was also true for the Socialist 
Party (SFIO) which was built on that loose model of party.39 The French 
political reality was far from the cliché of Jacobin France, powerfully cen-
tralized and with an authoritarian Administration supposed to control the 
whole process of local political life. Even the clientele phenomenon (clien-
télisme) that has usually been identified with social and a political archaism 
deserves to be rehabilitated in this perspective.40 Clientelism was in con-
stant evolution. Distribution of official medals, offices of public servants 
and public aides or allowances by Republican politicians replaced distribu-
tion of private goods by rich and aristocratic notables.41 The French politi-
cal system has developed more along a horizontal than a vertical pattern, 
more through its territories than through nation-wide pillars like mass 
parties or mass trade unions.
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The second crucial factor is the importance of propaganda. It was 
often decisive for a local politician to have the ownership, directly or indi-
rectly, of a local newspaper. The Third Republic was the golden age of the 
regional and local press, and local politicized newspapers were a key factor 
for personal and direct control over the electors without recourse to an 
organized party (1880–1910).
The third factor is the uneasy position of the representative between the 
Administration and his electors. He had to prove his capacity by obtaining 
individual advantages that he would distribute to his electors. He had also 
to prove his ability in providing collective goods that would benefit a town 
or the constituency as a whole. Thus, the local politician was fostering his 
position as the prominent personage of his town, canton or department. 
If he reached such a status, the ‘notable’ did not need any political party. 
And he was also in tune with Republican values of the nineteenth century, 
such as the service of the public good and the unity of the local polity.
The fourth factor was linked to civic representation. It was crucial to be 
the master of local ceremonies, give public speeches and be at the centre of 
public inaugurations. In this way, local politicians could claim to embody 
not a particular political party, but the town or the ‘little country’ (la petite 
patrie) as a whole, and to be ‘above parties and above divisions’ (to use 
a very common phrase of that time). He was the democratic monarch of 
his constituency rather than the leader of a political fraction. This was the 
trademark of the majority of Republican leaders in the nineteenth century. 
And it had a long heritage. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, Antoine 
Pinay had first built his image of consensual representative, independent 
of all parties, at the local level. Then, he transferred this catch-all identity 
to the national level. Pinay’s ascension was no exception. Most of the main 
political leaders of the centre-right and of the moderate right, like Thiers, 
Waldeck-Rousseau, Poincaré, Briand and Paul Reynaud, preferred to play 
the card of the politician ‘above political parties’ to becoming leader of a 
party.42 They preferred playing an intermediate role between political frac-
tions to the pejorative image attached to unilateral partisanship.
conclusion
The absence of unified and disciplined mass parties in French politics of 
the nineteenth century had long-lasting consequences in the twentieth 
century, but it was not a synonym for political archaism or failed modern-
ization. The power of the ‘notables’ and the weight of the, until the 1950s, 
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still predominantly rural French society prevented the emergence of mod-
ern political parties. And the attachment of French parliamentarians to the 
traditional rights of discussion and to the freedom of vote slowed down 
the emergence of disciplined parliamentary parties. However, there was 
no fatal stagnation or backwardness. Despite the absence of major political 
parties, French political life was modernizing and was characterized by a 
very high turnout, a widespread diffusion of political ideas and increasingly 
competitive elections. Political flexibility had allowed the enactment of 
major Republican legislation. These laws had rallied very large majorities 
composed of different political groups, and they had proved themselves 
more durable than other laws that had received the support of a partisan 
majority. The 1905 law on the Separation between Church and State is 
one example of these ‘great’ legislative accomplishments. On the ground, 
French politics was characterized by semi-spontaneous forms of political 
organization, such as local committees, public meetings43 and networks 
of different kinds. The traditional ‘sociability’ with its social or sometimes 
religious origins had transformed into a political and modern form of local 
and basic organization. Rather than signs of political backwardness, the 
new forms of political organization proved capable of diffusing political 
ideas and political commitments on a large scale. At the end of the nine-
teenth century, French society was profoundly politicized without having 
followed the path of modern political parties.
In this perspective, the French case shows that the emergence of mass 
politics in the nineteenth century did not always imply the emergence 
of disciplined political parties. There is not just one type of democracy, 
characterized by the triumph of parties. There is also a form of Republican 
democracy based on vivid and long-lasting Republican principles on the 
national stage and on horizontal networks on the local level.
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CHAPTER 9
The German National Association 
1859–1867: Rise and Fall of a Proto-Party
Andreas Biefang
The Deutscher Nationalverein, or German National Association, holds 
a special position in the history of political organization in the nine-
teenth century. It was, as Friedrich Engels opined in retrospect, the 
‘strongest organization the German bourgeoisie has ever had’.1 Founded 
in September 1859, it aimed to bring about a German national state 
with a directly elected parliament and a central government under 
Prussian leadership. This national union of federal states was to replace 
the Deutscher Bund or German Confederation, which had united the 
36 German states since 1815 into a confederation of federal states but 
which was a purely monarchical construct and possessed no democratic 
legitimacy whatsoever.2 The National Association based its political 
agenda on the Reichsverfassung, the German constitution proclaimed by 
the  revolutionary national  assembly in Frankfurt on 28 March 1849.3 
However, this time, it wanted to achieve its goals not by revolution but 
by organizing. In the self-confident words of its manager Lorenz Nagel 
A. Biefang (*) 
The Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen 
Parteien, Berlin, Germany
(April 1865), it wanted ‘to bring the German people to power by means 
of organizing’.4
Indeed, the founders of the association did much more in the field of 
organizing than what the liberal middle classes had so far been prepared 
to do. To that end, they borrowed and combined concepts from German, 
Italian and English examples. Within a few years, the Nationalverein 
developed from a nationalist pressure group into a mass organization that 
was directed towards parliament and resembled a modern political party. 
However, in 1867, immediately after the foundation of the North German 
Confederation it disbanded again. Its successor, the National Liberal 
Party, was set up as a parliamentary party without any extra-parliamentary 
structures to speak of. The Social Democrats, who around 1900 were the 
European model or bogeyman of a bureaucratic mass party, took over the 
organizational heritage of the National Association.
This contribution will present the National Association as a labora-
tory of the nineteenth-century bourgeois attempts at organization. The 
first section will discuss the phases of the history of the association and 
its corresponding political strategies. The development of the organiza-
tion can be understood only in relation to its dramatic political history. 
The second and most important section will discuss the organizational 
design of the National Association, its models, leaders and the way it oper-
ated. The development from pressure group to prototype of mass party 
deserves special attention as does the question of democracy within the 
party itself. The third and last section will explain the reasons for the dis-
solution (Auflösung) of the National Association and will try to determine 
the place of the Association in the history of political organizing by the 
liberal middle classes.
Aims And PoliticAl strAtegies: three PhAses 
in the history of the nAtionAlverein
The foundation of the Nationalverein in September 1859 was a result 
of the so-called New Era. This expression served as a euphemism for the 
hoped-for domestic policy reforms and political campaigns aimed at estab-
lishing a united German nation that a large part of the middle classes asso-
ciated with the accession of the Prince Regent and later King Wilhelm I 
of Prussia.5 After a decade of oppression, the state persecution of the press 
and of associations, clubs, societies and the like, which had  characterized 
the decade after the suppression of the 1848–1849 revolutions, did in 
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fact ease off. The establishment of a supra-local political organization 
would otherwise not have been possible. The first of these newly founded 
national organizations was the Kongress Deutscher Volkswirte, the con-
gress of German economists, which was established in 1858 and advocated 
a liberal-capitalist economic order. The Deutscher Nationalverein evolved 
a year later largely from its political wing. An important reason for its 
organization was the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Sardinia- 
Piedmont, which was supported by France. Many liberals and democrats 
saw the ‘Vaterland in Gefahr’. From the early phases of its establishment, 
it testified to the strong mobilizing power of emerging nationalism for the 
self-organization of citizens.6
A range of meetings at regional level preceded the foundation of the 
Nationalverein, which was formalized at a national assembly in Frankfurt 
called for 16 September 1859 and attended by over 100 liberal and demo-
cratic politicians. A temporary political agenda was agreed upon and a con-
cise organizational statute was decided on. It was to be drawn up in detail 
by a commission consisting of 12 members.7 In the first few months after 
the foundation, the Nationalverein’s steering committees, the commission 
and the executive committee were kept busy with the consolidation of the 
organization’s structure and agenda. The difficulty was that a ‘German 
nation’ as a political and emotional community existed only half-heartedly, 
as large parts of the various federal states’ respective populations were still 
focused entirely on the individual states’ centres. The Nationalverein’s 
organizational structure and agenda had to unite 1848 constitutionalists 
and 1848 democrats, northern and southern Germans, Protestants and 
Catholics, those who believed in a ‘Greater Germany’, and those who did 
not. It was therefore both a driver and an expression of nation-building.
The Nationalverein’s political history can be divided into three phases 
that greatly depended on the political developments in Prussia. These 
phases corresponded with a respectively adapted political strategy. The 
first phase was defined by the advent of the so-called New Era in Prussia 
and lasted from 1859 to around 1861–1862. During these years, the 
Nationalverein pursued a political strategy that could be described as a 
‘warmongering strategy’. It was applied for the first time on the occasion 
of the war in Northern Italy in 1859. The basic idea was as simple as it 
was risky. At the time, the Nationalverein called for the military and diplo-
matic authority of the Confederation’s various members to be transferred 
entirely to Prussia for the duration of the war. It was hoped that this action 
would break the hated principle of a confederation of federal states in 
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favour of a single, powerful German state. The thinking behind this plan 
was that Prussia would not relinquish this authority once it possessed it, or 
at any rate not if the war ended in a victory. A national parliament would 
subsequently have to be established to ensure that the political order thus 
created did not smack of despotism and to lend it political legitimacy. The 
war thereby became a nationalist-revolutionary-charged instrument to aid 
the foundation of a Prussian-dominated national state.
Over the next few years, the Nationalverein attempted to engender sev-
eral foreign policy crises or to exacerbate such crises by means of agitation 
in order to trigger the described mechanism. The first such instance was 
the occasion of Savoy and Nice being ceded to France in the spring of 1860 
as agreed by Piedmont-Sardinia in return for French military aid. After 
that, the warmongering concentrated increasingly on Schleswig-Holstein, 
a problem firmly and deeply rooted in the nation’s emotions and far better 
suited to agitation designed for mass impact than evoking the comparably 
abstract idea of a ‘danger emanating from France’. To some extent, this 
strategy proved successful with the war against Denmark in 1864, but 
in completely different and less favourable circumstances than expected. 
On the occasion of the 1867 ‘Luxembourg Crisis’ in 1867, involving the 
question as to whether the Grand Duchy, which had so far belonged to 
the German Confederation, would in future be French, German or neu-
tral, the Nationalverein again reverted to its warmongering strategy. The 
1870–1871 national-liberal enthusiasm for war was also a direct result of 
the warmongering strategy described above. From the emerging national- 
liberal perspective, the 1864, 1866 and 1870–1871 wars were fought for 
the purpose of national unification.
From the perspective of the Nationalverein, this ‘warmongering strat-
egy’ assumed a liberalized Prussia willing to accept considerable foreign 
policy and military risks. Alas, there was no such Prussia. In actual fact, in 
terms of foreign policy, the conservative monarchy’s actions never went 
against the legal system of the German Confederation and any interna-
tional treaties, and as far as domestic policy was concerned, the short 
phase of cautious liberalization soon came to an end. On the contrary, 
the debates about military reform rapidly grew into a constitutional  crisis 
between the liberal-dominated parliament and the royal government. The 
Nationalverein responded to these developments by ceasing to appeal 
directly to the Prussian government and shifting its political focus to the 
individual states. However, it was not averse to reverting to its original 
strategy whenever possible.
 A. BIEFANG
The second phase in the organization’s politics, which lasted from 
1861 until early 1864, was determined by the necessity of having to dis-
tance itself from Prussia at times. The basic principle of this new strategy 
consisted of concentrating on bringing the policies of the various German 
federal states in line with each other. This was intended to increase the 
pressure on the ‘Bundestag’, then the standing conference of the member 
states of the German Confederation, to instigate reforms, and indirectly 
also on Prussia. Branches of the ‘Deutsche Fortschrittspartei’, the German 
progress party, were founded in Prussia, Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse- 
Darmstadt, Nassau, Hanover and other federal states whose steering com-
mittee members enjoyed close links with their Nationalverein counterparts 
with the intention of creating the institutional prerequisites for achieving 
this goal.8 For the same reason, the Nationalverein also became involved 
in the foundation of the Deutscher Handelstag, the German chamber of 
commerce, and the Deutscher Abgeordnetentag, the German members of 
parliament congress, both of which had their roots in the individual states’ 
respective institutions. The collaboration and division of labour with the 
Abgeordnetentag was particularly successful, as the congress consisted of 
progressive-liberal members of federal state parliaments from across the 
Confederation’s states.
At the same time, the Nationalverein practised a more ‘grassroots’ 
political approach with increased mass impact, which resulted in a con-
siderably higher number of meetings held at a local level. However, this 
new style also included demonstrative participation in events organized 
by the national gymnastics and shooting associations and also the inde-
pendent organization of celebrations commemorating Fichte and, above 
all, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Reichsverfassung consti-
tution in 1849. By means of such performative and symbolic acts, the 
Nationalverein attempted to credibly demonstrate that large parts of the 
population supported its aims. The October 1862 general assembly, at 
which the 1849 Reichsverfassung constitution including the fundamen-
tal rights and electoral laws defined therein were formally adopted as the 
Nationalverein’s agenda, was the peak of its sharp swing to the left.
The fundamentally pro-Prussian Nationalverein’s cohesion was thereby 
maintained also during the constitutional crisis. The organization even 
managed to gain new members, and to reject the Austrian reform plans 
for the Confederation, which did not entail a directly elected parliament, 
as undemocratic and anti-national. However, when the Prussian govern-
ment, under its new chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was considered 
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the incarnation of political backwardness, continued to pursue its colli-
sion course against the parliament in violation of the constitution, the 
Nationalverein underwent a crisis. The October 1863 general assembly 
was marred by disputes between the various wings of the organization and 
splitting tendencies.
In what was a difficult situation for the Nationalverein, the conflict 
about which nation Schleswig-Holstein belonged to entered its deci-
sive stage occasioned by the death of King Frederick VII of Denmark, 
who by personal union was also Duke of Schleswig and Holstein. The 
Nationalverein entered the third and final phase of its history. In a dra-
matic sitting in late December 1863, it decided to revert to the ‘warmon-
gering strategy’, although in a radicalized and extended form: the plan 
consisted of clarifying matters by supporting the German pretender to 
Schleswig-Holstein’s throne, Friedrich von Augustenburg. This involved 
the ‘Augustenburger’ taking up residency in Kiel immediately, supported 
by a semi-legal army of volunteers organized by the Nationalverein, and 
taking over all affairs of state. The idea behind this show of partiality was 
to turn the international legal conflict between the German confedera-
tion and Denmark into a war between the nations, fought for Schleswig- 
Holstein’s liberty. The intended outcome was a united German nation 
under Prussian leadership—without Bismarck.
This strategy, pervaded by nationalist-revolutionary elements, failed 
primarily due to Prussia’s and Austria’s determination to conquer the 
duchies for Germany not by citing nationalist-revolutionary rights but 
on the strength of international treaties. With these latest—above all, 
Prussian—military victories, the national constitution movement’s strat-
egy completely collapsed. The Nationalverein was cast into a maelstrom 
of opposing currents: on the one side, there were those who were pro- 
annexation and prepared to tolerate Bismarck’s now even more powerful 
regime and in return accept the fact that Prussia’s territories would be 
extended northwards. On the other side stood the principled federalists 
who were opposed to granting concessions to a still reactionary Prussia.
The Nationalverein no longer managed to consolidate these diver-
gent opinions into an agenda acceptable to all. From 1865 onwards, it 
became restricted to its right-leaning, liberal, primarily Protestant wing as 
members departed and breakaway groups formed. It became regionally 
weighted in favour of northern Germany and the minor central German 
states. These remnants, too, were unable to agree on a common attitude 
towards the Prussian government and wavered between cooperation and 
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confrontation. Nevertheless, once the Prussian proposals for the reform of 
the German Confederation—which included the establishment of a body 
of directly elected national representatives—became public in April 1866, 
the Nationalverein became involved in instigating the tough negotiations 
that culminated in the 1867 constitutional compromise, which antici-
pated the constitution adopted by the newly founded German Empire in 
1871.9 The nationalist-liberal remnants of the Nationalverein, which later 
evolved into the nationalist-liberal wing of North German Confederation’s 
Reichstag, played a major part in ensuring that the new state was born as a 
federal state rather than simply a Prussia enlarged by annexations.
the nAtionAlverein’s orgAnizAtionAl structure
The Nationalverein managed to have such political impact not least due to 
its new and modern organizational structure. Its founders modelled the 
organization’s structure on various national and international examples, 
which they combined with a few innovations. Most of the literature cites 
the Italian Società nazionale as a role model, which has always seemed 
likely due to the identical name and the somewhat similar political circum-
stances.10 However, this assumption is superficial and must be modified. In 
actual fact, the organization’s founders at best looked towards the Italian 
role model in political terms. Italy’s Società nazionale, founded in 1857 as 
a union of liberal and democratic nationalists, fought for the establishment 
of a unified Italian state in close cooperation with the Piedmont govern-
ment led by Camillo Cavour. The Nationalverein’s ‘conservative liberal’ 
constitutional wing would have hoped for a similar cooperation with the 
Prussian government, but the greater majority of the organization was not 
content with playing the role of mere propaganda organ for Prussia. As far 
as the organizational structure was concerned, the organization’s found-
ers in fact built on experiences gained throughout the history of German 
associations, clubs and societies. Above all, however, they were inspired 
by Richard Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League, copying many details of 
its organizational structures and forms of action.11 The Nationalverein’s 
founders did not look towards Italy for guidance, but to highly industrial-
ized and politically developed England.12
The Nationalverein continued the traditions of traditional German 
associations, clubs and societies, and therefore also adopted their tradi-
tionally democratic internal structures: the principle of making a pub-
lic impact as well as the regular members’ meetings, agenda debates, an 
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elected board and functionary accountability.13 However, in one impor-
tant aspect, the organization differed from the previous norm: its central-
ist architecture. The federative fraternity alliances during the Vormärz era, 
the decades leading up to the March Revolution in the states belonging 
to the German Confederation, and the years of the Revolution, above 
all the Preß- und Vaterlandsverein, founded in 1832, and the democratic 
Centralmärzverein, founded in 1848–1849, had been unusual in that the 
political decision-making power had remained at the level of the local 
society.14 Decision-making was visible at a national level only through 
annual general meetings, where the so-called ‘Vororte’, outposts, were 
elected. These were local organizations of particular importance that were 
charged with running the business for one year. The ‘Vororte’ had little 
authority. They served mainly as coordination and communication centres 
and could neither act nor issue instructions in the name of their affiliated 
organizations.
The Nationalverein broke with this cumbersome pattern. In 1859, it 
constituted itself as a single organization for the whole of Germany and did 
not permit any local branches. Each member therefore received instruc-
tions directly from headquarters. The political power was concentrated in 
its main executive body, the commission, replacing the almost authority- 
less ‘Vororte’. This created a new type of organization: a centralized and 
powerful union of agitators.
The commission originally set up when the Nationalverein was founded 
became the hub of its power. Its members were elected at the annual 
general meeting by way of secret and equal vote. It was charged with lead-
ing the organization in political as well as business terms for one year at 
a time. For the day-to-day business, the commission elected an executive 
committee from amongst its members, which consisted of a chairman, 
his deputy and a head executive secretary as well as two to four other 
people. The commission had a lot of power. It was authorized to represent 
the Nationalverein and act in its name, and managed the organization’s 
substantial funds. It also had an unrestricted right to co-opt, which de 
facto diminished the democratic character of the commission elections. If 
a person was not elected at the general meeting, he was simply co-opted, if 
need be. The commission set down the guiding principles of the organiza-
tion’s politics, fixed the dates and agenda points of the general meetings 
and prepared the fundamental proposals. In the organization’s entire his-
tory, there was no example of a commission being voted down. Yet, the 
general meetings, with their almost parliamentary rituals and solemn pre-
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sentations, still remained central arenas for debates with a public impact. 
Without these, the commission would not have enjoyed either legitimacy 
or resonance.
The Nationalverein was founded on the concept of a membership- 
based organization and numbered around 25,000 paying members at its 
peak in 1862–1863. This was an unusually high number, equalled neither 
in the conservative nor in the democratic movements, nor in the emerging 
socialist camp. However, membership in the Nationalverein was de facto 
restricted to those social classes that owned at least some assets and could 
pay the annual membership fees (at least one thaler). The Nationalverein’s 
social mix reflected almost exactly what Ludwig August Rochau, for 
example, the publisher of the Nationalverein’s weekly paper, described 
as the ‘middle classes’, which he considered the actual, true embodiment 
of ‘the people’. Members of the working class and small-scale tradesmen 
remained excluded.15
The Nationalverein attempted to organize these population groups 
into workers’ (education) leagues and gymnastics and shooting associa-
tions over which it wanted to retain political control. It established its 
influence through a targeted personnel strategy as the executive boards 
of these leagues and clubs usually consisted of Nationalverein members. 
This organizational concept was inspired by secret societies that consisted 
of core and satellite organizations, as had been the ideal typical case in the 
relationship between the Communist League and various workers’ associ-
ations during the Revolution, for example, or as reflected by the organiza-
tional structure of the Italian Societè nazionale, which had to some extent 
adopted the traditions of the Carbonari and Giuseppe Mazzini.16 On 
the whole, this strategy worked remarkably well in the case of the work-
ers’ (education) leagues until at least 1863–1865; things were somewhat 
more difficult with regard to the gymnastics and shooting associations. All 
in all, the Nationalverein managed to secure a wide range of supporters 
without ever endangering the relative exclusivity of actual membership. 
Even though the tradesmen amongst its members were only a (significant) 
minority, the organization’s influence reached far into the lower middle 
classes through the affiliated organization system.
In Coburg in Thuringia, which had been chosen as the seat of the orga-
nization’s headquarters for reasons to do with the law of unincorporated 
associations as well as for political reasons, the Nationalverein established 
an office which can be understood as a prototype for modern political 
party headquarters. The increase in headquarter staff was closely con-
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nected to the initially rapid growth in membership. Full-time staff were 
soon employed to deal with the everyday business and political correspon-
dence, the administration of the membership fees and also the organiza-
tion’s public relations. As early as December 1859, the board enjoyed the 
services of a secretary, who was soon joined by a trained bookkeeper. In 
August 1861, the organization had at least eight full-time salaried staff.
The political executives also received payments from the organization’s 
funds. These were usually expense and travel cost reimbursements related 
to attendance at the board, commission and general meetings, or related 
to other journeys usually undertaken for the purpose of political agitation. 
However, the political executives were not paid an official salary. Only the 
organization’s head executive secretary, Feodor Streit, who worked full 
time for the organization, was paid a regular monthly remuneration for his 
services. In 1862–1863, around the turn of the year, the Nationalverein 
therefore had a powerful organization at its fingertips that, although by 
no means comparable with that engine of political warfare, the Anti-Corn 
Law League, despite the many aspects borrowed from this British model, 
was nevertheless an innovation for Germany.
forms of Action
The Nationalverein’s activities initially focused on gaining public support, 
as could be expected from a body of agitators. The raising of public aware-
ness was seen as a core element of its understanding of liberal politics. 
According to this view, only politics that were at least not opposed to the 
main current of public opinion could be successful in the long term. It 
was therefore important to consolidate the differing regional interests and 
identities of a fragmented Germany into a national agenda that was as uni-
versal and as popular as possible. In that sense, the adoption of the 1849 
Reichsverfassung constitution as the agenda in 1862 was also an element 
of the fight for public support and was therefore decided on for strate-
gic reasons and not because it represented its various advocates’  personal 
convictions. On the whole, the deference accorded to the power of public 
opinion was justified and ‘modern’, even though it could of course not 
replace the actions of the political decision-makers in government and 
administration. It could, however, shift the framework conditions for 
political action and thereby influence decisions. This was the agitation 
approach the Nationalverein pursued with its ‘warmongering strategy’. 
Ultimately, Bismarck also accepted a degree of dependence on the support 
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of wide sections of the population of some standing, but only after he had 
shifted the 1866 political power constellations clearly in his favour.
Based on this recognition of the significance of public support when 
it came to political power, the Nationalverein pursued extensive propa-
ganda efforts. In this context, the foundation of the Nationalverein’s own 
weekly paper, the Wochenschrift, must be mentioned first of all—this was 
also something completely new in the history of German organizations. 
The paper fulfilled two functions: on the one hand, it communicated 
news and information to the organization’s members; on the other hand, 
it was to serve as the leading political organ for the liberal- democratic 
middle classes. Subscription price, content and style were aimed at a 
sophisticated audience. Even though the number of subscriptions barely 
exceeded 5000, the paper was read by a considerably higher number of 
people because it was circulated throughout the organizations. Countless 
local newspapers also copied articles that appeared in the Wochenschrift. 
However, the Wochenschrift never became a mass-circulation paper like 
Berlin’s Volks-Zeitung.17
Besides the Wochenschrift, which retained the character of a contribu-
tory organization, the Nationalverein financed a wide range of political 
brochures and newspapers, established an office for correspondence in 
order to influence the international press manned by a well-paid member 
of staff expressly employed for this purpose, and published a total of 12 
brochures in which it explained its most important political ideas and aims 
in detail. However, the Nationalverein was not interested in influencing 
the public only in the short term. The organization also considered it 
important to establish a liberal, Protestant presence in the national history, 
as proven by the experiment of a public library of German history set-up 
by the Nationalverein, inspired by Friedrich Kapp, or the publication of 
cultural-conflict-provoking attacks on the Catholic Church.18 The close 
connection between nationalist-liberal politics and the historical sciences 
that characterized the late nineteenth century may be observed here in its 
formation phase.
An important field of activity in the first years was the so-called 
Wehrpolitik, the home-guard policy. The committee saw this as the pro-
motion of military exercises in the gymnastics and shooting associations or 
in the yet-to-be-established ‘Wehrvereine’, home-guard associations. For 
this purpose, it commissioned Wilhelm Rüstow, Giuseppe Garibaldi’s mili-
tary advisor and a brigade commander, to draft an expert’s report intended 
to serve as the basis for this paramilitary training. Together with detailed 
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military exercise and parade regulations, this report was published in May 
1861  in the form of a brochure and sent to the executive committees 
of numerous gymnastics associations. Simultaneously, the Nationalverein 
became involved in the organization and hosting of the major national 
gymnastics and shooting festivals and also encouraged the foundation of 
National Associations for both groups.
With this policy, it pursued several aims concurrently. The first was to 
increase the pressure on the various state governments for reforms and 
to encourage them to give up the system of standing armies through a 
symbolic anticipation of general conscription. In this way, the govern-
ments were to be deprived of a powerful tool that they had abused by 
turning it against their own people. The underlying intention to influence 
domestic policy could be seen in the fact that members of home-guard 
associations or national defence leagues were to be eligible for a reduction 
of their compulsory military service period. The home-guard policy also 
had a foreign policy component as it intended to prove to the world that 
the German nation was prepared to defend its home territories. Another 
aspect was the fear of not being adequately equipped for the generally 
expected great European war.
Despite the various attempts to shunt the Nationalverein’s almost 
constitutional home-guard policy off onto a track that smacked of rev-
olutionary activities, the organization’s leaders above all regarded this 
policy as symbolic—leaving aside the 1863–1864 Schleswig-Holstein 
crisis. This also applies to the donations collected for the establishment 
of a German navy, a drive started in 1861. By agitating for a German 
navy, the Nationalverein continued to root for a plan first mentioned at 
the Frankfurt national assembly that found great emotional resonance 
amongst the German nationalists. After ascertaining in confidential nego-
tiations with the Prussian minister responsible for defence and the navy, 
Albrecht von Roon, that the Prussian government would accept the 
money, the committee transferred the astonishing sum of 140,000 gul-
dens to the Admiralty.
In part, the Nationalverein’s policy towards the labour movement 
was connected to its home-guard policy, namely in respect to its efforts 
to integrate those parts of the population that were not in a position to 
pay the membership fees. The organization thereby showed that it had 
learned from the failed revolution, as one of the reasons for its failure 
was believed to have been the division between rich and poor. It was no 
coincidence that many commission members and agents became actively 
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involved in the workers’ (education) leagues that had been established 
in most cities since the early 1860s under middle-class patronage. The 
workers’ journey to the Great London World Exposition in the summer 
of 1862 organized by the Nationalverein inadvertently turned out to be 
of historic importance.19 As a part of the integration strategy, it was sup-
posed to acquaint selected workers with the situation in England and to 
demonstrate individual prospects of advancement to them. However, the 
journey did not achieve the desired results; instead, some of the workers 
drew completely different conclusions from the events and on their return 
started to organize a national workers’ congress. The Nationalverein 
attempted to halt the process of an independently organized labour move-
ment that had been triggered by the journey to London by providing 
occasional financial support to the ‘Vereinstag deutscher Arbeitervereine’, 
the congress of German workers’ associations established in 1863 under 
middle-class patronage. Some of its members even sat on the executive 
committees of both organizations. The Nationalverein also funded the 
Leipziger Arbeiterbildungsverein, the Leipzig workers’ educational asso-
ciation chaired by August Bebel.
Another of the Nationalverein’s fields of activity turns out to be of 
particular importance in terms of the development of organizational defi-
nition and capacity, namely the promotion and coordination of the prog-
ress parties in the individual states concurrent with the strategy change 
in 1861. Even the emergence of the Deutsche Fortschrittspartei, the 
German progress party, in Prussia since late 1860 had occurred in the style 
of the Nationalverein.20 The organization not only influenced the party’s 
agenda but also supported the election campaign by providing materials, 
funding and manpower. The assertion that the Prussian progress party 
would probably not have been created in the familiar form without the 
Nationalverein is no exaggeration. The question of whether the constitu-
tional crisis could have been avoided also cannot be answered adequately 
without taking the Nationalverein into account.
Following the Deutsche Fortschrittspartei’s election successes in 
Prussia, parties of the same name and political direction were created in 
all of the Confederation’s major states. All of them were headed by lead-
ing Nationalverein members. Between 1862 and 1865, the Nationalverein 
lent its support to the election campaigns in the Grand Duchy of Hesse, 
in Nassau and in Bavaria on several occasions by providing funds or pam-
phlets and mobilizing its network of agents. The organizational interlac-
ing between the progress party and the Nationalverein was particularly 
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marked in Württemberg, where the party membership fees were collected 
by the Nationalverein’s network of agents.
In the eyes of numerous contemporaries, the Nationalverein was cer-
tainly more than just the Prussian leadership’s propaganda organ. This 
is also shown by the diverse petitions received at its headquarters from 
widely different sections of the population. They ranged from applications 
for subsidies for newspapers or other media ventures to an organization 
member’s request for a scholarship grant for his son and even a widow’s 
appeal for support in a family emergency. The commission contributed 
funds to the research into submarine cannon boats, gave money for an 
expedition to Africa, and granted support to persecuted officers and offi-
cials from Schleswig-Holstein, to supporters of the organization in the 
Electorate of Hesse whose properties had suffered hail damage, and also 
to German victims of Indian attacks in North America. All this shows that 
the Nationalverein was seen as a kind of major social power with extensive 
authority and resources.
on the WAy to A modern mAjor PArty? the efforts 
undertAken to reform the nAtionAlverein
The Nationalverein had an agenda and organizational structures, and took 
recourse to forms of action that approached those of a modern politi-
cal party in terms of organization type. Above all, it was distinctly parlia-
ment focused. As a national parliament did not exist, it had to concentrate 
on influencing the parliaments of the individual German states, although 
without a doubt with the aim of potential involvement in a future national 
parliament. However, the Nationalverein’s centralism was more suitable 
for a band of agitators than for a political party: the authority held by the 
commission’s ‘steering oligarchy’ (Shlomo Na’aman) was in stark contrast 
to the democratic legacy of the traditional German associations,  societies 
and clubs. This is revealed particularly in the interaction between the orga-
nization’s headquarters and the local branches.
Any communication between the individual members and the 
Nationalverein’s headquarters was dealt with by the so-called local agents 
appointed by the organization’s executives. These local agents numbered 
around 400  in 1862–1863. They were usually well-educated, property- 
owning local dignitaries with close contacts to the various committees 
and societies in their local community. However, they were supposed to 
fulfil political tasks independently only to a limited extent; as functionaries 
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who received their instructions from headquarters, their duties primarily 
tended to lie in communicating instructions, information and propaganda 
material from headquarters to ‘the base’, meaning the ordinary members, 
and in collecting the membership fees and transferring them to Coburg.
This centralist organizational structure resulted in organizational and 
political problems. Firstly, the local agents’ accounting for the member-
ship fees was often full of mistakes and prone to abuse, prompting regular 
controls of the books. Secondly, the members started to object to the 
commission’s autocracy. Inspired by the legacy of the traditional German 
associations, societies and clubs, local member groups continued to form 
associations that drew up their own statutes, elected an executive commit-
tee and charged their own membership fees.
In view of this situation, the head executive secretary Feodor Streit 
planned to gradually decentralize the organization’s structure. According 
to his plans, the local agents were to be grouped in precisely defined ‘ray-
ons’, departments and report to the so-called main agents. These main 
agents, who were to be elected by the local agents that formed a rayon, 
were to play an important political role. However, his concept failed 
because the majority of the commission voted against relinquishing some 
of its authority to democratically legitimated mid-level functionaries. 
Instead, the commission came up with the idea of appointing a general 
inspector charged with mitigating the administrative or political problems 
in individual member groups by becoming personally involved. However, 
after the preferred candidate for the job, Friedrich Kapp, had graciously 
declined, no other suitable candidate was forthcoming.
As the need for action became increasingly more urgent, the commis-
sion fell back on Streit’s rayon idea, although this was altered to a more 
acceptable form. According to the revised concept, the main agents were 
no longer to be elected by the local agents but to be appointed by the 
commission—assuming their functions were not fulfilled by members of 
the commission themselves. They were charged with ensuring that the 
books of the rayons they were responsible for were in order and with 
political supervision of the rayons. In this way, the commission hoped to 
compensate for the disadvantages of a centralism fundamentally consid-
ered useful without curtailing its own authority any more than necessary.
In the summer of 1863, the commission also decided to gradually 
change the annual general meeting into a delegate conference. It there-
fore proposed the election of delegates whose numbers were to corre-
spond to the size of the respective local group, a rather vague definition. 
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The granting of any kind of imperative mandate was explicitly excluded. 
This attempt to shift the political-opinion forming to the local member 
groups represented a decisive step towards increasing the decentralized, 
participatory elements, a move that could have changed the annual gen-
eral meeting into a conference of representative delegates in the medium 
term. However, this organization model never got a chance to prove itself 
in practice as the outbreak of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis in 1863–1864 
led to a totally new set of political framework conditions. Nevertheless, in 
the summer of 1863, the Nationalverein was close to a threshold that, had 
it been crossed, would finally have transformed it from a band of agitators 
into a democratically structured, modern political party.
Post-nAtionAlverein: the nAtionAl liberAl PArty 
And sociAl democrAcy
Numerous contemporaries saw the Prussian-Austrian ‘Fratricidal War’ 
and the foundation of the North German Confederation in 1866–1867 
as a ‘revolution’, albeit as a ‘top-down revolution’. The new confederate 
state had a national parliament consisting of representatives elected on 
the basis of general, equal, secret and direct voting rights (for men); the 
government of the new nation was in the hands of the Prussian monarchy, 
and the constitution promised potential extensive legislative reforms for 
the purpose of creating a common national jurisdiction. Most observers 
believed that a true ‘Reichsgründung’, the formation of a national state 
which included the as-yet-separate southern German states, was only a 
matter of time. Many of the points on the Nationalverein’s agenda there-
fore seemed accomplished, although in part under circumstances different 
from those originally anticipated.
A heated debate about whether the organization should be continued 
and developed further under these new circumstances broke out within 
the Nationalverein, now largely reduced to its right wing. In the course 
of this debate, the importance of democratic voting rights, which would 
increase future election campaign efforts, was extensively discussed. The 
power political significance of an independent party organization was also 
clearly recognized and considered. Nevertheless, after drawn-out debates, 
the powers that objected to a continuation of the Nationalverein won 
the day. They intended to make the national parliament the sole forum 
of their political activities and viewed extra-parliamentary organizations 
as an indicator of an oppositional persuasion that was no longer neces-
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sary for liberals now ‘able to govern’ (Hermann Baumgarten). Obviously, 
the sceptical opinion of such organizations that had characterized the 
constitutionalists during the entire nineteenth century came to the fore 
here. Their increased willingness to become organized had undoubtedly 
been connected to the dominance of the ‘national question’ in the 1860s. 
Granted, in terms of its executives, the National Liberal party originated 
almost entirely in the Nationalverein. However, through the voluntary 
relinquishment of their extra-parliamentary organization, they had agreed 
to a partial abdication of power. The consequences did not become appar-
ent until Bismarck no longer needed the liberals to gain majorities for his 
policies in the Reichstag.
Instead, the Nationalverein’s organizational legacy was adopted by the 
Social Democrats. When Ferdinand Lassalle founded the Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV, General German Workers’ Association) 
in 1863, he structured it wholly in accordance with his personal prefer-
ences.21 He simply copied the Nationalverein’s union statutes. However, 
the ADAV’s local member groups soon did their own thing, too, particu-
larly after Lasalle’s untimely death in a duel. The ADAV’s joining with 
the Verband deutscher Arbeitervereine, the confederation of German 
workers’ associations, which embodied the federative ‘Vorort’ principle 
in the history of the labour movement, led to the creation of the Social 
Democratic Workers’ party in 1875, a modern political party that became 
a role model for major political parties throughout Europe.22 Even though 
the National Liberals relinquished their organizational legacy, they never 
forgot the Nationalverein. Whenever they endeavoured to improve the 
way in which their party was organized, which they considered inade-
quate, they looked to the prototype, the Nationalverein, for inspiration.
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CHAPTER 10
Manipulation or Participation? Membership 
Inclusion in the Party Organizations 
of the German Social Democratic Workers’ 
Party and the British National Liberal 
Federation
Anne Heyer
IntroductIon
Contemporaries as well as later academic scholars have criticized the dem-
ocratic nature of early political parties. Whereas party activists emphasized 
the participatory power of mass organization, critics feared them as auto-
cratic machines, dominated by a small club of wire-pullers. In their eyes, 
the representative structure of parties enabled their leaders to speak in the 
name of ordinary members, without ever consulting the organizations’ 
rank and file. It seemed that true popular participation could be achieved 
only on the basis of direct democracy and not in the representative 
 organizations of political parties.1 Considering this negative image, it is 
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no surprise that the nineteenth-century concern that a selfish party leader 
would ‘run through the question of the day, seeking for a cry which may 
help him to a career’2 found an echo in later academic studies. Although 
historians have recently provided more detailed accounts of party history, 
the view of early critics has prevailed, including in the social sciences.3 
Even those commentators who observed a causal link between democratic 
consolidation and the emergence of political parties argued that organi-
zational necessities will inevitably force party leaders to establish a repre-
sentative oligarchy to further their own interests.4 In competition with 
traditional elites, historical mass parties focused on internal cohesion and 
consequently applied rigid disciplining mechanisms.5 Even today, parties 
still stand for a top-down approach of interest representation, in contrast 
to grass-roots social movements.6 What can be asserted for contemporary 
parties is even more likely to hold true for their forerunners. Diversified 
and vivid membership participation, often resulting in a lengthy discussion 
process, must have been impractical for early parties. In the late nineteenth 
century, even if party leaders sang the song of democracy, their audience 
was trapped in a rigid hierarchy governed by the upper ranks.
Not surprisingly, members of early parties offered another interpreta-
tion of their experiences with representation. Although the implementa-
tion of membership participation proved to be a challenge in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the inclusive intentions of party activists 
were more honest than contemporaries expected. Popular participation 
was an ideal that was to be reached at different institutional levels not 
only in national politics but also in the discourse and structure of some of 
the organizations themselves. After all, members often provided the back-
bone of the new organizations and justified their claims for power. The 
large network of supporters facilitated nation-wide activities and financed 
campaigns and offices. In return, leaders regularly offered members access 
to the parties’ governing institutions through the system of representa-
tion. Within their organizations, members could become political men. 
Even though members could not vote directly on parties’ political orien-
tation, they became part of a political organization that provided them 
with information and the opportunity to run for party and public offices. 
Following the principle of representation, members as local delegates 
could determine the political course of the party at party congresses. Back 
home in their local branches, they defined the appearance of the party in 
the constituencies. Taking their responsibilities seriously, members were 
well aware of the need for coherent action and regularly demanded sta-
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ble organizational structures to make their voices heard. Moreover, party 
leaders operated in a moral framework that required serious treatment of 
their participatory claims for their organizations. They not only needed 
to justify their decisions to their followers but also had to legitimate their 
behaviour to themselves.
This contribution focuses on the perceptions and experiences of early 
party activists in order to explore the origins of these different interpreta-
tions of the mass party. Instead of following the distinction between direct 
democracy and representation, the chapter concentrates on party mem-
bers and their ability to participate and control its leadership in a repre-
sentative system. The study focuses on the founding congresses and their 
subsequent five years, the period when the organizations were still evolv-
ing. Two different case studies, the German Social Democratic Workers’ 
Party (SDAP) and the British National Liberal Federation (NLF), are pre-
sented.7 The British NLF functioned as a lobby group for non- conformists 
and Radicals who attempted to exercise greater influence within the 
Liberal Party. As leader of the organization, Joseph Chamberlain became 
infamous as the ‘master of the Caucus’.8 He was also the career-oriented 
party leader criticized in the quote at the beginning of this piece. His 
contemporaries suspected him of exploiting the NLF solely for his own 
advantage and of establishing a dictatorial regime hidden behind the orga-
nization’s popular appearance. In contrast, the German SDAP, inspired by 
the teachings of Karl Marx, was considered to be the first and foremost 
representative of the working class. Indeed, the party had limited interest 
in parliamentary politics, which it considered to be corrupt and a theatre 
stage for traditional elites. Judged very differently by their contemporaries 
and later commentators, the two organizations developed individual orga-
nizational responses to different political environments. However, despite 
their differences in political orientation, they both implemented mem-
bership participation and leadership restriction in their early years. Their 
cases illustrate that the need for efficient decision-making in representative 
organization does not inevitably preclude participation or facilitate auto-
cratic leadership.
How to Implement organIzatIonal Ideals?
Both the German SDAP and the British NLF were founded in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, a period of institutional change. The exten-
sion of suffrage rights shifted the relationship between formal state institu-
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tions and citizens. In Britain, the Second Reform Act increased the size of 
the electorate from 1,430,000 to 2,470,000, bringing the vote to many 
working-class households in 1867.9 In order to reach these new voters, 
Conservatives as well as Liberals experimented with electoral organization 
to secure as many votes as possible.10 In Germany, the unification of the 
Second Empire in 1871 provided the Social Democrats with a platform 
for political campaigns on the national level but also confronted them with 
oppressive state authorities. With the introduction of suffrage rights, all 
German men, older than 25, became voters for the German parliamentary 
assembly, the Reichstag.11 In these changing circumstances, an organiza-
tional structure that efficiently united members for national campaigns 
became indispensable, both to British Radical Liberals and to German 
Social Democrats. The German SDAP and the British NLF are among 
the most apparent responses to this political vacuum. With the foundation 
of the two organizations, party activists hoped to advance the political 
participation of ordinary people. Leaders of SDAP and NLF were chal-
lenged with the task of developing an organizational outline that would 
allow them to simultaneously coordinate coherent responses to political 
developments and adhere to their ideological demands of participation.
In Germany in 1869 at the foundation congress of the SDAP, politi-
cal activists united their resources to work together for the enhancement 
of the working class. Their aim was to create an organization that could 
distance itself from the deficiencies of previous Social Democratic institu-
tions. The delegates at the founding congress agreed that a strong, but 
not omnipotent, leadership would be responsible for the organizational 
orientation of the new party. Consequently, in 1868 the Federation of 
German Workers’ Associations (VDAV)12 voted in favour of a politi-
cal programme that prepared the foundation of the SDAP as a party.13 
Because of its radicalized political orientation, the SDAP organization 
needed a more coherent command structure than the VDAV. The party 
also invited representatives of its main competitor, the General German 
Workers Association (ADAV),14 to join its ranks. Such a development 
became possible because in the ADAV, under the authoritarian leadership 
of Ferdinand Lassalle, internal opposition had arisen, seizing the opportu-
nity to leave the organization.
August Bebel, as former president of the VDAV and architect behind 
the new party SDAP, tried to appeal to these defecting ADAV members 
by offering them an attractive compromise. The SDAP would not only 
take over the organizational features of the VDAV but combine the most 
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distinguished features of Social Democratic organizations, VDAV and 
ADAV. Bebel promised that the new party was not to be dominated by a 
single powerful leader, but rather would divide its responsibilities between 
different individuals, because of ‘blind obedience, the personality cult is 
itself undemocratic’.15 Not one but five party members constituted the 
leading institution of the party, the board.16 The location of the board 
was determined by election at the annual party congress. After a lengthy 
debate, the congress agreed that it would select one specific local branch 
whose members elected the board from their local companions. With this 
procedure in place, Bebel hoped that the party would be able ‘to prevent 
the abuse of violence in the hand of one single person and at the same time 
enable uniform action’.17
Although delegates had voted against the centralization of power in one 
individual party bureaucrat, they supported the creation of a board con-
stituted exclusively by members of a single party branch. Consequently, 
the administration of the party became concentrated in one location, pre-
venting a regionally diversified leadership. Practical considerations stood 
behind this approach. As former president of the VDAV, Bebel had expe-
rienced how difficult the administration of the party would become with 
a geographically dispersed board. Yet, the new organization was likely to 
engage in even more controversial political action than its predecessor, 
the loosely organized VDAV. The board had the responsibility to decide 
whether to implement or impede political campaigns. Coordinating the 
numerous local branches of the party and its newspaper was much easier 
at regular board meetings. Pressing leadership action needed fast internal 
face-to-face communication and could not be based on endless discussions 
by mail. Therefore, the party’s constitution required board members to 
be present at meetings because it asked the board ‘to make its decisions 
together’.18 Only with at least three members present were the board’s 
decisions considered as binding. In addition, delegates at the founding 
congress installed a control commission.19 This commission, whose loca-
tion was also selected at the annual party congress, acted as the counter-
weight to the board. It was composed of 11 members and ‘obliged to 
check and investigate the management, files, books and cash register and 
so forth of the board at least once quarterly’.20 It also had the right to 
suspend individual members or the entire board.
In Britain, the foundation of the NLF was rooted in the idea that the 
Liberal Party needed a new approach to leadership, thereby echoing the 
organizational concerns of the early SDAP. For the NLF, this approach 
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was based on popular representation and the incorporation of the British 
working class in political decisions. Joseph Chamberlain, later president of 
the NLF, gained his political reputation by criticizing Liberal leaders for 
their reluctance to implement radical reforms. In 1874, he presented the 
solution to this problem as ‘the speedy reorganization of the Liberalism 
of the future’.21 With the foundation of the NLF, Chamberlain hoped to 
meet this demand. He aimed at the development of a new organization 
that would use representative principles and press Liberal leaders to finally 
implement reform.
The essential feature of the proposed Federation is the principle which must 
henceforth govern the action of Liberals as a political party—namely, the 
direct participation of all members of the party in the direction of its policy; 
(…). This object can be secured only by the organisation of the party upon 
a representative basis; that is, by popularly elected committees of local asso-
ciations, and by the union of such local associations, by means of their freely 
chosen representatives, in a general federation.22
Following this spirit, the invitation to the founding congress proudly 
announced that the NLF would be ‘established on a popular basis’23 
in 1877. The federation’s national structure resembled the National 
Education League. Chamberlain, together with his supporters, had used 
this lobby organization to change educational policy in favour of non- 
conformist believers. With the foundation of the NLF, the single-issue 
organization of the National Education League became redundant and 
it was dissolved. At the local level, the Birmingham Liberal Association 
became the model for the federation’s individual associations.24 The pro-
posed constitution praised this successful Liberal association and suggested 
that ‘all Liberal Associations, established on a similar popular basis, should 
enter into a Federated Union’.25 On a national level, the council, the 
annual assembly of the NLF, was ‘composed of delegated representatives 
of the Federated Associations’.26 The council elected the president, vice-
presidents, treasurer and honorary secretary. Together with the  officers, 
the council formed the formally leading political institution of the NLF, 
the general committee. The task of the general committee was to sup-
port the foundation of new associations, to strengthen the objects of the 
federation and to organize the annual meeting of the council. It also had 
‘to submit to the Federated Associations political questions and measures 
upon which united action may be considered desirable’.27
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Birmingham was the organizational heart of the NLF at the beginning. 
Here, the meetings of the general committee took place, fortifying the 
position of Chamberlain and his associates. Being based in the political 
environment of the city, they gained permanent access to the committee 
and had the opportunity to dominate its decisions. Surprisingly, there was 
no open critical engagement with the leading role of the political clique 
of Birmingham at the congress. The likely reason for this was the formally 
guaranteed independence of local branches. They could decide on their 
own whether to follow or disregard the suggestions of the Birmingham 
centre of the NLF. Formally, there was no reason for them to be suspi-
cious of the authority of Chamberlain and his supporters.28
No interference with the local independence of the Federated Associations 
is proposed or contemplated. Each one of the Associations will arrange the 
detail of its own organisation and administer its own affairs (…).29
Although not always followed in the daily practice of the federation, this 
decentralized approach also supported the creation of a stable adminis-
trative leadership in Birmingham. The secretary of the general commit-
tee, Francis Schnadhorst, who also remained secretary of the Birmingham 
branch, had an influential managing position within the organization.30 
He was so successful that he maintained his secretary post until 1893.
NLF delegates also discussed the composition of the general council in 
relation to the size of the population of the respective branch. Although 
daily business was driven by practical concerns, questions of popular rep-
resentation determined the party’s discourse on basic organizational ques-
tions. Against his branch’s power interests, the delegate of London, Mr 
Firth, noted that his constituency with a large but mainly apolitical popu-
lation would be overrepresented at the general council. Following Firth, 
other speakers also emphasized the impracticality of the proposed scheme. 
Finally, R.N.  Philips, president of the influential Manchester Liberal 
Association, suggested first bringing the scheme into practice and evaluat-
ing its performance only after a year. This practical suggestion gained the 
support of the congress and the resolution was unanimously accepted. 
Between 5 and 20 representatives per delegation could attend the council, 
depending on the size of the borough or town.
For similar practical reasons, the delegates rejected the resolution of the 
delegate Wood. He suggested organizing an election in which all members 
could vote on the objectives of the federation. The association he repre-
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sented, the ‘Leicester Association had had no opportunity of considering 
the desirability even of forming a federation’.31 However, Chamberlain 
defended his preferred organizational model, and, as chairman of the 
meeting, argued:
If this subject was to be refereed to 100 associations meeting in different dis-
tricts, how could they all be brought together to decide by a majority what 
should be adopted? If, after the Conference had come to the conclusion, the 
scheme was unsatisfactory to any of the several associations, it was perfectly 
open to them not to join the federation.32
The conference rejected Wood’s proposal because conducting a refer-
endum of all members seemed to cause too many practical difficulties. 
Popular representation was important, but delegates also shared a sense of 
urgency to bring the organization into life without losing too much time 
with extensive debates. Ordinary delegates as well as Chamberlain voted 
at the congress in favour of, first, founding the organization and later 
reconsidering its procedures.
In the German SDAP, the number of representatives present at annual 
congresses was not determined by the size of the electorate of the rep-
resented town or district but generally could reach the maximum of 
five members. Also the number of members registered with the local 
branch did not matter in this context.33 In opposition to this regula-
tion, Mühlwasser34 argued that membership size should determine the 
number of delegates at the party congress. Otherwise, the smallest vil-
lages could have the same voting power as the biggest metropolis. Due 
to limited financial resources, those branches situated further away from 
the venue of the congress would be forced to send a smaller number of 
delegates. Those branches situated in closer proximity would be able to 
send a numerically strong delegation. By following this plan, the SDAP 
would break ‘the first and holiest principle of a true people’s party’.35 
Therefore, the party should ‘return to the principle of pure democracy and 
say: only someone who represents a specific number of voters—the con-
gress might agree about the number-, can have the vote of a delegate’.36 
Unfortunately, neither the party’s leadership nor delegates expressed an 
interest in Mühlwasser’s proposal. Without further debate, they voted in 
favour of the proposal of five delegates per town, expressing their prefer-
ence for the practical solution.
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organIzatIon In practIce
In less than a decade after their founding congresses, SDAP and NLF 
were forced to adjust their organizations according to changing political 
and social circumstances. Both organizations displayed a flexible attitude 
in dealing with various challenges and opportunities but overall main-
tained their representative structure based on local branches. Concerns 
of efficiency guided organizational modifications to prepare the two par-
ties either for upcoming elections or to ensure their existence in times 
of threatening state institutions. Acting in these challenging political cir-
cumstances, efficient administration seemed to be indispensable to the 
organizations. However, in contrast to their reputation as selfish machines 
using every opportunity to establish autocratic leadership structures, 
the parties remained committed to their organizational promises. Their 
attempts were focused on developing an organization that would function 
efficiently and simultaneously involve membership participation and avoid 
complete leadership control.
Following the founding constitution of the NLF, local branches were 
formally independent entities. But in times of electoral campaigning, 
the organization’s leadership took a more direct approach in influenc-
ing the political strategy of local associations. For the borough election 
in East Worcestershire, Joseph Chamberlain disapproved of the strategy 
of the Liberal candidate Hastings who refused to start campaigning at 
an early stage. Chamberlain in his position as NLF president decided 
that Hastings ‘must be overruled’.37 Chamberlain was also active in 
searching for a fitting constituency for Robert Laycock. Because he 
considered him as a suitable candidate, ‘a fair speaker and a sound poli-
tician’,38 he wrote to the NLF secretary Schnadhorst about Laycock’s 
possible candidacy. In his letter, Chamberlain presented a detailed elec-
toral strategy, discussing the qualifications of the candidate for various 
constituencies.
The question is where to suggest him. If Lord Anson does not accept 
quickly he would do for East Staffordshire or if Gladstone is not settled we 
might name him to our Committee in East Worcestershire. Failing both 
these there is still the southern division of Warwickshire and the other divi-
sions of Staffordshire to consider in our immediate neighbourhood, but 
what is necessary is to act quickly.39
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In addition to the management of local electoral affairs, changing politi-
cal circumstances eventually triggered an adjustment of the relation-
ship between NLF leaders and local branches. In 1880, the federation 
increased the influence of its leadership by adding an article to the consti-
tution. The revised constitution still paid tribute to the popular basis of 
the NLF. The organization also continued to reject a political programme 
and emphasized the independent position of local branches. However, 
a small article proposed to the founding congress by NLF leaders but 
omitted from the final founding constitution became part of the new con-
stitution. Although not being very strict, this modification increased the 
influence of the general council on local associations.
Each Association arranges the detail of its own organization, and admin-
isters its own affairs: but from time to time, and on all occasions of emer-
gency, representatives of all the Associations in union are convened to 
consider the course of action which may be recommended to their respec-
tive constituents.40
This version of the article was implemented right in time for the 1880 
election. In view of the upcoming election, the NLF’s leadership referred 
to the federation’s need for a focused and tightly organized campaign. It 
explained to its members that ‘in order that the Liberal majority of the 
nation might be enabled (…) to resume its former preponderance in the 
Legislative Council of the nation’41 the federation needed to mobilize all 
its resources.
Even after the Liberals won the election, the NLF could not expect that 
its radical demands would be directly transformed into government poli-
cies. The Liberal government might have seemed to be a natural recipient 
of NLF lobbying. But Gladstone, as Liberal Prime Minister, faced many 
political challenges, including the strong Whig faction in his cabinet, and 
remained careful in his interaction with the NLF. For the NLF, this meant 
that the organization had to double its campaigning efforts. The historic 
opportunity of a Liberal delegation in power could not be squandered. As 
the leadership of the federation euphemistically announced to its mem-
bers, the task of the federation was now ‘to support the Government, by 
expression of public opinion, and to strengthen its hands in such a way that 
it may introduce and succeed in carrying complete measures’.42 In order to 
meet its new challenge, the NLF widened its organizational structure and 
created a broader leadership. It extended the composition of its general 
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committee, increasing representation in its formally leading institution. 
Under the fourth rule of the 1877 constitution, brought into practice only 
in 1881, the general committee ‘shall have the power to add twenty-five 
to its number’.43 The party congress nominated 24 additional members 
to the general committee. These additional delegates represented local 
chapters and strengthened the representative function of the organization.
In Germany, the SDAP, founded on the basis of the VDAV, had 
assumed a clear political position that supported centralized administra-
tion.44 In contrast to the NLF, the German Social Democrats did not 
emphasize the independence of individual branches but rather elaborated 
on the best strategy to intensify the relationship between local chapters 
and the board. In the eyes of party members, the SDAP needed local 
branches that operated according to its political programme and strictly 
followed its campaigns. In 1869, Carl Hirsch emphasized the role of local 
associations in the SDAP’s struggle for political change.
If our party shall be organized according to its purpose, then its organization 
must be to promote agitation in the sense of our principles, in the sense of 
our programme. But because it is not possible under the blue sky, but usu-
ally it can be agitated only at a specific place, here follows the necessity that 
the indispensable basis of our organization is local, fomenting facilities.45
The SDAP’s political campaign concentrated on the local level. By address-
ing them in the context of their daily lives, workers could not only be 
mobilized but also be educated in preparation for the future people’s state. 
Although the party had managed to gain two seats in the German national 
parliament in 1871, its ability to influence national politics remained lim-
ited.46 In addition, the German Reichstag also had very little actual leg-
islative power. The SDAP could not hope to successfully lobby for policy 
changes within the German government, as the leadership of the NLF had 
managed with the Liberal Party in power.
Censorship and repression made it difficult for the German Social 
Democrats to build up their organization and attract new members. The 
party’s leadership was fully exposed to the harsh measures of the German 
authorities. In March 1871, August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht and Adolf 
Hepner were imprisoned and charged with high treason. For Bebel and 
Liebknecht, this meant a sharp break that interrupted their communi-
cation with party institutions. The prison’s personnel checked their mail 
for subversive messages.47 In 1870, the party had experienced an even 
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more serious crisis with the imprisonment of its entire board by the North 
German military authorities. The organization’s public appeal against the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and in favour of a fair peace with France 
had provoked the arrest.48 Following the loss of its board, the leadership 
of the SDAP was transferred to the control commission. The commission 
selected Dresden as the location of the new board. It determined that 
Walster would be secretary and Vahlteich treasurer.49 Due to the imme-
diacy of events, the control commission suspended the routine procedures 
of the local election of the board. The response of the Saxon authorities 
was not foreseeable and demanded a rapid decision. Since the election 
of the subsequent board would take place in a short period of time, this 
unusual procedure was considered to be justified.50 In the beginning of 
1871, the seat of the board was transferred to Leipzig to coordinate the 
campaign for the approaching parliamentary election. In contrast to the 
previous nomination of the Dresden board, the board was again elected 
by local members in keeping with the constitution of the SDAP. At the 
subsequent party congress in 1871, delegates elected Hamburg as the new 
location of the board. With the party congress selecting the location of 
the board again, the former procedures for the election of the board were 
reinstalled.
The difficulties surrounding the arrest of the Braunschweig board 
caused further discussions at the party congress in 1871. August Otto 
Walster, secretary of the Dresden board, expressed his disappointment at 
the party’s organizational inability to deal with the crisis.
There it was unfortunately shown that the organization was not adequate, 
was not adequately prepared and taken care of in a way that could have been 
expected from party fellows in a necessary manner. Late, very late the news 
came to us if at all when party fellows were again reprimanded in brutal 
manner; later, very late we were in the position to intervene helpingly and 
moderately and often only when we had taken initiative on our own. We of 
course had expected that everywhere where party fellows were reprimanded 
the remaining party fellows would consult and send in reports on the spot 
(…).51
Walster’s disappointment focused on the disloyalty and failed communica-
tion between local branches and the party’s headquarters. The SDAP had 
survived the repression of the German authorities, but local associations 
had failed to mobilize the necessary support for the party. Bracke, for-
mer treasurer of the arrested Braunschweig board, objected to Walster’s 
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 comment. He argued that it was only due to the harsh circumstances of 
the Franco-Prussian War that the party had been so severely damaged. In 
his time as board member, he in his communication with local branches 
‘had such an extraordinary mass of work that he (…) often had longed for 
once having the burden removed’.52 It was, therefore, not the organiza-
tion itself that had caused problems but the difficult political situation.
Although Walster’s critical comment was ignored by the majority of 
delegates, the party eventually adjusted its organizational format. Its lead-
ership developed a new system to improve the coordination between party 
centre and local branches. The 1871 congress installed the office of the 
trustee at the local level.53 The trustee registered party meetings and events 
with local authorities but was also responsible for transferring membership 
fees to the SDAP board. Trustees were elected by their local branch with a 
simple majority. However, only the party’s board had the power to even-
tually appoint them. Legal regulations on associational structure forced 
the SDAP to develop this rather impractical procedure. The party claimed 
that it would prevent local associations from becoming legal units of the 
SDAP.54 The concept seemed to be a success, and the number of trustees 
grew from 100 in 1872 to 226 in 1874.55
partIcIpatIon and legItImacy
Despite the considerable differences between the two organizations, nei-
ther SDAP nor NLF used their representative structure to establish an 
unrestricted autocratic regime. From the beginning, the SDAP focused on 
a centralized regime that would keep its leadership in check by strength-
ening party institutions and facilitating membership involvement. The 
NLF took a different approach and offered its local branches simultane-
ously independence from and representation in the governing institutions 
of the organization. The reasons for maintaining and developing these 
organizational procedures are as simple as they are unexpected. Despite 
their differences, both organizations had valid reasons to provide room 
for membership participation and for the restriction of leaders in their 
representative structures because it ultimately supported efficiency and 
 coherence. The SDAP relied on the narrative of working-class involvement 
to mobilize its members. The NLF could attract its supporters with the 
idea of popular participation and the independence of local branches. In 
addition, members in both organizations were well aware of the needs of 
a functioning leadership model and approached party leaders for  guidance 
MANIPULATION OR PARTICIPATION? MEMBERSHIP INCLUSION IN THE PARTY... 
and advice. Leaders also depended on a fair organizational model to justify 
their commitment to themselves and their close associates.56
For the British NLF, a successful way to mobilize its Liberal followers 
was to refer to its promise to include common people in political deci-
sions. The founders of the federation justified the establishment of the 
new organization by referring to the comprehensive political and social 
changes that demanded the expansion of popular participation in Liberal 
party matters.
Thanks to the increased intelligence of the people, or, at all events, to their 
increased education—thanks to the greater interest which, owing to the 
cheap press, is felt in political affairs—and thanks, above all, to the extension 
of the franchise, it has now become necessary, (…) that the people at large 
should be taken into the counsels of the party57
In this interpretation, the federation did not only lobby for Radical influ-
ence but also fought for the access of ordinary people to politics. Directly 
and repeatedly emphasizing the ‘popular’58 nature of its organization, the 
NLF could extend its influence among local associations that were politi-
cally close to the Liberal Party. Following the model of the Birmingham 
Liberal Association, they were generally expected to ‘establish (…) cor-
responding methods of political action’.59 This entrance criterion did not 
only demand organizational coherence from local associations but also 
provided them with legitimacy because the NLF’s representative model 
was promoted as participatory. Based on its popular claims, the organiza-
tion managed to connect political demands to organizational structure. 
This provided the NLF with ideological influence without a political pro-
gramme. It equipped the federation with a brand that increased its visibil-
ity in the eyes of its members and the wider public.
The emphasis on popular politics within the NLF was also necessary 
because the organization did not have as many working-class leaders as 
its political campaigns might have suggested. Many British Liberals dis-
trusted the organization that they assumed to be completely controlled 
by the industrialist Joseph Chamberlain. Based on its founding constitu-
tion, the NLF promised to its supporters to champion the independence 
of local branches and impede control by the Birmingham centre. The 
party’s leadership did not always follow this rule and regularly intervened 
in  local matters during electoral campaigns. However, these interven-
tions were initiated not only by the leadership but also local branches 
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themselves asked for the advice of leaders. For instance, the Newcastle 
under Lyme Liberal Council did not consider it a problem to write 
to Schnadhorst asking him to run as their electoral candidate. When 
Schnadhorst declined, the president of Newcastle thanked him ‘for his 
generous letter, giving them free action as to any course they make take 
in the future as to their representation’.60 Embracing the leading role 
of the central leadership, he expressed his hope that Schnadhorst would 
‘resume his place at the head of our affairs as the best and wisest organiser 
our party have ever seen’.61
The NLF leadership skilfully involved members in their electoral strate-
gies to mobilize their support. Leaders expressed their gratitude for the 
commitment of local members by keeping up contact and praising their 
efforts. The spokesman for the Norwood Liberal and Radical Association 
wrote to the NLF secretary Schnadhost to describe the effect of this 
approach in his local branch.
I read your letter (…) to the meeting and it was received with great satisfac-
tion. Several members expressed themselves as especially glad to hear that 
you intend to thank those who make personal execution on your behalf. 
Experience has shown that the voluntary canvassers and others value very 
highly any special mark of appreciation by the Candidate for whom they 
have devoted much time and energy.62
This formal appreciation tied active members to the organization and 
encouraged further support. Because they were granted direct commu-
nication with Schnadhorst, members in  local branches could feel that 
they had become an essential part of the NLF. Their connection with the 
organization grew, and they were willing to continue their involvement in 
political campaigns.
For the German SDAP, participation was the open secret behind 
the success of the organization. Party members did not need to praise 
its participatory nature, but rather discussed the implications of specific 
representative procedures. They approached the topic of organizational 
structures seriously and discussed possible amendments in their local 
branches. For the 1873 party congress in Eisenach, the impressive num-
ber of 55  proposals was submitted by local branches.63 They focused on 
organizational matters, many in a remarkably detailed way. In their local 
branches, members had discussed possible amendments to the party con-
stitution that had been suggested by the party’s leadership. From their 
MANIPULATION OR PARTICIPATION? MEMBERSHIP INCLUSION IN THE PARTY... 
own  experiences or what had been brought to their attention by party 
newspapers, members contributed directly to the discussions on orga-
nizational structure. Because the SDAP did not only formally but also 
practically incorporate members’ interests, they were willing to take great 
personal risks to promote the party. They spent much of their personal and 
professional lives within the organization.
As did their counterparts in the British NLF, in Germany, SDAP party 
members asked for a strong political organization because they wanted 
to be part of an effective institution. Their interpretation of political 
participation was not only connected to purely structural matters but 
became also strongly inspired by their individual experiences as party 
members. They considered the existence of their organization as a suc-
cess in their struggle for working-class participation, both within the 
organization and in national politics. In this atmosphere, the Leipzig 
representative, Schilling, enthusiastically shared his emotions with the 
founding congress.
I greet this day of today’s congress as the most beautiful one of my life. 
(…) Finally the day arrived where the unity among German workers is 
established!64
For Schilling, the common political cause of German workers called for 
close cooperation. Unity became even more pressing in times of crisis. In 
the aftermath of the SDAP board’s arrest in 1870 and in hindsight after 
the next national election, the control commission reported that they were 
approached ‘by several sides’ to strive for ‘tight centralization’.65 Being 
part of a coherent organization became a leading theme within the organi-
zational discourse. Extending their political knowledge, reading the party 
newspaper and taking part in SDAP events, party members felt that they 
had become political men. They benefited from political brochures and 
educational programmes that supported the creation of an SDAP identity. 
They identified with the party because it provided them with the experi-
ence of becoming part of a political organization, bringing them closer 
to daily politics.66 Even though internal coherence was under pressure in 
times of crisis, the party could count on the continued support and loyalty 
of its members.
Legitimization based on membership participation and leadership 
restriction not only facilitated the support of the rank and file of NLF 
and SDAP. It enabled members to comply with leaders’ wishes, but also 
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served leaders’ need to justify their rule ‘in their own eyes’.67 Whereas 
this interpretation can only be indirectly derived from sources, there are 
several historical details that illustrate that party leaders followed their 
own conceptual framework when they developed a model of organization. 
Although leaders occasionally benefited from their organizational engage-
ment, their personal risks seem to be too high to explain their commit-
ment. Especially in the early years of his career, Chamberlain was strongly 
ridiculed and criticized in the contemporary press. His doctor worried 
about Chamberlain’s health when he was just about to start his politi-
cal career in London.68 As president of the NLF, he and his supporters 
were generally considered to be populists who threatened the unity of the 
nation. In the comparably tolerant political environment of Britain, they 
did not face severe prosecution like imprisonment but risked their social 
reputation as honorary gentlemen. Also Schnadhorst, as the NLF’s secre-
tary, faced serious health problems and often returned to the administra-
tion of the party without the proper time for rest. For SDAP leaders, the 
danger of suppression and poverty was even more severe. The arrests and 
trials of many Social Democratic leaders were not only a heavy burden on 
their own shoulders but also posed a threat to their families who counted 
on them as breadwinners.
Party leaders were confronted with harsher circumstances than ordi-
nary members. As a reward for their political engagement, they earned the 
respect of their followers and, in the case of the NLF, influence on national 
politics. Yet, even more important to the parties’ leadership seemed to be 
the justification of their actions to themselves and their immediate circle.69 
Because they believed in the legitimacy of their actions, party activists 
could pursue their difficult leadership roles. Following their call for the 
inclusion of ordinary people in national politics, they also had a motive 
to implement participatory structures in their own organizations. In this 
interpretation, the emphasis on membership participation and leadership 
restriction in the two organizations not only constituted a clever mar-
keting strategy but was also rooted in the needs of political leaders for 
self-appreciation. Devoting parts of their political careers to popular and 
participatory elements, they could become skilled leaders who acted in 
accord with serious political motives. This is not to say that party leaders 
were exclusively concerned with altruistic motives. Clearly, the majority 
of them also used their organization to further their own political careers.
That party leaders personally benefited from their political engage-
ment did not mean that their interest in the role of ordinary  members 
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was a deception. SDAP leaders like August Bebel and Wilhelm 
Liebknecht wrote extensively about their political motives that inspired 
their political behaviour and justified the hardships they suffered. As a 
political prisoner, Bebel used his involuntary break from the party’s daily 
business to study ‘Marx’s Capital, (…) Engels’ The Condition of the 
Working Class in England, Lasalle’s The System of Acquired Rights’70 
and many other publications of Social Democratic literature. His fel-
low inmate, Wilhelm Liebknecht, even continued writing critical articles 
for the party’s newspaper, further provoking the authorities and risk-
ing extension of his imprisonment. The motives behind Chamberlain’s 
career have been criticized more often than those of the German Social 
Democrats. He was frequently accused of exclusively working towards 
his own good and exploiting his popular supporters for his own ben-
efit.71 Nevertheless, Chamberlain truly devoted his early political life to 
his career as a Radical party leader. In his time as the president of the 
NLF, Chamberlain mainly addressed his peer group, fellow Liberals in 
the constituencies, to justify his actions. These radical supporters of the 
Liberal party were the ones who constituted the NLF. It was to them 
Chamberlain spoke when he created a representative organization with 
formally independent branches and popular orientation. They were also 
the main audience when Chamberlain praised the contribution of ordi-
nary voters to the NLF in The Times.
(…) the active support, for the most part voluntary and unpaid, of thou-
sands and tens of thousands of voters, who have been willing to work hard 
for the candidates in whose selection they have for the first time had an 
influential voice.72
Based on the promise of participation, Chamberlain could offer his 
supporters political influence because he could mobilize working-class 
followers and gain their support for Liberals running as candidates for 
parliament. However, the idea of popular participation was also attrac-
tive to these circles because of its moral value. Their political goal of 
the advancement of the working class and personal interest in a political 
career became interconnected in the organization of the NLF. Like the 
SDAP party leaders, NLF representatives not only lived for politics but 
also started to make a living from it in party and government offices.73 
As a consequence, less affluent and less influential activists could enter 
the political realm.
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conclusIon
Looking at the experiences of leaders and members of the British NLF and 
German SDAP, representation is not necessarily an obstacle to member-
ship participation and leadership restriction but might also encourage an 
active party life. The organizations of the NLF and SDAP were based on 
representative structures that might be easily interpreted as the opposite of 
the procedures of direct democracy. In spite of their popular political ori-
entation, the NLF as well as the SDAP declined to conduct membership 
referenda but rather relied on local representatives to vote on their consti-
tution, leaders and, in the case of the SDAP, also its political programme. 
Yet, the organizational structures of the two organizations did not inevi-
tably enforce autocratic regimes on naïve members. Whereas SDAP lead-
ers provided its members with many opportunities to exercise influence, 
the NLF offered its followers formal independence from its leadership. 
The SDAP tried to balance its strong leadership with a centralized orga-
nizational structure that regularly informed and invited members to par-
ticipate in its decision-making structures. The NLF approached the topic 
differently and provided members with loose organizational procedures to 
develop their own political strategies and careers. Instead of being solely 
manipulating machines, parties could also become institutions where 
people with little political experience could establish closer contact with 
political life. Party leaders and members both chose to implement repre-
sentative structures that would involve members and control leaders but, 
simultaneously, function efficiently in the political realm.
Although NLF and SDAP exercised less influence on established poli-
tics than their contemporaries might have thought, their organizations 
responded to an important political question of their time.74 Could rep-
resentative structures facilitate popular participation without the seizure 
of power by populist leaders? Their case shows that party activists joined 
in a constant process of negotiation between efficiency and membership 
participation within the framework of their representative structures. 
Although the institutional structure of later political parties became much 
firmer, there is no reason to expect that membership participation and 
leadership confinement were completely lost in the process of institution-
alization as suggested by early commentators.75 If membership inclusion 
and leadership constraint are not interpreted only in the framework of 
direct democracy, they become a likely feature of representative structures. 
Leaders were subject to a system of checks and balances, including their 
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individual need for self-legitimation. Members became political men by 
joining a political organization that provided them with identity and influ-
ence. They could influence the organization as delegates at congresses 
and had the possibility to use local branches for their political activities: a 
procedure also applied in contemporary political systems that we know of 
today as liberal democracies.
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CHAPTER 11
Agitate, Educate, and Organize: Radical 
Networks in New York in the Early 1880s
Robert Allen
IntroductIon
In the early 1880s, a range of political organizations were available in 
New York1—clubs, leagues, unions, federations and parties. They provided 
opportunities, resources and events that would express the many concerns 
held by individuals, and groups, who believed that the current democratic 
machine, dominated by Tammany Hall, could never deliver them from the 
grasping hands of the monopolists. For the network of radicals, the club 
or party remained a means to an end, rather than an organizational end 
in itself. This contribution will concentrate on individuals and activities 
within a short period of time rather than long-term developments. The 
limitation to location and timescale provides an opportunity to look at 
the spectrum of organizational opportunities available to activists—from 
permanent national parties to short-lived local clubs—and at the extended 
and informal social network from which the individuals who led and pop-
ulated those organizations came. Using a synchronic horizontal analysis 
of this brief period in time, rather than focusing on the trajectories of the 
individual organizations, allows a consideration of the multiple organiza-
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tional memberships of activists, the characteristics of their organizations, 
the varied political and personal experiences they encountered, and the 
overarching commonality and constancy of purpose they exhibited across 
the organizations. Such a detailed synchronic approach can show that the 
radical labour movement was more important than any particular organi-
zation; the one moment when everything came together turned out to be 
the great parade of September 1882, bringing labour onto the streets in a 
way not seen before, and establishing USA Labor Day.
The story of two men will provide us with a starting point. In June 
1880, the New York press announced the arrival of an ‘English Agitator’, 
John De Morgan, a ‘celebrated speaker in the people’s cause’ and ‘anti- 
monarchist and anti-Land Grabber’.2 Now in his early 30s, he had been 
a notorious agitator and radical journalist for over a decade. Irish-born, 
but educated in England, he had established the Cork branch of Marx’s 
International Workingmen’s Association (the First International), founded 
a short-lived National Republican Brotherhood, had leadership roles 
in various populist causes including the preservation of urban common 
lands, and had attempted to establish a third party, the People’s Political 
Union. However—tired, broke and despondent—he immigrated to the 
USA where he hoped to ‘labour for radicalism … under the more glori-
ous—because more free—flag of America’.3
As a newcomer to the USA, he faced a bewildering panoply of radical 
organizations and causes. Kazin has described the late nineteenth century 
in the USA as a ‘frenzied political landscape’4 and Lause noted that during 
this period ‘Gotham politics experienced a confusing whirlwind of parties 
and open factions’.5 Ostrogorski, writing in 1902, commented that:
American parties have never been parties in the European sense … It is dif-
ficult to create a third party because in reality there are many parties, i.e. 
factions … A third party is simply a faction that has opted out of one of the 
two large coalitions.6
Though described as ‘English’, De Morgan used his Irish birth and con-
nections and his interest in land reform as a starting point for his new 
radical career. He had arrived in New York during the run-up to the 1880 
Presidential election and, ever the opportunist, quickly attached himself 
to the radical Greenback-Labor party (GLP), for a few years the primary 
national electoral vehicle for the radical labour movement. Here, he found 
himself regularly lecturing alongside another exiled ‘English Irishman’ 
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and ex-internationalist, Robert Blissert. Resident in the USA since 1867, 
Blissert, a tailor by trade, had been blacklisted after the London tailors’ 
strike of 1865. Originally active in the New  York branch of the First 
International, he was prominent in the Amalgamated Trades and Labor 
Union as well as his own Journeyman Tailors’ Union. Like De Morgan, 
he was a ‘skilled and inflammatory speaker’, and the two of them quickly 
made an effective platform partnership in support of the GLP.7 Despite 
their differences—Blissert representing the politicized trade union move-
ment and De Morgan a more populist anti-monopoly stance—the GLP, 
for the moment, provided a useful base for both of them.
The activities of De Morgan and Blissert will provide the basis for a 
deeper look at Kazin’s ‘frenzied’ landscape.8 Although they came from 
very different ideological positions, the two men frequently crossed 
each other’s paths, sometimes collaborated, knew the same people, were 
involved with some of the same organizations, disagreed over particular 
issues and shared some common views. They were part of an extended 
network of radical activists working in New York that underpinned a range 
of organizations—including political parties—that waxed and waned in 
this period.
the electIon of 1880
The GLP was a coalition of different reform groups, ‘independent’ parties 
and causes, originally promoting the idea that a paper currency would be 
better for business and farmers. In 1878, some national electoral success 
led to the broadening of its programme to cover other radical and labour 
interests.9 Lause noted that no minor or third party in American history 
had ‘ever mobilized support as ideologically diverse [drawing in] lesser 
Democratic and Republican politicians … the Socialistic Labor party … 
[as well as a] wide range of woman suffragists, African American militants, 
spiritualists, vegetarians, environmentalists and others ….’10 After years in 
the third-party wilderness of the UK, De Morgan would have found this 
opportunity to practise his agitational skills enticing.
The GLP was not, however, the only minor national party seeking to 
have an impact upon the forthcoming election. During the 1870s, the 
Socialistic Labor party (SLP) had emerged from a base within the First 
International.11 Despite an ongoing internal rift between the electorally 
oriented Lassalleans and the union-oriented Marxists, some tenuous unity 
had allowed the party to cautiously explore a tactical fusion with the GLP, 
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‘to unite [and] make common cause against the common enemy’. This 
allowed the GLP to claim that it ‘was ideally positioned to mount a serious 
challenge to the country’s two old and corrupt parties’.12
The uneasy coalition was possible because most radicals (and much of 
the general population) held the view that the USA was ruled by ‘bankers, 
stock-jobbers, land-grabbers and professional politicians to the exclusion 
of those whose labor produces its wealth and pays its taxes’.13 The solution, 
it was claimed, was a stronger anti-monopolist intervention from a govern-
ment of the ‘people’, which neither the Democrats nor the Republicans 
seemed willing or able to provide.14 However, while ‘anti-monopoly’ pro-
vided a powerful unifying force for the Greenbackers, the accumulation 
of the wide range of different interests and causes meant that ‘managing 
the combustible combination of visionaries, idealistic reformers, eccentrics 
and demagogues gathered under the Greenback banner would prove to 
be a much tougher challenge’.15
land reform
The turbulence in the political landscape was exacerbated by the recent 
rapid development of the Irish Land League movement on both sides 
of the Atlantic. De Morgan and Blissert were quickly drawn, as semi- 
professional agitators, into the briefly flourishing US branch of the move-
ment. Established in Ireland in late 1879 to promote land reform and 
reduced rents, the league was launched in the USA with fundraising visits 
from the two Irish leaders—Charles Parnell and Michael Davitt. Although 
Parnell, the aristocratic MP, and Davitt, a former Fenian, were very differ-
ent, they presented, initially at least, a unifying framework of reform with 
battle cries of ‘Down with landlordism!’ and ‘The land for the people’, 
which proved to be equally popular on both sides of the Atlantic.16
Their campaign was picked up by the radical weekly newspaper, the 
Irish World, which became the principal vehicle for distributing funds 
from the USA to Ireland.17 However, the Irish World claimed that the 
issue went well beyond that of Irish land, arguing that:
… while a comparatively few men have gotten possession of the wealth of 
Nature and labor, there are nine hundred millions of bare backs and as 
many millions of empty stomachs in the world …. It is not the Irish Land 
 question, or the English Land Question, but the Land Question itself that 
we must study and solve…18
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The Land League, like many organizations of this period, had inherent 
tensions, which were always near the surface. The national organization 
was tightly controlled by moderate nationalists, respectable representatives 
of the middle class, who would ultimately unite against the Irish World’s 
‘pernicious doctrines of communism’, which saw Ireland ‘as a means of 
working out a social revolution in other countries’, notably the USA.19 This 
linkage of Irish land reform to wider concerns about American capitalism 
and democracy became a central theme for many radical organizations. 
In particular, the work of the political economist Henry George—rapidly 
emerging as a prominent figure on both sides of the Atlantic as a result of 
his book Progress and Poverty and his views on land tax reform—provided 
a focal point for radical thinking.
labour reform
Blissert was also a prominent figure within New York’s labour movement, 
not just through his general union activities but also because of his mem-
bership in the secret, fraternal and ritualistic Knights of Labor (KOL).20 
The Knights, now over a decade old, still had fewer than 10,000 members, 
but was, under its new leader Terence Powderly, going through a transfor-
mation that would see it become public, open and very large.21 Powderly 
would attempt to make it into an organization that ‘challenged corporate 
control at the workplace and the hegemony of two major parties at the 
polls’.22 Rather than focussing on conventional trade union structures, 
concerns and activities, it sought to bring all workers (not just the skilled) 
‘into the fold’, through the identification of common social and economic 
issues—such as the eight-hour day—and by developing a ‘grand army of 
the discontented’.
Formally, the Knights considered that their District and Local Assemblies 
should be above electioneering. The Order, it was said, ‘teaches MAN his 
duty by educating him on the great question of labor’.23 It was made clear 
that while ‘political action is absolutely necessary to secure the interests of 
labor … to have political action we must have education … ORGANIZE! 
EDUCATE!’ At this time, many socialists in the USA had an evolutionary 
view of socialism in which the education of the workforce would be nec-
essary before society could transition to a new form. At demonstrations, 
banners would pronounce ‘Agitate, Educate, Organize’ and ‘Correct 
Ideas Must Precede Useful Action’.
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However, the Knights, and specifically Powderly, encouraged individu-
als to explore other political opportunities.24 In particular, they had much 
in sympathy with the emerging position of the GLP and its new socialist 
partner, and its most prominent activists and many of its members were 
connected to, even leaders of, these other organizations. These overlap-
ping memberships meant that organizations were sometimes seen—on 
occasion correctly—as public fronts for the secretive Knights. While the 
Knights in New York were, until 1882, few in number, they featured indi-
viduals from what Phelan has called a ‘stellar cast’ of labour leaders in the 
region.25
In the months leading up to the 1880 presidential election the 
Greenback platform, as represented on the streets by De Morgan and 
Blissert, therefore provided an electoral umbrella for a number of organi-
zations whose members preferred to sit outside the two mainstream politi-
cal parties—including the Socialists, the Land League, the Knights and 
the trade union movement generally. The fragility of such a combination 
was, however, never far from the surface. As the election loomed, the 
Irish World commented that, ‘Greenbackism is by no means a perfect and 
well-defined protest …. But as against the two great swindles that oppose 
it, it is the hope of the American people’.26 The hope was to be thwarted. 
The electoral successes of the 1878 campaign were not repeated, with 
the party’s presidential vote a paltry 3% of the total. The New York Times 
concluded, prematurely but not unreasonably, that the party was ‘appar-
ently dead’.27
SpreadIng the lIght
De Morgan moved on from the GLP, prompted not just by electoral fail-
ure but by the need to earn money. In England, he had claimed that, while 
he was called a ‘professional agitator’, agitation always seemed to lose him 
money.28 He now became editor of a new weekly paper called House and 
Home: a Journal of Literature, Science, Agriculture and General News. 
While aiming to be ‘an advocate of all that tends to make the homes of 
people happy and contented’, it wished to ‘tear the mask from society’ and 
‘show the hideous deformities beneath’. The paper’s banner read ‘Equal 
Laws! Equal Rights!! Justice to All!!!’29
The paper was in fact a vehicle for a new ‘People’s party’ established 
by a retired businessman, Bradhurst Schieffelin.30 Believing that neither 
the republicans nor the democrats could prevent the eventual downfall of 
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the Republic, Schieffelin advocated the need for a third party that would 
promote legislation to limit inheritance and prevent the accumulation of 
wealth by a small minority. De Morgan, while still writing and lecturing on 
the broader radical issues dear to his heart, effectively became the public 
face of Schieffelin’s party.31
Blissert and De Morgan continued to encounter each other, for exam-
ple, in early 1881 at the recently established Brooklyn Spread the Light 
Club. The Club, with the overt purpose of ‘diffusing knowledge on social 
and scientific subjects among the masses to enable them to assert their 
rights against the universally felt influence of domineering corporations 
and monopolies’, was based around weekly lectures from New  York’s 
prominent radicals, which attracted large crowds and significant press 
attention.32 Party politics was tabooed. De Morgan and Blissert were both 
occasional lecturers. The committee members were principally socialists 
and Greenbackers, frequently Irish, and with a strong connection to the 
Knights.
The dominant theme at the meetings was the land question, and the 
club drew its name from the Irish World’s Spread the Light campaign, 
aimed initially at fundraising for Ireland but quickly becoming a more 
general banner for education and agitation. The first speaker at the club 
had been the land tax reformer Henry George.33 The Club provided a 
weekly focal point for individuals with attachments to a range of political, 
ethnic, reform and labour groups, a crossover forum bridging the complex 
interconnections between the more formal organizations.
However, many regarded the Club as simply a front for Brooklyn’s 
Local Assembly (LA) 1562 of the still-secret Knights. While the Club 
undoubtedly provided a public platform for the Order’s members, it was 
neither a recruitment device for it (or if it was, a very unsuccessful one),34 
nor was it simply there to provide an alternative vehicle for the Order’s pro-
gramme. The Knights’ local leaders themselves simultaneously belonged 
to a variety of organizations, while some of the Club’s committee had no 
direct connection to the Order. In the weekly life of the leading members, 
the Club, the Order, a ‘third’ party, a trade union (and/or a trade union 
federation), the Land League and/or any of the numerous other clubs 
and organizations alive in New York could be featured.35 Many, for exam-
ple, including Blissert and De Morgan, attended the short-lived Brooklyn 
Church of Humanity, described in the press as a ‘communistic church’ 
which claimed ‘the Lord Jesus Christ as a Communist, without a foot of 
land’. This was run by the somewhat eccentric Reverend Henry Kimball, 
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who was a prominent member of the Spread the Light Club but who had 
no evident direct connections to the Knights, the GLP or the SLP.36
the changIng landScape
Through 1881, De Morgan became publicly preoccupied with the People’s 
party which aimed to ‘provide a remedy for … the demoralized state of the 
present parties’. At an ‘anti-monopoly labor meeting’ held by the party, De 
Morgan and Blissert both made speeches.37 Elsewhere this theme of third 
parties, new and old, continued. The ‘people’, ‘labor’ and ‘anti-monopoly’ 
were dominant, sometimes overlapping, organizing principles. The GLP, 
supposedly dead, sought to relaunch itself within New York in order ‘to 
rescue the liberties of the people from the grasp of the banking, railroad 
and other monopolies’.38 Meanwhile, the KOL moved, in theory at least, 
to become a public organization, the beginning of a period of dramatic 
national expansion. The Spread the Light Club began to transform into the 
more overtly KOL-dominated Advance Labor Club, effectively a pseud-
onym for LA1562, which—disinclined either to give up secrecy or to sup-
port the central leadership—was creating discontent within the Knights. 
As this internal battle within the Order emerged, the Irish Land League 
began to crumble under its own internal and inherent tensions, principally 
between the supporters of the moderate Parnell and the radical Davitt.
At the end of 1881, prompted initially by the increasingly obvious 
gap between these two branches of the Irish movement, Blissert con-
vened a meeting of representatives of over 40 trade unions to establish 
the Organization of United Trade and Labor Organizations of New York 
and Vicinity with the Brooklyn Knights prominently involved.39 Twelve 
thousand men demonstrated against the ‘tyrannous and dastardly action 
of the British Government’ in suppressing Land League members.40 With 
this success, Blissert saw an opportunity for a ‘progressive labor federa-
tion’ linking the interest in universal land reform with labour, and drawing 
in socialist, trade union and KOL principles.41 This became the Central 
Labor Union (CLU) of New York and Vicinity in May 1882 and soon had 
over 50,000 affiliated members.
Retaining its commitment to land reform (and to the Irish cause), the 
CLU organized a mass meeting for Michael Davitt42 who now tied labour 
unity and land reform to the theories of Henry George.43 This commit-
ment of Davitt’s to George’s land tax has been seen as ‘the climax of the 
factional and ideological disputes within the American Land League’.44 
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The moderates now united against him and ‘vented their deep-seated 
hostility to … social radicalism’.45 Within three months, the Irish World 
stopped forwarding contributions to Ireland, complaining that ‘there is 
no longer a Land League in existence’ and that ‘the heel has been put 
firmly down on the principle of the land for the people’.46
labour unIted
The CLU platform quickly spread well beyond land reform, and the orga-
nization began to develop its own radical anti-monopoly campaign, ambi-
tiously appealing ‘to the labourers of the whole world’.47 In June 1882, it 
took a big step and entered the political fray. At a ‘monster mass meeting’ 
Blissert announced that:
… it is absolutely necessary that the industrial classes form a political party 
which shall legislate for the best interests of the whole of the people and 
regardless of class … we pledge our lives, sacred honor, and hearty support 
to the workingman’s party.48
The following month it promoted ‘political action under the title of the 
United Labor party [with] … every degree and kind of unity existing in 
the ranks of labor’ … ‘a starting point of a great victory for the working 
masses’.
Increasingly confident, the CLU was also planning the step that would 
put it, and its organizers, into the history books. In September 1882, it 
held a ‘Mammoth Festival, Parade and Pic-Nic’ attended by 20,000 peo-
ple that is now held to be, in effect, the first USA Labor Day. This parade 
was deemed a great success.
the electIon of 1882
The motives for the parade have been variously identified as part of the 
emerging battle between militants and the leadership of the Knights, as 
a wish of the CLU to impress New York with the power of the labour 
 movement or as a more general attempt by activists to provide inspira-
tion for improving the lot of workers.49 The fact that the CLU had, sev-
eral months earlier, entered the 1882 political campaign, nominally as a 
‘United Labor party’, and had stated the wish to use the parade as a vehi-
cle for that party, has been mostly overlooked.
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However, it is clear that, whatever the original intention of the parade, 
the election had been a significant feature. The parade’s Grand Marshall, 
William McCabe, stated specifically:
Taking into account the importance of the coming election, the working-
men … ought to join in the parade. A large and imposing demonstration 
will strike more terror in the hearts of the monopolists and their political 
tools than anything else can do. It will demoralise our enemy and will insure 
our success in the near future.50
After the parade, the New York Herald noted that ‘the Central Labor 
Union members paraded to convince the political world of their strengths 
…. determined to show their numerical strength in order to satisfy the 
politicians [that] they must not be trifled with’.51
The ‘festival’ drew together the disparate organizations, their leaders 
and members, and demonstrated that their differences as organizational 
forms could be briefly, but dramatically, subsumed. In doing this, the net-
work of activists, based for this purpose within the CLU, but representing, 
through their multiple memberships (individually and collectively), a wide 
range of organizations were able to leverage the city’s labour movement. 
It was this capacity to momentarily unify thousands in its events, which 
made the CLU very different.
Meanwhile, the other minor parties were also gearing up for the elec-
tion. The Greenbacks, after a ‘battle royal over the land question’, reaf-
firmed the party’s 1880 platform, annexed the CLU’s recently acquired 
platform, and laid claim to being the ‘original anti-monopoly party’. 
However, many now took the view that the party had been hijacked by 
socialists52 with a mixture of communism, anti-monopoly and land confis-
cation, which had ‘succeeded in sinking the greenback theory of the party 
and substituting in its place their socialistic theories’.53
By October, the various campaigns had built up. At its ‘first political 
mass meeting’ of the ‘CLU and the United Labor party’54 Blissert said: ‘It 
was the first time that ever workmen were organized on sound principles 
… [and] …. the CLU was the first party to recognize the  democracy of 
labor’.55 He told the party convention that, ‘The time was coming when 
Greenbackers, Anti-Monopolists and Central Labor Unionists must stand 
on a common platform and unite their forces against both the old parties’.56
De Morgan was also campaigning, holding well-attended meet-
ings for the People’s party and gaining Schieffelin’s nomination for 
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 congressman- at- large. At one of the meetings De Morgan spoke of ‘the 
evils arising out of the power of monopolies and corporations’, supported 
by the ubiquitous Blissert who ‘advocated the union of all independent 
parties on some broad platform and then success would be certain’.57
However, as in 1880, the optimism of the radical movement was 
quickly deflated. After the November election, the United Labor candi-
dates met to discuss their performance at the ballot box. Blissert, attempt-
ing to make the best of the situation, said the Labor party ‘should not 
be ashamed of the vote polled. They had made an advance from 600 
[in 1880] … to 10,000’, despite the ‘poor management at the polls and 
against the Democratic tidal wave which swept over the country’. But 
for many, the poor management at the polls was the principal cause, with 
the CLU unable to provide the infrastructural machinery and sufficient 
people on the ground to gain success. One delegate said that ‘unless the 
boxes were fully manned in the future the party would never elect a can-
didate’.58 Others noted that it was not simply ballot management, but 
‘internal dissensions and unscrupulous leaders’ that were the problem. 
The message was that the party, if it was to succeed, would have to operate 
like the other main parties, the very thing that worried such radicals most. 
The excursion into the political arena frightened most of them away—at 
least for the time being—from the establishment of their own party.
beIng organIzed
Between the presidential election of 1880, with its temporary coalition of 
socialists and Greenbackers, and the congressional mid-term election of 
late 1882 when, for the first time, labour attempted to bring together its 
own United Labor party, the radicals of New York engaged with a range 
of organizations that emerged, grew, flourished, declined or disappeared, 
or in the case of the Land League and the Spread the Light Club, did all of 
those things. The leading activists and agitators moved frequently and flu-
idly across the boundaries of these various organizations. Their individual 
centres of gravity may have been focussed around one (or a small number) 
of them, but between them the various organizations provided multiple 
and different opportunities for radicals to pursue their interests. Blissert, 
the unionist, and De Morgan the populist, wove their way through this 
complexity. As the organizations waxed and waned, it was to be such indi-
viduals, with their commonalities and differences (and their very different 
personalities and motivations) who provided continuity amidst the turbu-
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lent organizational changes of the radical landscape. To them, a party, a 
club, a church, a trade union, a league, a federation and an assembly were 
all possibilities to influence and effect in different ways, at different times, 
to different purposes, with different constituencies.
This was helped by the fact that the organizations had much in com-
mon in terms of important issues. In these two years, they usually rep-
resented ‘anti-monopoly’, and the need for alternatives to the existing 
political parties, as central principles. Specific issues such as the eight-hour 
day were common to them. Increasingly the land tax reforms of Henry 
George provided a linking theme. A range of other smaller issues—antag-
onism to convict labour and the need for a professional civil service, for 
example—could supplement their programmes, but for the activists, there 
was sufficient in common for these organizations to be mostly acceptable 
to, and accepting of, them.
What did differ were the nature and scope of the organizations: size, 
culture, constituency, events, experience, public profile and impact. The 
Spread the Light Club, for example, provided an opportunity for leading 
radicals to ‘educate’ and an audience of several hundred to listen and, 
hopefully, learn; a trade union was a vehicle for specific, pragmatic, work- 
related issues and actions; the Knights offered an intense fraternal semi- 
masonic experience within a small local assembly but were principally 
devoted to nation-wide education and labour solidarity rather than prag-
matism; the Land League was a unifying experience for the Irish bringing 
together the old and the new worlds; the CLU combined the world of 
unionism with that of large-scale political organization and action. The 
political ‘party’ threaded its way through these experiences.
So the experience of these organizations—in social and psychologi-
cal terms as well as in relation to activity and impact—would have been 
very different. Some, like the GLP and SLP, had reasonably strong semi- 
permanent structures, with local, state and national bureaucracies and the 
paraphernalia of constitutions and conventions. But many of the clubs and 
local organizations were, in formal terms, unstructured, run by an ad hoc 
committee of varying membership and dependent on particular  individuals 
to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. The more radical organiza-
tions often deliberately had no single formal ‘leader’ and would change 
the presidency or chairmanship on a rotating basis. The Spread the Light 
Club and the CLU were good examples. This approach was intended 
to ensure that organizations did not get captured by individuals or fac-
tions. Even in nationally based organizations, local level  activity was often 
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fairly autonomous. For example, while the American Land League had a 
national bureaucracy, it was regarded by many as exactly that—a bureau-
cracy—and local branches quickly proliferated with their own emphases, 
‘brands’, and often a defiantly independent approach to what they did, 
and how they did it.
The common existence of multiple organizational memberships inevi-
tably brought together, within any one particular organization, people 
with very different histories, dispositions and demands. Tensions were 
inevitable. The CLU meetings in New York, for example, were constantly 
dominated by arguments about ‘action’ versus ‘words’, with trade union 
delegates infuriated by the inclination of others to make speeches, get 
into philosophical and political discussions, and generally refuse to act, 
and specifically to act in ways that would improve the short-term condi-
tions of the members whom they were supposed to be representing. Intra- 
and inter-organizational battles sometimes seemed to occupy much of the 
energy and time of participants.
More positively, radical organizations were often more than just talking 
shops, political organizations or agitational vehicles. The lives of individu-
als, especially the prominent ones, were taken over by their radicalism, 
particularly as many of them were active in a number of organizations at 
any one point in time. To support this lifestyle, social activity was often 
integrated into the organization’s activities, frequently embracing whole 
families. Demonstrations were often described as festivals, with attached 
picnics and entertainment. Music was a central feature of events, with 
glee clubs, choirs and concerts. The big events might have sports such as 
baseball and fireworks. Robert Weir noted that the KOL ‘tried to rebuild 
community by constructing an entire KOL universe that embraced not 
only work and ideology, but also badges, parades, picnics, music, poetry, 
literature and religion’.59
The organizations were also a vehicle for the more personal and psy-
chological needs of their members. The personalities of individuals were, 
not unexpectedly, a factor in the role they played in these organizations. 
De Morgan, throughout his career in radical politics on both sides of the 
Atlantic, needed to be on the platform and in charge. With no real capacity 
to be a team player or for organizational management, he moved through 
organizations—his own and others—briefly emerging as a ‘star’—and then 
moving on.60 Blissert, on the other hand, while always at the public front 
of an organization, looked to establish and construct organizations and 
used his undoubted skills to provide a framework for others to work col-
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lectively around him. An example of this was his involvement with particu-
larly prominent members of the New York radical fraternity at this time. 
These included Peter J McGuire—founder of the Carpenters’ Union and 
of the American Federation of Labor (and a supposed ‘father’ of Labor 
Day)—who was, in his early career, a mercurial firebrand described as 
having blood ‘at a temperature of 150 degrees in the shade’.61 Like De 
Morgan he was happiest in the limelight and often appeared on the plat-
form alongside Blissert. Another was Matthew Maguire, a machinist, with 
whom Blissert founded the CLU. Behind the public leaders were the many 
people who made the organizations work, ensuring that the meetings hap-
pened, the speakers were there, the handbills got printed, and the demon-
strations occurred. Maguire was the archetype of that group, a perpetual 
secretary of organizations. Known as ‘Faithful, good old Matt’, he was in 
this period secretary to at least five organizations—the Brooklyn GLP, the 
Spread the Light Club, LA 1562 (and its pseudonymous Advance Labor 
Club) and the CLU.
For the ordinary members, the experience was very different in the 
various organizations. Most obviously, the esoteric rituals, as well as the 
secrecy, of the Knights provided a unique experience. In other organiza-
tions, it was the chance to hear speakers, debate issues, gain a sense of 
belonging or get something done that was important. Sunday was, inevita-
bly, the busiest day in the radical calendar. In Brooklyn alone, there would 
have been over 50 meetings of one sort of another, running through the 
afternoon and evening. A major complaint from organizations was that, 
as a result, they were unable to get enough good speakers because of the 
competition. Blissert and De Morgan were among a group of itinerant 
speakers, who moved around the various organizations, sometimes paid 
for what they did (e.g. as with Land League activities). The meeting places 
were quite varied. Some were just commercially available halls, but others 
were dedicated facilities. The Spread the Light Hall, for example, while 
the base for the political activities of the club and its associated organiza-
tions, also played an important social function and membership provided, 
in addition to the lecture series, an informal meeting place, social and 
event space, and a library.
Women, while mostly absent from the formal organizational structures, 
and from the public platform, were frequently involved in the day-to-day 
social organization. Occasionally they did come into the limelight. For 
example, the fundraising activities of the Land League were very depen-
dent on the establishment of the Ladies Land League in 1881, the leaders 
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of which—at least in Brooklyn—were related to the main male radical 
leaders within the city. Many branches of the League gave picnics and 
hosted weekend excursions, combining their fundraising activities with 
recreational outings.62
The significance of organizations therefore, particularly for the leading 
activists, was more than simply their political purpose. They were part of 
the construction of a radical lifestyle that supported and gave additional 
value to the activists’ experience of their sometimes turbulent existence.
the ‘party’
The period covered in this chapter has been bounded by two sets of elec-
tions situated two years apart. Elections were events that provided a tem-
porary, public, base that allowed the various radical organizations, party 
and non-party, and their constituent members, to express much of what 
they wanted, but without them having to fall into the clutches of the 
machine-based parties they so despised.
In the USA, the term ‘party’ was, during the late nineteenth century, 
very flexible. Usually utilizing the lower-case ‘party’, even within formal 
organizational designations, it could be applied to everything from a 
small local group, to a federation of such small groups pursuing a spe-
cific theme, to a full-blown party with regional or national aspirations 
and infrastructure. The term could be attached to single-issue organiza-
tions, often had no pretensions to state or national identity, and may 
have had little expectation of permanency or, indeed, electoral success. 
Other than the GLP, which for a few years appeared to be capable of 
crossing over into the mainstream, these minor parties resolutely pre-
sented themselves as intent on challenging and changing the system 
rather than joining it.
The nineteenth century was a period when third-party and indepen-
dent candidates had much greater success at the ballot box than in the 
twentieth century. Richardson’s mammoth four-volume series ‘Others’ 
tracks 1000 minor parties that have existed over 200 years—many in a 
single town, city, county or state, with the majority barely surviving one or 
two election cycles. A number of factors made them particularly prolific in 
the nineteenth century, including the inclination of newspapers to provide 
meaningful coverage to third-party candidates, the lack of burdensome 
ballot access barriers, and no government printed ballots and parties, with 
voters free to print and distribute their own.63
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Therefore, while many radicals claimed antagonism towards political 
parties, the option of establishing, joining and voting for parties was always 
there and frequently used. The line between radical organizations and par-
ties was fluid and ephemeral. Candidates might seek and receive nomina-
tions from a number of parties, and might move regularly between them. 
A party’s nominating convention might attract a number of affiliated, 
even oppositional, groups. The 1880 GLP convention was, for example, 
described as ‘a cacophony of discordant voices representing almost every 
reform movement in the country’.64 Loyalty, exclusivity, chance of success 
and permanence were not necessarily important components of member-
ship or support.
Ostrogorski took the view that ‘third’ parties at this time usually 
emerged ‘in opposition to the existing economic regime, and as an 
expression of social discontent’. While they were generally ephemeral, 
they would reappear sometimes with different names but ‘more or less 
analogous or kindred objects’. Although they took on different forms and 
structures, with different programmes, they shared the position that it was 
their role to ‘rescue the country from the clutches of the corporations and 
the monopolists’ and looked on the two main parties as ‘accomplices of 
these latter and as an obstacle to reform’.65 In the end, however, he took 
the view that such third parties were all doomed to ‘fail’ because ‘one or 
another of the old parties was willing and anxious to coalesce with them, 
or to take the wind out of their sails by accepting or “capturing” their 
program’.
This notion that they always ‘failed’ can however be contested. It can 
be argued that, in this period and this place at least, these parties were not 
always intended, or at least expected, to ‘succeed’ in conventional elec-
toral terms. Instead, they provided profile, impact, experience and activity 
before, and at, the frequent electoral events. They established a platform, 
displayed—physically and politically—on the streets and in the press, 
which allowed the presentation of the views of the activists to the broader 
public. They provided an intense political experience for the participants 
and, in the case of the very large parades, the observers.
concluSIon
The parties, and the elections, were but one of a number of organizational 
forms, activities and events—brought into being by a number of individ-
ual activists—that underpinned the overarching network of radicals within 
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New York, and the various interwoven strands of the radical platform. The 
parties in this period were as much about opportunities and events—fluid 
and ephemeral—as were the clubs, leagues, unions, federations through 
which they wove. All were embedded within the structures of the activ-
ist network, components of, rather than the primary vehicles for, radical 
activity. As the radicals in New York moved from the presidential election 
of 1880 to the mid-term elections of 1882, they explored the various 
channels and opportunities to take part in the electoral process through 
existing parties and organizations—relaunching the GLP, mostly discard-
ing the SLP, establishing a fledgling United Labor party, promoting a 
nascent Anti-Monopoly party, playing with ‘People’s parties’. Meanwhile, 
they worked on a day-by-day basis within a wide range of other non-party 
radical organizations, pursuing the same interests but through different 
means.
Underpinning much of the activity of this radical network and their 
organizational vehicles was what Canovan has called the ‘democratic pre-
tensions’ of popular activists. Seeing themselves as ‘true democrats’, their 
interest is in making sure that democracy keeps to its promise of ‘power to 
the people’. They themselves claim to be the voice of ‘the people’, and the 
organizations established provide a range of outlets for that voice. That 
ensures that what Canovan terms the ‘redemptive’ face of democracy—the 
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’—balances, and 
if necessary challenges, the ‘pragmatic’ face which provides the mechan-
ics and machinery of a representative democracy. As such, says Canovan, 
popular political activity (populism in the broadest sense of that word66) 
accompanies, and is integrated into, democracy like a ‘shadow’.
The extended and highly energetic network of activists, supported by 
a large constituency of highly participatory followers, sought to use the 
different structures, cultures and experiences of the different organiza-
tions to gain traction and to maximize impact, but also to ensure con-
tinuity such that the organizations might disappear but the aims and 
purposes—general and specific—persisted. At a time when the main-
stream political parties had yet to prove themselves and demonstrate 
long-term sustainability, it was the complex iteration between a highly 
active informal network and a multitude of organizational forms (includ-
ing, but not principally, political parties) that provided the platform for 
the radical thinking and activity that would in a later period come to be 
accepted aspects of the platforms of established national parties. While the 
individual organizations grew, peaked and usually disappeared, over vari-
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ous periods of time, the network of radicals continued on. The  oft-noted 
disruption and dysfunctionality, impermanence and  incoherence, within 
the radical movement were ameliorated by the enduring existence of the 
strong social networks that ensured the continuity of position, purpose 
and practice.
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CHAPTER 12
Party Versus Party: Beatrice Webb 
and the Ascent of the British Labour Party
Hanneke Hoekstra
In January 1924, the British socialist and reformer Beatrice Webb joy-
fully noted in her diary that the press was beginning to mention that ‘the 
Labour Party, with its usual foresight, has organized its own London 
Society’! She continued by gloating about how lucky it was that they had 
done so. However, the party, she realized, would need all their ‘sense of 
solidarity and puritanism to keep some of the frailer vessels upstanding 
against the onslaughts of duchesses and millionaires against their integ-
rity’.1 In the well-known fashion of Britain’s best circles, Beatrice Webb 
had started to organize political luncheons and fancy dress dances. Shortly 
before, her husband Sidney Webb had joined the first Labour Cabinet 
as Minister of Labour, and the Webbs found themselves unexpectedly in 
the centre of political power. Beatrice Webb, together with her husband 
Sidney, was commonly regarded in England as well as on the Continent 
as the intellectual leader of British socialism. One would hardly expect 
that their efforts to bring about true political change would include an 
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imitation of what they must have considered as the corrupting influence 
of the upper classes, who through the manipulative power of the petticoats 
of marchionesses and duchesses had their way anyway. Early on in her 
life, she had found that personal vanity was an ‘occupational disease’ of 
London Society and that it should be avoided as the ‘very Devil’.2
Yet, in addition to improving the rhetorical skills of Labour candi-
dates, Beatrice Webb had been busy since 1921 polishing the social skills 
of Labour women as well. She did so by founding the Half-Circle Club, 
a society that organized lectures, luncheons and dances for the wives of 
Labour MPs. The object of this club was to prepare Labour women for an 
active role in British political life and to cultivate something like a social-
ist sociability. Apparently, the influence of Society was still strong enough 
for Beatrice Webb to worry about naïve Labour couples who would be 
vulnerable to the political game of the dinner table. She herself reluctantly 
assumed the role of political hostess to the new Labour Party but vowed 
to avoid London Society and Court functions, pleading ill health and old 
age. ‘Also I want to give a lead against participation in London Society as 
a desirable part of the routine of a Cabinet Minister and his family’.3 The 
Half-Circle Club should function as an alternative.
Her concern with the role of Labour wives in political life raises an 
intriguing question. Why now, would Beatrice Webb, a committed social-
ist who obviously abhorred the corruptions of Society, foresee a role for 
Labour women in political life modelled on a gendered tradition that 
looked backwards, rather than forward? Was not such a function wholly 
out of date in the era of democracy in which the professional organization 
of mass political parties had taken over the functions previously fulfilled 
by the aristocratic women incorporated in the political pursuits of their 
families? Had not the political hostess died a quiet but certain death with 
the arrival of democracy? The riddle of Beatrice Webb’s apparently inexpli-
cable pursuits touches upon the structure of British politics, the particular 
position certain women traditionally held in British political life and the 
nature of party politics.
Not everyone in Great Britain, not even those who considered them-
selves to be ‘progressives’, believed in the added value of party organi-
zation. There were other practices available for influencing the political 
process. When Beatrice Webb became a member of the Royal Commission 
on the Poor Law, she did not find all committee members to be coopera-
tive. ‘Lord George gives me unhesitating support; my difficulty is with Sir 
Samuel Provis. But I had the most friendly chat with him this afternoon, 
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and he comes to dine to meet a carefully selected party on Wednesday’.4 In 
England, the dinner table stood for the existence of a strong, informal 
political culture that revolved around Parliament. The informal setting in 
which much of the political process took place was gendered. Women had 
a pivotal role in the organization and hosting of social parties that brought 
politicians of various creed and ambition together. In general, historians 
have showed a tendency to concentrate on the male spaces in politics, 
such as Parliament, the electoral platform or the party convention. Yet it 
was in the female space of the salon, the dining room or the ballroom that 
reputations were wrecked or leaders were chosen.5
Shifting the historical camera to the paper trail of the political behav-
iour of women is a useful method to reveal this considerable informal side 
of British political culture. In this chapter, I will argue that, particularly 
in England, parties in the sense of a festive gathering were in fact an 
impediment to the development of political parties in the fashion of their 
Continental equivalents. The role of elite women in British political life 
around Parliament and party constitutes the framework of my analysis. I 
will test my case by employing the lens of the Labour Party for the same 
reason that Robert Michels chose to study the German SPD to argue his 
‘iron law of oligarchy’; socialist parties have the ambition to be demo-
cratic at every level.6 In addition, after 1870 formal organization and 
seeking strength in numbers became intrinsic to socialism. Thus, Beatrice 
Webb’s aristocratic manoeuvring on behalf of the poor will prove my 
case.
The PoliTical hosTess
Recent historiography on the political influence of aristocratic women in 
the eighteenth century has significantly changed the received idea that 
women were devoid of political power before they won the vote. On 
the contrary, the dynastic nature of aristocratic politics allowed women 
of the nobility to have a significant role in Britain’s ruling class.7 Some 
privileged women were players to be reckoned with, as is evidenced in the 
considerable documentation they have left behind in the form of diaries, 
memoirs and letters. They entered the power game on an individual basis 
using ‘ancien régime techniques of female influence’—that is, using their 
femininity to play upon the passions of powerful men. At the time of the 
accession of George III, duchesses, marquesses and viscountesses could, 
due to the familial nature of aristocratic politics, fulfil a significant role in 
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British political life. Elaine Chalus emphasizes the importance of the social 
dimension of politics during this era.8
In a society where bureaucracy and party organization did not yet 
completely govern the political process, the social rituals surrounding the 
political power game could be crucial to its outcome. Successful politi-
cal women were invariably socially skilled, intelligent and well informed. 
Above all, their charm was vital in determining their degree of power.9 As 
hostesses to the Tory or Whig elite they could become quite powerful, 
organizing balls and dinners to promote family interests. As canvassers, 
they could be instrumental in elections.10 In general, the pivotal role of 
certain elite women was crucial to the culture of power in Britain’s rul-
ing elite and continued to be substantive until the Second World War.11 
The classical conception of a culture of power, in terms of patronage and 
familial and personal alliances, has allowed women in circles of political 
elites, hitherto always hidden behind the scenes of Parliament and party, 
to become visible as vital to the creation of a political culture and a politi-
cal society, which proved to be remarkably stable.12
The perception of elite women as agents of power certainly adds to a 
vision of higher politics as governed by alliances and intrigue. Indeed, the 
eighteenth-century trope of ‘petticoat government’, as Kathryn Gleadle 
and Sarah Richardson have argued, suggests that contemporaries were well 
aware that women were capable of exploiting ‘various sites of power’.13 The 
role of elite women reveals the important relationship between informal 
and formal aspects of power, between private influence and public rule. 
Patronage, social influence, that elusive field, caught in the double meaning 
of the word ‘party’ and psychological support were aspects of female power 
that could make or ruin political careers. In addition, in the absence of pro-
fessional party organizations, inside or outside Parliament, communication 
could assume only an informal character. It made no difference whether it 
concerned the exchange between front- and backbench or party-political 
communication with opponents or the press. The venues for communica-
tion with supporters outside parliaments or the press were even scarcer. 
The entertainment of the political hostess served all these functions.14
In the mid-Victorian age, Lady Palmerston held grand evening recep-
tions for a politically diverse crowd. In fact, these parties reflected the 
change in the structure of politics and consequently also the altered 
 status of these ‘political parties’. In the period 1815–45, political alle-
giance often polarized around issues such as the Corn Laws, reform and 
so forth. The social consequence was partisan entertainment. However, 
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in the period 1846–65 entertainment became more inclusive of other 
‘parties’ including quite a few backbench MPs. Lady Palmerston’s large 
receptions across party lines were crucial to the unstable years of the 
mid-Victorian era marked by the government of shifting coalitions of 
weak parties. These informal social occasions ensured that the delicate 
political process of compromise and coalition continued. These gather-
ings reflected the party-political instability of these decades and allowed 
a broad spectrum of political opinion to literally stay on speaking terms. 
Had Lady Palmerston’s parties remained more socially exclusive, it would 
have aggravated political relations. ‘My parties are very popular and their 
success is chiefly due to the fact that all political factions are to be found 
there’, Emily Palmerston wrote to Dorothea Lieven. The aristocracy con-
firmed its dominance, however, by the social exclusivity of an invitation to 
Cambridge House.15
Reynolds concludes, as a matter of course, that ‘any increase in the elec-
torate […], diminished the power of the aristocracy and muted the voice 
of the aristocratic woman’.16 The great salons of Lady Palmerston or Lady 
Waldegrave with their connections to important newspapers such as the 
Morning Post and The Times had lost their political centrality. The implica-
tion is that the machinery of increased party organization, the hallmark 
of democracy, competing for votes took over many functions of the host-
ess. Even the extra-parliamentary practice of influencing decision- making 
could be said to be conducted through the institutions of national extra-
parliamentary party organizations that pressured their representatives to 
execute the party-programme. However, contrary to the suggestion of 
Reynolds, the decline and fall of the aristocracy did not necessarily mean 
that the political hostess perished with it.
After the Second Reform Act (1867), the social structure of politics 
and the redistribution of power endowed the political dinner party with 
yet another function, namely the fusion of the aristocracy with new mon-
eyed power of the industrial magnates. The political hostess was crucial 
to the successful merger of disparate social groups in order to maintain 
an equilibrium still favourable to the aristocratic element. Reynolds has 
argued that the one characteristic that influential Victorian hostesses 
appeared to share was their eccentric social background. They were born 
into non- aristocratic families, were divorcees or were heiresses to new 
money.17 Their ability to communicate and form relationships with people 
from widely divergent backgrounds made them ideal hostesses, acting 
as catalysts for the integration of the old nobility and new magnates on 
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terms that were agreeable to the traditional sociability of the aristocracy. 
Actually, the importance of hostesses as gatekeepers to power increased 
when the economic position of the aristocracy fell in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century. Traditionally, the social structure of power was 
determined by birth and family. Now, social prestige became accessible 
through the accumulation of capital and social success. This resulted in a 
remarkable increase in the complexity of rules of etiquette and access to 
Society in order to avoid the entrance of unwanted newcomers. Before, 
kinship ties determined membership of the British power elite. Now, the 
aristocracy could ‘choose’ their next of kin and exclude those members 
of the family they saw unfit for political functions. Networks developed 
based on the principle of ‘kin by choice’.18 Hostesses were clearly of use in 
a political culture otherwise ill-equipped to accommodate new groups of 
voters and members of the elite.
Certainly, the political conduct of nineteenth-century aristocratic 
women can be understood in terms of the precepts of their world, which 
had been, by and large, familiar to titled women for centuries, and in this 
respect they were not feminist heroines avant la lettre.19 The prospect of 
political rights for women threatened their privileged position and sub-
stantial influence and may have inspired the staunch anti-suffrage stance 
of prominent patrician hostesses. However, the politicking of elite women 
would not remain untouched by feminism. The feminist claim to political 
rights and the spirit of democracy was bound to influence the expectations 
and behaviour of elite women as well.20 In 1919, hostess and wealthy sup-
porter of the Conservative Party, American-born Nancy Astor, seized the 
historical moment and entered the House of Commons as the first female 
MP. In a way, her election was the logical conclusion to the paradox that 
the age of democracy and reform saw the rise of political power of elite 
women.
Both Liberal and Conservative parties created their organizations out-
side Parliament deliberately to recruit voters among the mass electorate 
after the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867. It was never meant, however, 
that these mass organizations should come to rule Parliament as well. 
Representation remained a matter of distance between elector and elected. 
It was the task of parliamentarians to organize support without sacrific-
ing their freedom of action in Parliament.21 McKenzie points out that in 
the British context, political parties, including the Labour party, never 
became subject to direct control of its mass membership. The representa-
tive nature of Parliament requires that members of Parliament, and thus 
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parliamentary parties also, must hold themselves responsible only to the 
electorate and not to the organization of supporters outside Parliament. 
Thus, in Great Britain there will always be marked difference between the 
Parliamentary Party and the Political Party whose primary function it is to 
sustain competing teams of potential leaders in the House of Commons. 
All other functions, such as influencing policy or the emergence of leaders 
within the parliamentary parties, must remain subsidiary.22 The distance 
between extra-parliamentary organization and parliamentary party left 
ample space for informal politics, and for pressure groups, to influence the 
parliamentary process.
Even though the British aristocracy was disintegrating, the political sys-
tem retained its aristocratic form much longer. In fact, in Great Britain 
the rise of new social groups did not immediately affect and transform 
the political structure. The social reality of the aristocratic constitution 
forced the middle and working classes to accommodate in order to obtain 
positions. A. Lawrence Lowell concluded in The Government of England 
(1908) that British government was still mainly in the hands of the upper 
class, although the exact social composition of that class had changed. Old 
landed gentry had lost their prominence to make room for representatives 
of commercial wealth. But then, the British aristocracy was never a closed 
body. Its resilience and power can be attributed to the capacity to open 
its gate at times to achievement and money. ‘The connection of fashion-
able society with politics is still very close, perhaps on the whole not less 
close than at other times’.23 The (kinship) networks of the ruling class 
covered the entire country. They met constantly at country houses and 
at entertainments in London. According to Lowell, such a ‘constitution’ 
created a sustainable Society, which could wield considerable influence. 
The early twentieth century also witnessed an increase in political weight 
at the cost of Parliament. It is in the cabinet that the governing class was 
most strongly represented. It was an effect of the practice that leadership 
developed in Parliament through social intercourse, by ties of blood or 
friendship in order to avoid the risk of misrule by appointing ‘strangers’.
Seen in this light, the position of the hostess increased not only because 
of the extension of the franchise but also because of the continued impor-
tance of society for the informal politics around the cabinet. The role of 
society was key to the maintenance of the balance of power. Ultimately, in 
the female space of the political hostesses the relationships and social bases 
that make possible the operation of efficient government were forged. As 
Reynolds argued, the days of the grand Whig hostesses might have been 
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over by 1867, an inevitable sign that the end of aristocratic rule was near, 
yet the political structure proved to be resilient. The Conservative Party 
continued to rely much longer on the discreet social skills of the spouses 
of the rich and the powerful.24
Bourgeois women partly took over their functions of social gatekeep-
ers and manipulators of power. In the period before the First World War, 
Society was dominated by the political ambition of nouveaux riche heir-
esses such as Nancy Astor and Margot Asquith. ‘Dollar Princess’ Nancy 
Astor, wife of Waldorf Astor, heir to an immense American fortune, had 
revitalized her country house Cliveden as a popular place for political 
parties. Once one of the homes of the Whig hostess Harriet Duchess of 
Sutherland, the patroness of Gladstone, it now functioned as the court 
of the Conservative Party. The purpose was to promote a political career 
for her husband.25 His fortune was most convenient for the Conservative 
Party, anxious for millions in order to finance their election campaigns. 
Actually, the extension of the suffrage created space for revitalized role 
of the political hostess. Nancy Astor would receive not only Conservative 
leaders like Arthur Balfour and Lord Curzon but also the Liberal Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith and his wife Margot. Years before Nancy had 
befriended Margot on horseback during the hunting season, when Margot 
was enjoying the fox hunt and Nancy was hunting for a husband.26 Both 
Margot Asquith and Nancy Astor personified the new money which lit-
erally had married old power. As ‘Prime Ministress’, as Margot Asquith 
would call herself, she surpassed every previous prime minister’s wife in 
terms of notoriety and fame.27 Lady Palmerston had become but a quaint 
memory.
The social style of Nancy Astor and Margot Asquith was equally fitted to 
the new challenges of the traditional parties in either meaning of the word. 
Margot, wild, humorous and unconventional, had livened up Society with 
her quick wit and subversive behaviour. She would not hesitate to dance 
a passionate cancan on the landing of the country house where she was 
staying. Asquith, already widowed, had fallen madly in love with her.28 
Nancy Astor was equally unconventional. She liked to impersonate her 
famous acquaintances during her dinner parties. Margot was among her 
favourites. Nancy would imitate Margot’s stiff upper lip with a pair of false 
teeth. The presence of the Asquiths at the Astors’ house parties must be 
understood in terms of the inter-party civility the Asquiths wished to rep-
resent. However, soon after, when political relations deteriorated due to 
the constitutional crisis as a result of Lloyd George’s Budget, congeniality 
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between the two hostesses suffered accordingly. In 1912, Margot Asquith 
wrote an angry letter to Nancy Astor after finding out she was denied an 
invitation to a weekend at Cliveden:
I will say one thing to you (as a much older & far wider-ranged woman than 
you by education & inclination can ever be.) You will never be a leader in 
any society or have authority influence or first-rate society if you xclude yr 
[sic] political opponents or have not the intellectual temper or social gran-
deur to be able to argue on big political points […]29
The question regarding the extent to which these hostesses really influ-
enced the course of politics is not relevant. It is sufficient that they per-
ceived themselves as powerful and that they were crucial to the sociability 
of British politics. The pressures on traditional power demanding political 
and social reform, however, were persistent and increasingly radical around 
the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. But the demand for 
radical change did not necessarily change political culture in radical fash-
ion, on the contrary. The politics of knife and fork were adopted by new 
political groups wishing to influence existing political parties.
Grosvenor road
Beatrice Webb’s diary entry of 29 July 1897 included a map of the dinner 
table she was seated at that very night. The dinner was hosted by Beatrice’s 
friend Richard Burdon Haldane, a prominent Liberal MP.  The Webbs 
found themselves in the company of, among others, Asquith and his wife 
Margot, the prominent Conservative Lord Curzon and Lady Rothschild, 
a member of a family then believed to possess the largest private fortune 
in the world. To Beatrice, Haldane’s dinner table represented his ambition 
to be part of every set (his weakness) and his capacity for friendship which 
enabled him to bring about non-party measures (his strength).30
To her, her seat amidst the political elite meant access to power and the 
opportunity to influence the liberal powerholders with her socialist ideas. 
In 1892, Beatrice Potter had married Sidney Webb, a bright but physically 
unattractive civil servant who shared her commitment to the Co-operatist 
Movement. Her inherited income enabled him to give up his clerical job 
and concentrate on his political and scientific activities. Their marriage 
meant the merger of different worlds. For years, Beatrice had acted as 
hostess to her wealthy father, entertaining the leading politicians of the 
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day. She had known many, and a few intimately. She fell deeply in love 
with Joseph Chamberlain, the famous initiator of the Caucus, who was 
20 years her senior. Both dominant personalities, they soon clashed after 
a brief period of courtship, and Chamberlain married the daughter of an 
American politician. For Beatrice, the marriage to Sidney meant in addi-
tion to a farewell to passion in favour of an equal intellectual partnership, 
a considerable descent down the social ladder. Webb came from a lower-
middle-class background and gained his prestige through hard work and 
discipline. In the year of their marriage, he became a member of London 
City Council by courting liberal votes. He aspired to a career in Parliament 
and as minister if only he could afford to do so. Beatrice’s plan for Sidney 
Webb was clear. She would use her money, her wide political knowledge 
and influence to introduce him in parliamentary circles. She would pull 
wires for him in her most intelligent capacity in order to make him the 
‘politician of the future’.31 She could not possibly imagine a direct role for 
herself in politics since women were excluded from formal functions. A 
role as hostess was the only model available for her to wield political power 
within the political elite.
Sidney Webb was a prominent member of the Fabian Society, this curi-
ous British socialist club, which rejected the traditional socialist methods 
of mass organization and revolutionary propaganda. Instead, Fabians 
hoped through patient and plodding penetration of the seats of power to 
change the body politic in England. And so they did. Through their per-
sistent, informed and practical advice to the men of power, Fabians were 
instrumental in the promotion of the Local Government Act of 1888. 
Fabians did not want power for themselves. Although not indifferent to 
charisma and leadership, they thought that they should use these figure-
heads, not worship them. Through their trained knowledge and reason, 
Sidney Webb, Bernard Shaw, Graham Wallas and others meant to neutral-
ize and subvert the ‘untrained’ rhetoric of political leaders like Haldane. 
The Education Acts of 1902 and 1903 were based on a tract written by 
Sidney Webb. In addition, through incessant public agitation (in 1891–92 
378,281 tracts were distributed), Fabians tried to make the existing politi-
cal system absorb their ideas for reform.32
In general, in countries normally dominated by two parties, like Great 
Britain and the United States, the natural thing to do for advocates of a 
new great cause is not to organize a new party, but to bring organized 
influence to bear on the old. That is what the Anti-Corn Law League did 
in Britain, or the Prohibitionists in America. Influencing and pressuring 
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opinion was sometimes directed towards both parties. At other times, the 
emphasis was on infiltrating the preferred party and establishing as many 
supporters of the cause. In a third stage of influencing, those with posi-
tions inside the party which held their political sympathies may deem it 
fruitful in order to carry out a particular policy (or to obstruct one) to 
work through the rival party by making friends with its leaders. The British 
socialist Fabian Society labelled this practice ‘permeation’ from about 
1886 onwards.33 The Fabians, originally radical in their political views, 
tried to permeate the Liberal Party with their socialist ideas. After 1886 
when the Party lost direction after the split over Home Rule, the radical 
wing was open to new ideas. Beatrice Webb, former hostess of the ruling 
class, would elevate permeation to an entirely new level of influence. ‘We 
are always abusing the Liberal Party for not knowing its own mind—it 
would be more to the purpose if we made it up ourselves!’, she noted in 
her diary at Whitsun 1896.34
It hardly was a coincidence that the first residence of the Webbs was 
at 41 Grosvenor Road. The address was a short walking distance from 
Parliament. If Sidney Webb were to become an MP, this would have given 
him an enormous advantage in a time before the advent of motorcars. 
The house enabled Beatrice to lure her parliamentary friends to lunch and 
dinner. She did so simply to advance the political career of her husband. 
Thus, the famous Webb salon began. In the post-Victorian age, Beatrice 
became an impressive but strict hostess who exploited her connections to 
the elite without reserve to promote Webbian politics. She was also bright 
and beautiful with dark and sharp features, and a nonchalance that made 
some men think of her as a gypsy. Her friendship with Richard Burdon 
Haldane provided her with entrance into the highest circles of the Liberal 
Party. He cared for her before her marriage and might have married her.35
Fellow-Fabian George Bernard Shaw, also a good friend of the Webbs, 
originally suggested the idea for a socialist salon. He wrote to Sidney: 
‘Webb, me boy a wurd wuz yis. I am seriously of the opinion that what is 
wanted is a salon for the cultivation of the Socialist Party in Parliament. 
Will Madame Potter-Webb undertake it?’36 In the absence of a modern 
party organization, Shaw resorted to a form reminiscent of the old regime, 
although Shaw must have had the French example in mind. In France, the 
salons of Early Modern and Revolutionary France played an integral role 
in developing the pre-revolutionary spirit and culture. In the intimacy of 
the Rococo salon, brilliant women hosted the members of the Republic 
of Letters. Manners were cultivated and ideas were born.37 Shaw’s original 
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idea was that the socialists who had a seat in Parliament on behalf of the 
Liberal Party needed to be educated through conversation and debate in 
order to fulfil their roles. Beatrice Webb, however, did not gain fame for 
cultivating socialist conversation but was notorious for her talent for polit-
ical intrigue. The secret of Fabian success (and failure) could be attrib-
uted to Beatrice’s permeation tactics. Much of their impact came about 
through private contacts in clubs and country houses, in smoking rooms 
and exclusive social gatherings. The Webbs became popular in Society. 
They received every bit of attention, not as reformers but as representa-
tives of a new form of unconventional ‘chic’.38
‘Winston Churchill dined with us last night’, wrote Beatrice Webb in a 
typical diary entry on 11 March 1908. ‘…We talked exclusively shop. He 
has swallowed whole Sidney’ s scheme for boy labour and unemployment, 
had even dished it up in an article in The Nation’.39 Her diaries are full of 
these reports on her and Sidney’s informal politics. Beatrice Webb enjoyed 
these evenings of ‘Bright talk with paradoxes and subleties, sentiments 
and allusions, with the personal note emphasized’. Yet her feelings of guilt 
over her own perceived ‘vanity’ would surface the next morning:
One wonders whether all this manipulating activity is worthwhile, whether 
one would not do so just as much by cutting the whole business of human 
intercourse and devoting oneself to thinking and writing out one’s thoughts. 
It would certainly be a far pleasanter because a far less complicated life, with 
fewer liabilities against personal dignity, veracity and kindliness. It is so easy 
to maintain these qualities in a vacuum! In rubbing up against others, one’s 
vanity, one’s self-will and any strain of spite gets uncovered and revealed in 
all their ugliness to oneself, one’s friends and one’s opponents. But someone 
has to do this practical work, and possibly it is just as well that it should be 
done by those who have the ‘other life’ to withdraw into so as keep up their 
standard of thought and feeling.40
Their ‘salon’ in time became a parlour in which they figured as spiders, 
tempting political spies into their web. Asquith, Balfour, Churchill, Lloyd 
George, Haldane, almost all leading Liberal politicians and quite a few 
Conservatives came under the Webb influence and came to their dinner 
parties where the menu of mutton and rice pudding was decidedly not 
the main attraction. Permeation had become a doctrine instead of a party- 
political practice. The Webbs developed as good intellectuals a theory of 
permeation, and permeated incessantly in the London City Council at 
soirees and diners, including at other people’s houses. Beatrice’s influence 
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became a serious impediment to Webb’s political career. She discouraged 
him from accepting a constituency because, as she confessed to her diary, 
‘A Parliamentary career would destroy our united life’.41 Sidney’s conver-
sion to the backstairs politics of his wife did contribute to his image of 
being unreliable and prevented him from realizing Beatrice’s initial ambi-
tion for him to become ‘the politician of the future’. Yet Fabians were 
successful and, through their leaders and the connections and charm of 
Beatrice Webb, they were able to have a say in the legislation of the nation.
The labour ParTy Machine
Fabian membership continued to be small and metropolitan. Fabians 
never aspired to become part of a broad popular movement. When in 
1896 Ramsay MacDonald suggested using the society’s funds to establish 
provincial branches, Beatrice Webb haughtily interjected: ‘Do we want 
to organise unthinking persons into Socialistic Societies, or to make the 
thinking persons Socialistic? We believe in the latter process’.42 To be sure, 
Fabians entertained a rather ‘weak’ view of democracy. Fabians found the 
parliamentary system and ‘The British Constitution’ in general a sound 
system, only in need of minor reform. Their view of democracy was per-
haps best summarized in words attributed to Shaw as ‘true democracy 
does not mean that people rule themselves but that they have the power to 
choose who rules them’.43 Their rival, the Social-Democratic Federation 
was, however, opposed to permeation, favoured direct democracy and 
preached joining a socialist party.
Fabian ideas were clearly out of step with the declared ideas on direct 
democracy of the international socialist movement. By the 1900s, social-
ist parties on the Continent favoured the referendum and initiative. In 
1896, Sidney Webb delivered a series of lectures on the ‘machinery of 
democracy’ in which he dismissed mass meetings, the rotation of office 
and other practices as primitive expedients. This view would also explain 
their distrust of party organization since this would bring the ‘apathetic 
mass of routine toilers’, according to the Fabian resolution to the Socialist 
International, to power.44 In November 1893, Sidney Webb and Bernard 
Shaw had published the historic Manifesto ‘To your Tents, O Israel’ 
(afterwards issued as ‘A Plan of Campaign for Labour’). In this pamphlet, 
they proposed that the working classes should abandon their support of 
Liberalism—as the Fabians at this point would do—and form a Party of 
their own. They should raise 30,000 pounds to finance 50 candidates for 
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Parliament.45 The Fabians wanted an independent working-class party sup-
ported by the trade unions. However, the Trade Union Congress would 
not financially back the new party.46 In the end, Webb’s liberal allies in 
the London City Council felt severely betrayed by his change in tactics. It 
would greatly damage his prospects for becoming, ironically, ‘the London 
Chamberlain’.47
After the founding of the Labour Party, the Webbs worked less closely 
with Liberal and Conservative politicians but would not fundamentally 
change their outlook. ‘We staked our hopes on the organized working 
class’, Beatrice Webb wrote, ‘served and guided, it is true by an elite of 
unassuming experts who would make no claim to superior social status, 
but would content themselves with exercising the power inherent in 
superior knowledge and longer administrative experience’. The Fabians, 
suspicious of party organization, were nevertheless able to make the estab-
lishment receptive to their message of a socialist transformation because 
they accepted the rules of the political game and revered the English 
Constitution. Fabians overtly rejected the traditional socialist methods of 
mass organization and revolutionary propaganda. G.M. Trevelyan called 
the Fabians ‘intelligence officers without an army who influenced the 
strategy and even the direction of the great hosts moving under other 
banners’. The Fabians never became a political party, and no candidate 
ever stood for Parliament as a Fabian; Fabian speakers never called on the 
public to join the Society.48 The Fabian Society was influential in shaping 
the climate of social and economic change in Great Britain. The society 
also contributed to the philosophy of the nascent Labour Party. Historians 
agree, however, that the Fabians had no decisive role in the creation of 
the new party.49 My point here rather is that the expressed reverence of 
the Fabians for the existing political structure in Britain indicates that the 
evolution of the Labour Party was very much a process of adaption to the 
formal—and informal—institutions of British politics. British trade unions 
equally were convinced of the desirability of the parliamentary method.
In 1900, the Labour Representation Committee (LCR) had been 
founded, an organization whose constituent parts, the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), the trade unions and the Fabian Society, were to form 
a distinct Labour group in Parliament ‘who shall have their own whips 
and agree upon their own policy’.50 Until after the First World War, the 
Labour Party would remain a loosely knit alliance which could be joined 
only through membership of the aforementioned organizations. It lacked 
most features of political party such as a programme. Its machinery was 
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distinctly immature. It benefited, however, from the zeal and enthusiasm 
of the local rank and file of the affiliated organizations such as the ILP. The 
future party chairman Fenner Brockway later recounted the revivalist 
mood of the gatherings of his local ILP branch gathering in 1907:
On Sunday nights a meeting was conducted rather on the lines of the Labour 
Church Movement—we had a small voluntary orchestra, sang Labour songs 
and the speeches were mostly Socialist evangelism, emotion in denunciation 
of injustice, visionary in their anticipation of a new society.51
While these meetings may have spurred socialist spirit, politically they 
became less important when the need to win elections became vital.52 
The electoral defeat of 1895 had hastened the establishment of cen-
tralizing and anti-democratic practices within the ILP and concentrated 
power within the National Administrative Committee, including hege-
monistic control over crucial matters such as electoral decisions and rela-
tions with other parties. The ILP leader Keir Hardie, a former miner, was 
an ardent supporter of a ‘Labour alliance’ between trade unionists and 
socialists.53 The subsequent formation of the LCR was not the uprising 
of a class, but primarily a new phase in the struggle of the trade union 
movement for the right to negotiate on equal terms with employers and 
apply sanctions, such as strikes when negotiations failed.54 The organi-
zational principle of the trade unions would determine the evolution of 
the Labour Party. It was the bloc voting of trade union leaders that had 
the determined the pro-war policy of the Labour Party and to which the 
party leader Ramsay MacDonald had been fiercely opposed. He resigned 
the chairmanship in 1914. Influenced by the famous study of the former 
German socialist Robert Michels, which was translated into English in 
1915, he blamed the British trade unions for ‘stifling the spirit of man in 
a mechanical machine and in formal order…It was the rebellious spirit, 
caught in the wheels of this party machine but vital to the survival of the 
socialist idea, which needed to be saved’.55 No wonder that to the pacifist 
MacDonald, for a brief moment that is, Lenin and Trotsky seemed kin-
dred spirits.56 The Fabian point of view as well as MacDonald’s response 
to Michels showed that socialist leadership in Britain held serious res-
ervations regarding the machinations of mass political parties. Fabians, 
who were essentially liberal radicals, increasingly defined their socialism 
not as the collective political party fist of the working classes but in terms 
of the development of collective institutions. For MacDonald, Michels’s 
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‘iron law of oligarchy’ meant the death of socialist spirit. Fabians feared 
that on a local level, the Labour Party would bring incompetent admin-
istrators to power.57 This was in their view not an effect of machinery 
but of political motive, including the lack of knowledge and true public 
spirit.
conclusion: The sTranGe deaTh of The PoliTical 
hosTess?
For Beatrice Webb, the development of a party machine meant a threat to 
democracy, since it made the rise to power of the wrong leaders possible. In 
1914, Beatrice Webb still found that ‘the Labour members (in Parliament) 
are a lot of ordinary workmen who neither know or care about anything 
but the interests of their respective trade unions and a comfortable life for 
themselves’. Labour men were in the view of Beatrice Webb lacking good 
manners. The Labour MPs hated to be invited to dinner to talk politics; 
they preferred to sit smoking in the lounge in the House of Commons and 
vote against the government. Moreover, she found that the middle-class 
socialist members were hampered by their pledge to the Labour Party 
in the Fabian policy of permeation of all parties. ‘But to go back on the 
creation of a Labour Party would be to admit failure’.58 Although Beatrice 
Webb’s political views were decidedly progressive and scientific, her politi-
cal practice remained informal and rested upon a firm sense of the resil-
ience of the old political culture continued by the Conservative Party, 
Labour’s political opponent. What’s more, she endorsed this culture out 
of reverence for the parliamentary system. She espoused something like an 
aristocratic socialism, which included an active role for certain women in 
the game of higher politics.
Because of her own elitist upbringing and convictions, Beatrice was 
fully aware of the powers of Society and particularly the influence of 
women who stood at its gate. She herself had been a hostess who had 
enjoyed considerable political impact. How persistent the female aristo-
cratic element in the British political world remained becomes evident 
in Beatrice Webb’s report in her diary of a visit by Margot Asquith. In 
1918 when a Labour government was an option, Margot rushed from 
Cavendish Square to Grosvenor Road to solicit the support of Beatrice’s 
husband for a coalition between the Liberal leaders and the Labour Party. 
‘Would Mr. Webb come and see my husband?’, Margot asked. Beatrice 
refused, however, to intervene. ‘The Liberal leaders have always taken us 
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up when they are in opposition and have always dropped us when they are 
in office. The policy of permeation is played out and labour and socialism 
must either be in control or in wholehearted opposition…’59 However, 
it was exactly the recollection of the part played by Margot Asquith and 
other brilliant hostesses that made Beatrice Webb decide in 1920 that 
the women of the Labour Party needed educating for politics even more 
than the men. Moreover, the most influential Conservative ‘petticoat in 
politics’ Nancy Astor had been elected in 1919 as the first woman in to 
become a member of Parliament. She continued as hostess in the House.60
Beatrice Webb must have felt that Labour needed to counter the 
Conservative Party and the menace of its ‘aristocratic embrace’ by its own 
means.61 In her view, the parties of hostesses were a practical alternative to 
party machinery. But Labour women were often ‘singularly ill-equipped’ 
and too shy to hold their own in a setting of even moderately high poli-
tics.62 Therefore, the spouses of Labour politicians needed to be trained 
in the social graces not only to conduct polite conversation but also to 
develop their techniques of female influencing. Beatrice Webb’s Half- 
Circle Club may now appear as strangely out of touch with political real-
ity. However, the prominent political presence of upper-class women even 
in the history of the Labour Party, such as Beatrice Webb (and later on 
Lady Cynthia Mosley), rather shows that like the Liberal Party, the politi-
cal hostess, the informal predecessor of the party machine, was ‘dying with 
extreme reluctance and considerable skill’.63
Beatrice Webb’s persistent belief in the festive party as a base for politics 
is another illustration of the current historiographical view that in England 
socialism was not necessarily bound to result in a class-based mass political 
party. Political tradition (not only intellectual) and ‘situated agency’ deter-
mined the political response to the challenge posed by the arbitrariness of 
the market.64
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CHAPTER 13
The Domestication of a Machine. 
The Debate About Political Parties  
Around 1900
Henk te Velde
The library is full of books about particular political parties in Europe, 
but histories of the emergence of ‘the party’ as a general phenomenon 
are rare. The general history of the emergence of party organizations and 
their critics has not often been the subject of historical research.1 This 
is strange because modern party organizations struck contemporaries as 
something new and puzzling already at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury itself. It was then still too early to write a proper ‘history’ of what 
was happening, but a number of scholars went to great pains to get the 
information they needed to write comprehensive contemporary surveys. 
Organization as such was not new in politics, of course, but now, extra-
parliamentary forms of  organization were included in the definition of 
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formal politics for the first time. Until then, extra-parliamentary organi-
zations could be part of civil society but not of what was regarded as poli-
tics proper. Even if many historians today regard single-issue movements 
as political movements, contemporaries thought differently. For the first 
time, something that scholars and also members of the government or 
parliament saw as ‘politics’ was happening outside the state and outside 
parliament. Earlier forms of organization, such as single-issue move-
ments, had already changed the conception of politics, but they were 
considered as attempts at influencing politics from without, not as part of 
the state. Now, the state and the established political system itself seemed 
to be changing.
This contribution looks at the consequences of this new analysis and 
puts it into perspective by assessing it in light of some other contempo-
rary forms of public politics. The new parties could have been regarded 
as dynamic and fleeting moral communities that roused enthusiasm 
and commitment as single-issue movements had done previously. They 
could have been seen as part of a social movement or as a social move-
ment in their own right.2 And in fact they were, but this interpretation 
was subservient to the analysis of the new parties that dominated in 
the twentieth century and that saw them primarily as instruments of 
modern government politics. As a result, political parties that were 
often at first designed to stimulate the participation of the people were 
mostly analysed as instruments for the administration of the state. 
For participation, a measure of discipline was already needed, but the 
government demanded a really disciplined machine. This final chapter 
retraces how and why analyses of political parties started to underline 
administration and government instead of participation. The debate 
about parties and party organization around 1900 was in fact a dis-
cussion about the nature of ‘democracy’, a form that already existed 
as a political system in the United States but was still new in Europe. 
Political scientists were looking for ways to domesticate democracy, a 
form of government that had traditionally been regarded as fickle and 
unreliable. If party organizations fell into the wrong hands, the politi-
cal system was in great danger, but if managed properly, it could lend 
stability to democratic politics. Seen in this light, ‘organization’ was 
not primarily a tool in the hands of the people to put pressure on the 
political system—as it had earlier been in single-issue movements—but 
a tool of the government.
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The STudy of PoliTical ParTieS
At the end of the nineteenth century, cultural anthropologists were intro-
ducing the new method of participant observation for studying indige-
nous peoples. Probably unaware of this development, political scientists 
were discovering the same method for their study of the new parties. In 
1896–1897, the young Frenchman Edgard Milhaud visited German cities 
such as Leipzig, Berlin and Stuttgart in order to study the social democratic 
party’s life in practice, including electoral campaigns, demonstrations and 
programmes, party conferences, public meetings, celebrations like May 
Day, Trade Unions and cooperative associations or associations of women, 
popular education, newspapers and brochures and private conversations. 
For the research visits, Milhaud—who sympathized with socialism—was 
introduced by the prominent social democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht, and 
he was welcomed by members of the party everywhere. In 1902, he was 
appointed to the chair of professor of political economy in Geneva on the 
recommendation of the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès. It caused a 
row, but he became a well-reputed academic.3
In the introduction to his book about the German social democratic 
party, La démocratie socialiste Allemande (1903), Milhaud emphasized 
that he had gone to great lengths to check his sources. He almost seemed 
to apologize for his participant method of using ‘les sources diverses 
de mes impressions’.4 His colleague as a student of political parties, the 
Russian political scientist Mosei Ostrogorski, was even more apologetic 
in his much more famous Democracy and the Organization of Political 
Parties, which appeared at almost the same time (1902). ‘I owe the pub-
lic an account of my method’, he wrote in the introduction to his book 
because he could not rely on ‘authorities’. He had to piece together his 
material of ‘facts and impressions’ in ‘a long and minute enquiry’ and 
based ‘on personal testimony and on direct observation of political life in 
general and on the working of party organization in particular’. It was dif-
ficult to achieve his objective of ‘a scientific observation’, ‘calm, unbiased’ 
view of ‘political phenomena’ ‘amid the perpetual flux of things as diffi-
cult to grasp as the running stream’.5 His type of participant observation 
was clearly more distant and critical than Milhaud’s. Ostrogorski wrote in 
fact a long and consistent indictment of the modern type of party orga-
nization. Nevertheless, it has been claimed that he was the first scholar 
‘to go beyond the analysis of formal political institutions, to study the 
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actual political behavior of men and institutions outside the governmental 
sphere’.6 This was, of course, true only when seen from the perspective of 
twentieth-century political science.
It could be argued that the first phase of the study of the new mod-
ern parties was concluded by Robert Michels’s study of the German 
social democratic party of 1911. His Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in 
der modernen Demokratie (or Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the 
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy) was hailed by Carl Schmitt 
as the beginning of a new scientific sub-discipline of party sociology.7 
Michels for his part shared Ostrogorski’s criticism of the party as an orga-
nization. There has been some discussion as to whether he was influenced 
by Ostrogorski, whose work he quoted but at first does not seem to have 
known.8 He also quoted Milhaud but only once: he was much more criti-
cal of the socialist party than Milhaud, and he resembled Ostrogorski in 
his critical attitude towards political parties in general. His book was also 
closer to Ostrogorski’s in other respects. Ostrogorski’s second volume was 
about the American party system. His first volume was about the ‘liberal 
Caucus’ in Great Britain, but the title of his book reflected his more gen-
eral interest in the tendencies of modern party politics. Michels’s book 
was mostly about the German social democratic party, but its title showed 
his interest in the ‘sociology’ of political parties in the plural (the English 
title) or in the nature of parties (Parteiwesen, in the German title). Like 
Ostrogorski, he pretended to be an impartial scientist. The state and the 
individual had always been there, but now, the new element of the politi-
cal party had emerged in between the two—this was his object of study. 
Michels wrote that almost every political party in Europe already had its 
own party history, but a more general ‘Analyse des Parteiwesens’ was lack-
ing.9 His analysis resulted in his famous iron law of oligarchy. This was, of 
course, not a dispassionate and unprejudiced analysis but a long and bitter 
goodbye to the social democratic party, to which Michels had belonged 
for quite some time. He moved on to anarchism and later to fascism and 
finally taught at the University of Perugia in Mussolini’s Italy.
Michels’s book is brilliant and thoughtful, but it is the work of a ren-
egade looking back at the world he had left and lost. It was written by 
someone who had been an insider but had turned into an outsider. It is 
significant that the modern image of political parties was framed by out-
siders such as Michels and Ostrogorski (who had never even sympathized 
with the parties he was studying) and that Milhaud was forgotten. In the 
twentieth century, formally organized political parties rapidly became 
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part of established politics, and for critical observers, their organizations 
seemed to have become vehicles for career politicians that stifled idealism 
rather than social movements of the people. There was now much more 
interest in a critical and negative general analysis of organizations than in a 
sympathetic study of the commitment of a specific party community.
The fuTure of democracy and american PoliTical 
ParTieS
It is no coincidence that the titles of both Michels’s and Ostrogorski’s 
books contain the word ‘democracy’. Around 1900, democracy was 
the great question of European politics. Both France and Germany had 
general male suffrage, even though the German Empire was not really 
functioning as a parliamentary democracy. Great Britain went from one 
electoral reform to another and was already considered as a ‘democracy’.10 
Belgium was experimenting with a combination of general male suffrage 
and plural voting and was seen by some as a laboratory for Europe.11
Europe was experiencing a kind of paradigm shift in politics, a change 
with Copernican dimensions, from liberal parliamentarianism to parlia-
mentary democracy with organized parties. Ostrogorski studied the new 
democracy, but from an outsider’s perspective, the view of someone who 
still held on to the liberal values of the world of elite parliamentarianism. 
Because of his criticism of parties and his sympathy for older liberal values 
the book contained, according to a critic, ‘a series of conscientious obser-
vations of the Copernican heavens by a loyal but saddened believer in the 
Ptolemaic astronomy’.12 Whether this image of Ostrogorski is correct or 
not, it draws our attention to the fundamental changes in politics that he 
and his European contemporaries were facing.
This background determined the analysis of political parties. 
Democratic politics apparently needed a new sort of organization. Even 
though ‘parties’ in the sense of a current of thought or a loose combi-
nation of parliamentarians had existed for a long time, the new extra-
parliamentary organizations were seen as novel inventions. They changed 
the nature of what a ‘party’ was and even the nature of politics in general. 
Their emergence engendered a lot of debate in many countries. Each 
country had its own peculiarities, but the debate as such was an interna-
tional phenomenon. Many of the main participants had an international 
background. Milhaud was a Frenchman who wrote about Germany and 
became a professor in Switzerland. Michels was German but studied in 
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France—he had a French mother—and in Italy where he later became 
professor. Ostrogorski was a Russian liberal, who later studied in Paris 
and spent a long time in Britain and in the United States conducting his 
research. This international orientation was perhaps what it took to be 
able to look beyond the history of a single party and concentrate on ‘par-
ties’ as a new phenomenon. Often, international analysis was also easily 
accepted; Ostrogorski was criticized by British scholars for what he wrote 
about Britain but praised abroad and Michels writes in the introduction 
to the second edition of his book that most reviewers liked his book, but 
many took exception to his treatment of politics in their own country. 
For German critics, ‘oligarchy’ was a feature of Latin countries, French 
critics thought that it was the result of the German authoritarian spirit 
and English critics would have preferred a separate treatment of British 
‘selfgovernment’.13
In the analysis of parties, one frightening example was always loom-
ing in the distance: the American experience. The United States had 
already been a ‘democracy’ for a long time, and many people thought 
they could study the future of democracy by looking at that country, as 
Alexis de Tocqueville had done. At least they could use the American 
example to frighten the public about the prospects of European party 
democracy. Tocqueville had noticed the American political parties but had 
written little about their form of organization. This lack of detailed atten-
tion changed at the end of the nineteenth century. The prominent British 
political scientist, professor, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) and 
minister James Bryce gave an authoritative overview in his The American 
Commonwealth (1888/1889). Its second volume contains many pages 
about ‘The Machine’ and its ‘Bosses’.
Bryce was trained as a lawyer, and he was primarily interested in govern-
ment and constitutional matters. However, in the case of the parties, he 
had to rely for his information on ‘the conversation of American acquain-
tances’ and ‘impressions formed on the spot from seeing incidents and 
hearing stories and anecdotes’. This was only a part of his book project, 
so he did not feel he really needed new methods of research as Milhaud 
and Ostrogorski did, but his remarks show that he was already sympa-
thetic to their approach. In fact, he encouraged Ostrogorski to pursue his 
studies and wrote an introduction to the book—in which he disagreed 
with Ostrogorski’s pessimistic picture of British party politics. As some-
one studying the American government, he was primarily interested in the 
party as a political tool for governing the country. His metaphors show 
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this rather abstract interest. According to Bryce, ‘the spirit and force of 
party has in America been as essential to the action of the machinery of 
government as steam is to a locomotive engine’. The American parties 
had lost their ideological content and their principles, but their organiza-
tion was all-powerful; they had retained their machine: ‘The mill has been 
constructed, and its machinery goes on turning’.14
Politics had become a (profitable) profession, and the parties were 
based on organization and discipline, if not on corruption. The ‘bosses’, 
the political professionals par excellence, did not try to mobilize the masses 
on the platform but worked in backrooms, in the ‘committee-room’.15 
Bryce accepted parties as part of the reality of modern democratic politics, 
but he was rather pessimistic about their influence. The party organiza-
tion obstructed ‘the free play of public opinion’. The question was, how-
ever, whether the American practice predicted the future of European or, 
more precisely, British politics. As his preface to Ostrogorski shows, Bryce 
thought it did not.16 One can understand that he wanted to make that 
point clear because, according to Ostrogorski, the most obvious mani-
festation of ‘Americanizing’ tendencies in British politics was found in 
Bryce’s own Liberal Party.
oSTrogorSki and The caucuS
Ostrogorski’s book was published in 1902, but he had written the volume 
about Britain around the middle of the 1890s.17 According to Ostrogorski, 
the new National Liberal Federation, organized by Joseph Chamberlain 
from Birmingham, was a pernicious ‘Caucus’, an American type of closed 
organization, disciplining, manipulating and using the masses. It was 
the importation of American politics into Britain, the beginning of the 
end of freedom in British politics, more frightfully so as it was beginning 
to dominate British politics. In the past, the great changes of Catholic 
emancipation (1829), the first Reform Bill (1832) and the abolition 
of the protectionist Corn Laws (1846) had been achieved as the result of 
the pressure of ‘extra-constitutional organizations’ on Parliament. Now, 
the traditional parties ‘had laid hands on the very weapon which was being 
used against them, extra-parliamentary organization’.18 They had become 
the cynical instrument of career politicians in the established parties. The 
parties seemed to stimulate the participation of the people in politics, but 
they had become means in the hands of ambitious politicians who wanted 
to control the state.
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Ostrogorski argued that the new political parties threatened democ-
racy because their ‘machinery’ was a bureaucratic instrument in the 
hands of a small group of manipulators. His description of the devel-
opment of the English Caucus and the National Liberal Federation 
contains the clichés that were used for American party politics: ‘to 
strengthen the hands of the leaders, the wire-pullers set the machine of 
the Organization in motion’.19 However, he conceded that the Caucus 
provided a kind of political education for the masses and that its oratory 
was meant ‘to convince the audience’ instead of just contributing to 
the ‘political carnival’ that elections had formerly been. But, according 
to him, it was still bread and circuses in the end. Because ‘the English 
masses are still unable to take an intelligent interest in political ques-
tions’, politics had to be presented as amusement. Noisy mass meetings 
served to turn on ‘enthusiasm’, and ‘the more impressionable voter’ 
became a ‘hypnotized subject’. It was not only the masses who fell vic-
tim to the Caucus but also members of Parliament. They had become 
‘legislators in the second place only; their main function is to be com-
mercial travellers for their party’. Instead of independent ‘representa-
tives’, they had become the ‘clerk’ of the party: ‘delegates’ who had to 
do what the party wanted.20
If this sounds rather ominous, it was nothing compared to what had 
happened in the United States. At the end of the first volume of his 
book, Ostrogorski writes that the ‘English Caucus’ was ‘still in the grow-
ing stage’. In the second volume, he painted an extremely dark picture 
of American politics. ‘What appeared to us in England as a germ, blos-
soms in the United States’. ‘Politicians’ danced ‘round the golden calf ’, 
and corruption had pervaded politics. The Machine and the Bosses were 
everywhere, and the professional politicians were not statesmen but only 
‘experts in the art of organization’ who played the part of ‘the political 
machinist’.21
At the end of his book, Ostrogorski asked if there was a way out. 
Surprisingly, he argued that the solution to the problem of parties was 
obvious and rather simple. What was needed was another type of organi-
zation: ‘a combination of citizens formed specially for a particular politi-
cal issue’, with a ‘single aim’.22 Such an organization would remain in 
existence only during the campaign for such a cause, as one of a num-
ber of ‘temporary single issue parties’. Ostrogorski thought that these 
single-issue movements would dissolve once their original goal had been 
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achieved—as had happened with the Anti-Corn Law League. The tem-
porality offered a solution to the problem of the wire-pullers because 
there would be no opportunity for professional politicians to buy or sell 
politics. Parliament would become ‘a real deliberating assembly, instead 
of an arena of the parties, a theatre of civil war’. It was clear: ‘Political 
society will be transformed into a vast school, and democratic govern-
ment will become really a government of discussion’. ‘Down with party 
and Up with league’, he exclaimed, and he quoted the examples of the 
Catholic Association and the league of leagues, the Anti-Corn Law 
League, with which he had also started his first volume to explain what 
he meant.23
The reaction to Ostrogorski’s magnum opus was mixed. Its enormous 
empirical base, and its comparative ambitions impressed all readers. From 
the first reviews until the reception in political sociology much later, how-
ever, commentators wrote that the book exaggerated the power of party 
organization, both in the United States and, more particularly, in Britain.24 
Ostrogorski was not original in his use of the word Caucus either. The 
conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli, among others, had started to accuse 
Chamberlain’s liberal organization of being a Caucus. And already in the 
1870s, Chamberlain himself had proudly used the word—which Disraeli 
had introduced as a term of abuse—for his own organization. He made 
fun of the accusations of ‘wire-pulling’, ‘manufactories of public opinion’, 
‘machinery’ and bosses and argued that it would have been impossible 
to manipulate independent English citizens in such a way.25 In the late 
1870s and in the 1880s, a debate raged in England about the nature of 
this organization. The Caucus was much criticized, and many people did 
not like Chamberlain’s style of politics, but by 1890, most had drawn the 
conclusion that it would remain a passing and minority feature and that 
there were many differences between the English or British situation and 
the American one.26
Bryce had encouraged Ostrogorski to write his book, but he was 
disappointed by his treatment of the English Caucus. On the whole, 
Ostrogorski’s book was not very well received in Britain. Since then, 
almost all reviewers have expressed doubts about the rigidity of the 
thesis of the book, and recent scholarship has confirmed their doubts. 
Moreover, the ideas about the leagues that Ostrogorski himself thought 
were most important have been dispelled as unconvincing or even ‘naïve’ 
and inconsistent.27
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PoPular ParTiciPaTion
It is true that Ostrogorski’s ideas about the leagues sound a bit odd, after 
two large volumes about the power of party Caucuses. But they are not 
so strange, if we read them in the context of the 1880s when he did 
his research and the 1890s when he wrote his book. In 1892, Henry 
Jephson’s The Platform. Its Rise and Progress had appeared—in fact with 
Ostrogorski’s publisher MacMillan. Jephson was almost as ambitious 
as Ostrogorski; his book also consists of two volumes, and it also is ‘an 
attempt at a solution of the great problem of popular [democratic] gov-
ernment which has in recent times come into such commanding promi-
nence’. Jephson defined the Platform as ‘the spoken expression of public 
opinion outside Parliament’.28 His book is a still useful comprehensive 
history of political speech and debate in mass meetings in the British 
extra-parliamentary public sphere. After dealing very briefly with the 
Birmingham Caucus, Jephson argues that the pressure of public opinion 
had turned Parliament into ‘the executive of the Platform’, not the execu-
tive of parties. The Platform was ‘able, by its controlling function, when 
collectively employed, to impose its will on the House of Commons’. 
Jephson presented his book as an analysis of ‘the Platform, as an institu-
tion of government’. Jephson applauded the pressure of the Platform that 
turned MPs into ‘delegates from the constituencies’ and the mouthpiece 
or the voice of the people.29 In that sense, the book seems to be the very 
opposite of Ostrogorski’s, for whom the independence of the MPs was an 
article of faith. Also in concentrating on free public speaking instead of 
wire-pullers, Jephson seems to contradict Ostrogorski.
However, there are striking resemblances too. The new democracy was 
the starting point for Ostrogorski as well as Jephson, and Jephson also 
wanted to show the consequences of the corresponding broadening of 
the concept of established politics. Both authors admire the Anti-Corn 
Law League as the prime example of a disciplined and democratic pressure 
group that had shown how democratic politics should work, as for instance 
opposed to the quasi-revolutionary, unrespectable movement of Chartism 
that both men did not like. Moreover, Jephson was also convinced of the 
importance and power of organizations in democratic politics. He writes 
‘that in any great popular struggle the Platform, to be successful, requires 
a powerful organisation at its back’. In fact, the ‘agitation against the Corn 
Laws is the most perfect example which our history affords of the action 
of the Platform as an engine of political warfare’. And, like Ostrogorski, 
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he thought that ‘the strength of the League was the singleness of its aim’ 
and that it was befitting that the Anti-Corn Law League and leagues of 
that nature were dismantled as soon as the goal was reached, as had in fact 
happened.30
Ostrogorski quotes Jephson a few times, but he was not inspired by 
his political views. Jephson was not a well-known scholar. His work was 
noticed at the time—and one of the heroes of the book, Liberal Prime 
Minister William Gladstone, wrote a review—31 but Jephson was not an 
academic or an influential politician, and his work has been almost for-
gotten since. Historians have only occasionally referred to him, and his 
political views do not seem to have made an impression. His book is not 
important for its role in a historiographical debate, but it was a sure sign of 
the times, an expression of the prevalent liberal and democratic spirit. The 
1880s were not only the years of debate about the Caucus but also the 
years of intense general public discussion about politics. For a moment, it 
seemed certain that democracy would engender a massive and also serious 
popular interest in politics.
Ostrogorski did not really take this interest seriously because he thought 
that it was only a superficial lust for entertainment, comparable to sports 
or music halls. It is true that the ‘theatre of politics’ attracted a lot of atten-
tion, but this was more than just entertainment alone. The wide ramifica-
tions of the ‘duel’ between the Liberal leader William Gladstone and the 
Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli and the broadening of the suffrage 
gave many people the impression that there really was a choice to be made. 
People followed politics as if they were following a sports game, but this 
also meant that they were really interested in the issues at stake and knew 
something about them.32 The prestige of parliamentary politics added 
to the attraction of politics. People everywhere were copying the parlia-
mentary model of politics in order to be able to participate themselves. 
Around 1880, ‘mock’ or ‘local parliaments’ mushroomed. They meticu-
lously imitated the procedures of Parliament and discussed the issues that 
were debated there. Some of the London local parliaments comprised 
more than a thousand members, and they enthusiastically engaged in the 
debates, either as public in the ‘galleries’, as ‘Speaker’ or as ministers or 
front benchers. Historians have mainly concentrated on the socializing 
and educational functions of the local parliaments.33 Ostrogorski also 
saw them as a form of ‘political education’, although this useful role was, 
according to him, somewhat jeopardized by the theatricality of it all.34 For 
a few years, however, the local parliament movement promised to become 
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much more than that. According to a thorough overview of the movement 
in 1883, it was ‘the newest and most important factor of public opinion 
which has appeared in recent years’.35 Its advocates were convinced that 
it would become a sort of organized democratic public opinion in action 
influencing Parliament, more or less what Jephson thought the Platform 
would do.
It did not happen, and in the 1890s, the political ambitions of the local 
parliament movement evaporated quickly. However, the attempt at popu-
larizing parliamentary forms in order to give a voice to the people appealed 
to a lot of people. In an often-quoted phrase, Joseph Chamberlain pre-
sented the meetings of the National Liberal Federation as the manifes-
tation ‘of what will be a really Liberal Parliament outside the Imperial 
Legislature [the House of Commons], and, unlike it, elected by universal 
suffrage’.36 Certainly in Britain, parliament was a much more prestigious 
and popular model than party organization as such. It enhanced the pres-
tige of the Caucus if it could be presented as a modern form of parliament. 
But parliamentary forms of debating were then popular in other coun-
tries as well, in particular when adjusted to mass meetings. Even among 
German socialists, who lived in a country with a much less impressive 
parliament and had the most impressive party organization that existed in 
Europe, ‘a widespread consensus demanded that public meetings should 
proceed in a “parliamentary” manner’. This meant that the public should 
decide who would chair the assembly, what the agenda would be and 
how much time would be allotted to each speaker.37 The attraction of 
socialism in Germany was based on the power of collective action, but at 
first, this power was felt most strongly in free debates in mass meetings.38 
Democracy was attractive because it showed that it mattered what ordi-
nary people thought and said. It was active participation that mattered, 
not just agreeing with bureaucratic leadership or being member of a for-
mal, institutionalized organization.
So Chamberlain simply had to argue that his Caucus was a form of 
real participation, expressing popular opinion instead of manufacturing 
it: ‘It cannot be too strongly insisted on that the caucus does not make 
opinion, it only expresses it’.39 Even though the Caucus seemed to outsid-
ers to be a form of ‘disciplined control of a mass electorate by a tightly 
organized party apparatus’,40 and even though the executive power of the 
board dominated in practice, it was conceived as a democratic organiza-
tion in the first place. That was the only possible way because it lacked 
the resources it would have needed to organize the powerful Machine 
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Ostrogorski thought it was. Ironically, it also drew heavily on the experi-
ence of leagues and associations such as the National Education League 
that Ostrogorski had presented as its opposite and as the alternative that 
would be the remedy for the cynicism and materialism of the Caucus.41
The question was, however, what democracy meant in practical poli-
tics and for the administration of the country. For Chamberlain, this was 
simple. It was the rule of the majority instead of aristocratic and oligarchic 
minorities. The purpose of this majority, he felt, was not popular participa-
tion as such but to get things done.42 In this sense, majority rule could be 
used as a legitimation for populist and Caesarist leadership and as a tool 
of executive government. Chamberlain would have liked to use the new 
organization in this way. His National Liberal Federation incorporated 
two seemingly incompatible things at the same time: an ‘autocratic elec-
toral “machine”’ and a ‘democratic assembly’.43 These were the two most 
common conceptions of democracy at the time, but most people thought 
that it was the one or the other.
max Weber and The domeSTicaTion of democracy
Jephson thought that organizational structures would help to give the 
democratic assemblies of the Platform an even more important role. 
According to Ostrogorski, organization would destroy liberty and democ-
racy. Ostrogorski argued that ‘democracy had ceased to have the sub-
stantive purpose of deliberating on the common good and had become 
a purely formal and mechanical procedure of popular endorsement’.44 
Moreover, he was a liberal rather than an unqualified democrat. He was 
certainly not in favour of a popular democracy in the sense of an unpre-
dictable participation of the common people. The practice of democratic 
deliberation had to be respectable and responsible. Ostrogorski had had 
his education as a political scientist at the liberal and conservative Institut 
d’Études Politiques (Sciences-Po) in Paris and had never distanced him-
self from the criticism of democracy that was common there. In fact, his 
ideas about wire-pullers and professional politicians were completely in 
line with what was being taught about democratic politics at Sciences-Po, 
for instance, by its founder, political scientist Émile Boutmy, who put 
Ostrogorski in touch with James Bryce and who wrote a lot about British 
and American politics.45
It was this side of his book that made the most lasting impression. 
Ostrogorski received much praise from ‘scholars and politicians, who found 
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their fears confirmed in the book’. Politicians of a number of countries used 
his book to demonstrate the dangers of the organizations of mass parties.46 
For instance, when general male suffrage and proportional representation 
were being introduced in the Netherlands around the First World War, 
Prime Minister Cort van der Linden quoted Ostrogorski in the parliamen-
tary debates, in order to show the dangers of a democracy that was not 
managed well.47 Cort van der Linden’s resigned attitude towards democ-
racy—whether you liked it or not, it would come, and you had better pre-
pare for it carefully—resembled the spirit of Max Weber in Germany. No 
doubt, his famous lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’ has contributed a lot to the 
authority of Ostrogorski. By presenting the negative images of American 
machine politics, Weber summarized what was already common knowl-
edge about American politics in Germany.48 However, he chose to derive it 
from Ostrogorski’s book, quoting him as his only and authoritative source, 
whom he also used (uncritically) to characterize British machine politics.
Most interestingly, Weber did not use Ostrogorski to denounce politi-
cal parties but to argue what positive goals they could serve: ‘Far from 
undermining democracy, party organisation made it possible’.49 If used 
appropriately, political parties could help to manage democracy. Weber 
drew in fact the logical, though somewhat cynical, conclusion from the 
analysis of the party organizations by political scientists. Most of them had 
been interested in political parties as tools of government. For Weber, this 
was their obvious purpose. At the beginning of his lecture, he had defined 
politics as ‘leadership, or the exercise of influence on the leadership, of a 
political organization, in other words a state’.50 Seen in this light, it was 
no problem that parties were instruments in the hands of politicians. On 
the contrary, parties should be efficient machines, provided the politicians 
were responsible statesmen, committed to a cause.
Weber followed Ostrogorski’s analysis of British politics that was 
much criticized in Britain itself but much more appreciated elsewhere.51 
Ostrogorski had concentrated exclusively on Britain and the United States 
because they seemed the most advanced countries in politics. Weber wrote 
to Robert Michels about the German socialist party that it was ‘outside 
the Anglo-Saxon realm, the only one which is technically fully developed’. 
He thought that in socialist parties, the bureaucratic apparatus would 
(and should) eventually prevail over ideology too.52 He was implicitly sup-
ported by the socialist leader August Bebel who wrote in 1911 to his 
Austrian colleague Victor Adler: ‘There is little trace of the old willingness 
to make sacrifices. Today all services are to be paid, and paid well at that’.53
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This was exactly what Michels was arguing, albeit for different purposes. 
While Michels was pessimistic because he wanted to defend direct democ-
racy against party bureaucracy, Weber was trying to domesticate democ-
racy. Michels’s work could, however, be used to support the point Weber 
was trying to make.54 In the first chapter of his book about ‘democratic 
aristocracy’ and ‘aristocratic democracy’, Michels argues that democracy 
by its nature tends to be fickle and changeable and that the principle of 
conservatism is stability. This was in fact the classic and ancient percep-
tion of the nature of democracy as a principle of government, which was 
only slowly changing during the nineteenth century. Weber, to whom the 
first German edition of Michels’s book was dedicated, could use Michels 
(and Ostrogorski) to argue that democracy needed an elite or a certain 
aristocratic element that could stabilize and manage it. In his final book, 
Modern Democracies (1921), James Bryce reached the same conclusion. 
As Michels proudly notes in the second edition of his book, Bryce was 
praising him. However, on the same page, Bryce wrote that ‘organization 
is essential for the accomplishment of any purpose’ and that it would be 
absurd ‘to attempt to govern a country by the votes of masses left with-
out control’. The people were fit to express what they did not want, but 
government ‘By the People’ was impossible; the best one could get was 
government ‘For the People’.55
concluSion
Even though Ostrogorski and Michels were critical of political parties, 
leading political scientists such as Weber and Bryce used their work to 
argue that democracy needed guidance, and could be guided, by party 
organizations in particular. They interpreted organization as an instru-
ment of government, not as an instrument of protest against government 
politics. Political organization could be used to domesticate democracy. 
That was the correct way to use political parties and that is why their 
interest in parties was rather one dimensional. The organizational side of 
the parties was almost the only thing that interested them. Ostrogorski 
had realized that a modern party was not only an instrument in the hands 
of its leaders but also a cultural community. However, he saw only draw-
backs: noise, superficial entertainment and amusement for the masses or 
an oppressive ‘church’ with a ‘religion’ of its own.56 Weber wrote that 
the sophisticated organization of the German socialist party was akin to 
the elaborate machine of American parties, but he knew, of course, that 
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the socialists also had a ‘Weltanschauung’.57 However, that was not what 
interested him in the first place, and he thought that the machine would 
prevail over the ideology anyhow. Significantly, Milhaud, the biographer 
of German socialist party life, was seen as ‘plutôt un historien du mou-
vement social’, which suggests that his type of analysis was still seen as 
belonging to social history instead of political science.58
Michels advocated direct democracy, but his book is much more about 
the leaders and the party elite than about the followers and the voters. 
Nevertheless, he writes about socialism as a sort of family tradition, which 
was inherited and passed on from father to son, as a form of cultural iden-
tity.59 That was not what interested Weber in the first place, but seen in 
this light, the party could even be useful as an ideological and moral com-
munity. In due course, this aspect of parties would be seen as an essential 
strength of socialist and other established democratic parties as opposed to 
the Caucus Ostrogorski was describing.60 By the 1960s, Lipset was argu-
ing that the ‘uncritical permanent loyalty to parties, akin to religious affili-
ation, that Ostrogorski bemoaned, may also be viewed as contributing to 
the stability of the democratic process’.61
The condition was, of course, that these parties were pillars of gov-
ernment. In such a situation, democratic participation would serve gov-
ernment and administration. On the one hand, political parties offered 
professional politicians the necessary support to do their work; on the 
other, identification with the party gave citizens the conviction that their 
(stable) choice mattered. Around 1900, however, scholars still doubted 
whether the new parties could fulfil that role. They first wanted to be 
sure that the ‘organization’ would be directed in the right direction. Seen 
from the perspective of established politics, this was the main issue, and 
this explains not only why prominent scholars were interested in organiza-
tion but also why exactly these scholars achieved a worldwide reputation. 
Democratic participation was unpredictable, unless guided by a strong 
organization that was part of established politics.
After the Second World War, mass parties had become pillars of gov-
ernment, and it was an important part of their work to bridge the gap 
between government and society. They should be part of the state as 
well as of civil society. Today, scholars note the disappearance of this lat-
ter part of the job and conclude that parties have become parts of the 
state.62 Seen in this light, party organization has been directed at integrat-
ing the people into the political system and administrating the state, but 
this is a twentieth-century story. If we revisit the nineteenth century and 
 H. TE VELDE
 reconsider the early history of parties in relation to the earlier develop-
ment of the species of single-issue movements, we get another picture.63 
Then, organization was an instrument for opposition, for people who 
advocated a radical change of society and the state. ‘Organization’ did 
not yet hold a promise for professional politicians in search of a stable 
basis but for common people and for new men and women who wanted 
to right a wrong in society.
It was only in the course of the twentieth century that political parties 
became inextricably intertwined with the state. Around 1900, political 
‘organization’ was not new at all in Europe but the idea that a political 
party machine would become part of the state was. Here lies the origin of 
the eventual teleological analysis of the party as a bridge between society 
and the state, a means to integrate the population into the nation state and 
the starting point of ‘real’ political organization. That was the twentieth- 
century outcome, but the nineteenth century tells a much more varied story.
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